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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In April 2010 the responsibility for law and order in Northern Ireland was transferred back 
from Westminister to Stormont, thereby ending a 38 year long period of Westminister control. 
The Alliance Party leader, David Ford is expected to take the office as the first Northern Irish 
Justice Minister in almost 40 years. He was the preferred choice of the provinces two largest 
party’s, Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). This created some discontent 
among the two minor parties in Stormont’s four party coalition government, the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), who felt that one 
of their representatives should have been considered.1 
 If we go back 40 years, when the troubles in Northern Ireland began, the political 
situation was quite different. Then, the province had in reality only one main party, and that 
was the Ulster Unionist Party. The UUP had governed alone since the birth of the Northern 
Irish state. During this period the Catholic community had very little political influence. This 
would all change when the Catholic community, tired of being on the outside, mounted a civil 
rights campaign to demand more influence in Northern Ireland in the late 1960’s. The 
campaign would lead to the creation of both the SDLP and the Alliance Party, and was an 
intrinsic part of the process which led to the suspension of the Stormont parliament, and 
decades of violence. 
Subject outline and previous research  
”I do not think a future historian of Londonderry will look back on 1968 as the year of disturbances, but as the 
year of the area plan”2 
Terence O`Neill 
The Northern Irish Prime Minister Terence O’Neill’s predictions would turn out to be quite 
wrong. The historical writing about Northern Ireland has often focused on religious and 
political conflict. Plenty of books have been written about the violence that has plagued the 
provinces, yet, for the most of the time since the creation of Northern Ireland in 1921 and up 
to the late 1960’s, the province had been at peace. Up to the late 1960’s there was indeed little 
violence, and because of this the civil rights campaign has been regarded as the starting point 
of the period of violence.3 The civil rights campaign began its journey with the establishment 
                                                 
1
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2
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of the Campaign for Civil Justice (CSJ) in 1964.4 Yet, it would take 4 years before the 
campaign would get international attention.  
Since the civil rights campaign is seen as the starting point of ‘the troubles’, as it is 
usually referred to in Northern Ireland, the movement itself has been thoroughly explored. My 
focus will be on a different aspect of that period, which has not been given the same amount 
of attention. In my master thesis I will explore and discuss how the civil rights movement 
influenced the process that led to direct rule in 1972, by analysing how the Unionist Party and 
different unionist politicians perceived the civil rights movement. In order to analyse the 
unionist perception I will also have to explore the loyalist perception of the civil rights 
movement.  
‘Unionist’ and ‘loyalist’ are terms that are used on different political positions within 
the Protestant population in Northern Ireland, and the clash between these positions was one 
of the main conflicts in the period of which I write. The meaning of these labels will be 
explained later in this chapter. The main questions of this master thesis will be presented, after 
I have explained why and how my project can contribute with new and relevant information 
in relation to the existing literature. To explain why my project will represent a new approach, 
I will present some books and authors that illustrate the dominant approaches in the research 
field. 
 Since the civil rights movement is seen as the beginning of ‘the troubles’, the origins 
of the movement is well documented. The motives of the movement as been much debated, 
and in my “303 paper” I explored the different explanations concerning the development of 
the civil rights movement. One explanation is that the civil rights campaign started because of 
the emergence of a new well educated Catholic middle class, and their demands of equal 
rights.5  
Another explanation is presented by Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson in 
the book Northern Ireland 1921-1994. Bew, Gibbon and Patterson say that the emergence of 
the larger Catholic middle class is not a sufficient explanation of the origins of the civil rights 
movement. They say that the growth in the middle class was accompanied by a growth in the 
lower sections of the Catholic community. This section would make up the majority in the 
civil rights movement, and because of this, the growth of the lower classes must be included 
in the explanation of the civil rights movement.6 
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  A third explanation claims that the civil rights movement was a republican conspiracy 
to overthrow the state. In a series of articles in The British Journal of Sociology, Christopher 
Hewitt presents his view that the civil rights movements claims of discrimination was 
severely exaggerated, and that this could not be the real reason for the emergence of the civil 
rights movement.7 Instead he contends that civil rights campaign was only a new way to 
express the same old nationalism.8 
 In addition to the origins of the civil rights movement, the movement itself has been 
well explored. Bob Purdie’s book, Politics in the street, contains a detailed analysis of the 
origin and actions of the civil rights movement. It also touches upon the conflict between the 
unionist Prime Minister Terence O’Neill, and the loyalist leader Ian Paisley, and how this 
conflict limited O’Neill’s room for manoeuvre.9 But the conflict within the Unionist Party is 
however given little focus. This if for example demonstrated when Purdie only refers to the 
statement from the Minister of Home Affairs William Craig, after the civil rights march in 
Derry on the 5th of October 1968.10 And after the civil rights march from Belfast to Derry in 
January 1969, Purdie presents the views of O’Neill and the Minister of Development, Brian 
Faulkner, in a way that make it seem as if they were in an agreement.11 As I will show in this 
master thesis, there were several points of view regarding the civil rights movement within the 
Unionist Party, and an in-depth analysis of these views is essential in order to understand the 
actions of the unionist government during the civil rights campaign.  
There are already some books that touch upon the same subject. Jonathan Tonge, 
Professor in politics at the University at Salford, writes in his book Northern Ireland, Conflict 
and Change, that the Unionist Party was split into “reformers” and “resisters” in the period 
from October 1968 and up to 1972. The “reformers” held sympathy towards some of the 
demands from the civil rights movement, while the “resisters” dismissed it as a false 
movement.12 In Tonge’s book, the subject is however touched upon only briefly, and it is as 
such not a completely adequate analysis of the relationship between the civil rights movement 
and the unionists. The historian Thomas Hennessey has a more in-depth analyse of the 
situation in his book, A History of Northern Ireland, where he shows that there existed more 
positions than just “reformers” and “resisters” within the Unionist Party. He shows that there 
can be identified several positions within the party, and points to the difference between the 
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unionist politicians Brian Faulkner and William Craig.13 The period 1968-1972 is however 
not given much focus in his book that stretches from 1920 and up to 1996.  
The historian Marc Mulholland has an in-depth analyse of the O’Neill period in his 
book Northern Ireland at the Crossroads, which is an analysis of the premiership of Terence 
O’Neill. His focus, in the period which coincides with this thesis, is however mostly on the 
internal conflict within the Unionist Party, and not so much on how the civil rights movement 
influenced the increasing split in the party.14 His book ends with O’Neill’s resignation in 1969, 
and therefore ends long before the end of the civil rights campaign.  
My main focus will be on the unionists’ opinion of the civil rights movement as a 
theme in itself, and my master thesis will then aim to bring new insight into how the civil 
rights movement influenced the Unionist Party and the events in this very significant period in 
Northern Ireland history. I have chosen to explore the period between 1968 and 1972 because 
this was the golden era for the civil rights movement, and the period in which the unionist 
movement fell apart.    
  
Main questions 
The main questions throughout my master thesis will be: 
• How did the unionist politicians perceive the civil rights movement, and how did the 
perception change between 1968 and 1972? 
• How did the civil rights movement influence the development of the unionist 
movement and the process leading up to the suspension of the Stormont Parliament in 
March 1972? 
Through the discussion of these questions I will also analyse the following questions: 
• How did the loyalist opposition perceive the civil rights movement? 
• In what way did the loyalist perception of the civil rights movement influence the 
unionist government’s room to manoeuvre?  
 
Political and religious labels 
Since I will be using several political labels throughout the thesis, I will try to explain how 
and why I will use the different labels. The two communities in Northern Ireland have 
traditionally been labelled as Protestants and Catholics. This is not sufficient for the different 
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groups I will speak of in this master thesis. Therefore I will use additional labels to separate 
the people I write about in different groups. One particular important label I am going to use 
is ‘unionist’. There is no definitive answer to what constitutes a ‘unionist’. A ‘unionist’ will 
support the union with Great Britain, but so will a loyalist. When I use the term ‘unionist’, I 
will thus speak about a person who supported the Unionist Party during the period of which I 
write. In addition I will use two others label to classify the unionists who stood in opposition 
to the party leadership, and that will be ‘hardliner’ or ‘backbencher’. This was members of the 
Unionist Party who expressed opposition to the government’s policies, but still supported the 
Unionist Party.  
I will also use the term ‘loyalist’. A ‘loyalist’ will be used in this thesis for a person 
who regarded himself as particularly loyal to the union and Crown. A loyalist would be 
strongly opposed to the unionist government’s policies, and especially its attempt to give into 
the demands of the civil rights movement. A loyalist would also be more inclined to use non-
parliamentarian methods to make his voice heard.      
 When I use the term ‘civil rights campaigner’, it will cover a person that was a 
member in the civil rights movement. Most of the members in the movement were Catholics, 
but since the movement professed to be non-sectarian, I will use the terms ‘Catholic’ or 
‘minority’ when I speak of the Catholic community in specific, not the civil rights movement. 
 Neither of these labels are definitive labels, but they will help me to sort the different 
views in a more orderly fashion. They are not labels that could be used in all periods in 
Northern Irish history, but they will fit into the period of which I write. The labels are not my 
own. They are labels that were used by the persons themselves, and often the various groups 
used the labels on themselves to distinguish themselves from others. As far as possible I will 
try to be true to their own perception of which label they should be given.     
 
Sources 
My main sources for this thesis will be the Belfast Telegraph and parliamentary debates. The 
Belfast Telegraph is traditionally looked upon as a moderate unionist paper. The paper was a 
supporter of Terence O’Neill policies, and the paper printed ‘support O’Neill’ coupons for the 
readers to send in after a televised speech in 1968.15 I do not think that this fact will affect my 
analyse to a large degree, since I will use the paper to extract statements from the different 
politicians, and to present different events, and not the opinions of the different journalists. 
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Several speeches by the different politicians was printed in full or almost full in the period of 
which I write, and this makes the Belfast Telegraph a valuable source to explore the 
difference in opinions among the politicians. Since many of the most important debates from 
the Stormont Parliament was printed in full I will be able to check validity of what was 
printed in the Belfast Telegraph by comparing the articles with the debates themselves.  
It might be that it was more difficult for politicians that were strongly against 
O’Neill’s policies to get their opinions printed in the Belfast Telegraph. To counter this I will 
also use Ian Paisley’s newspaper, the Protestant Telegraph, a strongly loyalist newspaper, in 
which the loyalists views were freely expressed. I will use the Protestant Telegraph in a 
different way than the Belfast Telegraph. The Protestant Telegraph never tried to hide that it 
was a loyalist newspaper, and because of this I will use the paper as source to explore the 
opinions of the loyalist community.  
In addition to the newspapers I will use parliamentary debates. The debates that took 
place in the Stormont parliament between 1921 and 1972 can be found online at 
http://stormontpapers.ahds.ac.uk/index.html. These debates will be among the main sources 
for this thesis, and valuable as such since the parliament was a place where most of the 
politicians would be able to voice their opinion. Since several loyalists were elected as 
Members of Parliament during the period of which I write, I will also be able to use the 
parliamentary debates to analyse their opinions. 
I will also to a lesser degree use some political pamphlets that were published in the 
period of which I write. These will be the Unionist Party’s election manifesto, Ulster at the 
crossroads, published in 1969, the loyalist pamphlet Which way Ulster, concerning the 
governments policies towards the civil rights movement, published in 1970, and Ulster, a 
program of action, a pamphlet issued by the Northern Irish government as a response to the 
Cameron report in 1970.  With this combination I believe I will be able to get a balanced 
perception of the situation.           
 
Chapter outline 
The content in each chapter in this paper will for the most part be organised chronologically. 
With the exception of chapter four, the chapters will also be chronologically. I have chosen 
this structure because I aim to follow the development of the different opinions. Chapter four 
will explore the same period as chapter two and three, this because it will be necessary to 
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explain the difference between the unionist and loyalist point of view separately, before I 
discuss them altogether in chapter five.   
In chapter two I will look into the period from the 5th of October 1968, and up to the 
end of that year. It was from the 5th of October that the civil rights movement really made a 
name for itself, and it was in this period that violence once again started to play a role in 
Northern Ireland. Therefore, this will be my starting point. The main focus will be on the 
unionist Prime Minister Terence O’Neill, and his politics towards the civil rights movement. 
In addition I will look into the different perceptions of the civil rights movement within the 
Unionist Party.   
Chapter three will stretch from the beginning of January 1969, and up to O’Neill’s 
resignation in April 1969. The main issue will be how the civil rights movement influenced 
the events that led to O’Neill’s resignation. In addition I will explore how the perception of 
the civil rights movement changed among the unionists politicians during this period. 
Chapter four covers the same period as chapter two and three, but discusses how the 
loyalist community in Northern Ireland reacted to the civil rights campaign, and how their 
actions influenced the political situation which led to O’Neill’s resignation. My main focus 
will be on the reverend and loyalist leader Ian Paisley, but I will also include other loyalists 
that were prominent during the period leading up to O’Neill’s resignation. 
Chapter five will start with the beginning of James Chichester-Clark’s premiership, 
and stretch to the suspension of the Stormont Parliament in March 1972. This chapter will 
focus on both the unionist and loyalist fractions at the same time. In chapter six I will present 
a summary of my findings and conclusions. 
 
Historical context: The formation of the Northern Irish state 
The origins of the Northern Irish state can be found in the upheavals of the Home Rule crisis 
in Ireland of 1912-14. The nationalists of the Irish Party argued that the political Irish nation 
was co-extensive with the geographical island of Ireland, and rejected that the Protestants 
should break free and form their own nation.16  
 The Unionists in Ireland were strongly opposed to Home Rule, and the opposition was 
concentrated within the Irish Unionist Party, under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson. 
Carson spearheaded the fight against Home rule in close cooperation with James Craig. Craig 
became a Member of Parliament (MP) in 1906, and would become the first Prime Minister 
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(PM) of the newly Northern Ireland in 1921, a post he would hold until his death in 1940.17 
The names Carson and Craig would be used actively by various unionist and loyalist 
politicians in later periods as a substantiation of their claim to represent the “true unionism.”         
The result of the fight for and against Home Rule was that Northern Ireland was split, 
and a new political entity was created in Northern Ireland. 6 of the 9 counties of Ulster 
Antrim, Down, Armagh, Londonderry, Fermanagh and Tyrone, became Northern Ireland.18 
The Protestants were in a majority since the foundation of the state, and in 1971 the 
population in Northern Ireland numbered 1 536 065. Of those approximately 559 800 were 
Catholics.19 
The model of government in Northern Ireland was built on the Westminister model, 
with a first past the post voting system. This system would lead to the total dominance of the 
Unionist Party, and they would remain in control of the Stormont parliament and the 
government from the foundation of the Northern Irish parliament in 1921 to its suspension in 
1972.20 Even if the Northern Irish parliament retained a great deal of autonomy, sovereignty 
was retained in Westminister, and Westminister kept the responsibility for foreign policy, 
defence and other UK matters.21 
In 1963 Lord Brookeborough resigned after 20 years as the Prime Minister in 
Northern Ireland. He was succeeded by Terence O’Neill. O’Neill made it quickly clear that he 
was set on a reformist cause. He advocated strong cross-border economic links, and he tried to 
accommodate the political ambitions of an increasingly educated Catholic community.22 In 
1965 he surprised all with an unannounced visit of Ireland’s Prime Minister Sean Lemass. 
This trip angered the unionist right-wing, and is seen to have triggered the loyalist leader, and 
reverend Ian Paisley’s “O’Neill must go” campaign.23  
 
The political parties 
The Ulster Unionist Party 
The Unionist Party sprang out of the Irish Unionist Party, and developed an umbrella-like 
structure, in which the most important was that one had to accept that Northern Ireland should 
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remain a part of Britain. If one accepted that, there was much room for different political 
views within the party.24 The party became a left to right coalition, and drew support from all 
classes, but disproportionately from the middle class. From 1921 and up to 1972 the unionists 
held up to 40 of the 52 seats in the Stormont parliament.25 The governing body of the Unionist 
Party is the Ulster Unionist Council. The Council meets annually to elect the party leader and 
officers, but do not decide the party’s policies.26  
 
The Nationalist Party 
The Nationalist Party grew out of the Irish Parliamentary Party. For much of its existence it 
was a locally based party with much clerical influence. The National Party was the main 
vehicle for anti-partition politics until the civil rights campaign.27 Because of the dominance 
of the Unionist Party, the party remained on the sideline. The party lacked organisation, and 
until the 1960s it was without headquarters, political manifesto and professional staff.28 In the 
1960’s its leader, Eddie McAteer tried to give it a more radical image and a constituency 
based organisation, but the civil rights movement developing at the same time would prove to 
have a more popular appeal.29 
 
The Northern Ireland Labour Party    
The Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) adopted a policy of neutrality on the border issue, 
but failed to attract sufficient support to make a mark in Northern Irish politics. In 1949 the 
party decided to formally recognise the union with Great Britain. At first this lead to a fall in 
support, but the party made a small recovery in the 1950s. In the 1960s, when the 
constitutional issue was not as dominating as before, the party increased its support. The 
election system nullified the increasing support however, and the votes did not transfer to 
increased parliamentary representation.30 Many of its members became actively involved in 
the civil rights movement. 
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The Social Democratic and Labour Party 
The Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) was founded on the 21st of August 1970 and 
would absorb most of the Nationalist Party’s supporters. The SDLP grew out of the civil 
rights campaign, and three of the seven founders had been prominent in the civil rights 
movement.31 The party quickly became one of the most important political forces in Northern 
Ireland. The party was a left-of-centre party.32  
 
The Alliance Party 
The Alliance Party was formed in April 1970, and attracted most of its support from unionists 
that had supported Terence O’Neill, and felt that the Alliance Party better represented their 
outlook. It tried to attract support from both sides of the community.33 
 
Organisations and movements 
Loyal orders 
The Orange Order was the largest Protestant organisation in Northern Ireland, formed in 1795. 
The order arranges the annual twelfth of July demonstrations in remembrance of King 
William’s victory over King James at the Battle of Boyne in 1690. The effective beginning of 
the Unionist Party came after a meeting of seven Orangemen. The Unionist Party had a close 
relationship with the Order, often with overlapping membership.34 
 In addition to the Orange Order, the Apprentice Boys is another important 
organisation within the loyal orders. The Apprentice boys is a loyal organisation set up in 
memory of the apprentice boys who shut the gates of Derry when the Catholic King James 
was approaching the city with an army in 1688. This led to the siege of Derry which lasted for 
105 days. The event is commemorated annually.35      
 
The New Ulster movement 
The New Ulster movement developed in early 1969 to urge moderation and non-sectarianism 
in politics and to press for reforms. It was among the first groups to call for a community 
relations commission, a central housing executive and the abolition of the B-Specials. In 1971 
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it proposed power sharing in government, and later that year it called for the suspension of the 
Stormont Parliament. Many of its members became active in the Alliance Party.36 
 
Ulster Vanguard 
Ulster Vanguard was a pressure group within unionism. It was led by William Craig, and 
established when the possibility of direct rule came up in 1972. Its purpose was to provide an 
umbrella organisation for loyalists.37        
 
The Civil Rights Movement 
The civil rights movement was not a single organisation, but many groups fighting for the 
same goal. Since my focus is not on the civil rights movement itself, I will for the most part 
classify all the different groups under the label ‘the civil rights movement’ when I speak of it. 
   The first civil rights group is regarded to be the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) was 
founded on the 17th of January 1964. It grew out the Homeless Citizens League, which had 
been founded to protest over poor housing conditions and discrimination in housing allocation. 
CSJ would stand in opposition to what they perceived as discrimination and apartheid 
implemented by the Stormont government.38 The organisation was built up of people drawn 
mainly from the Catholic middle class. The objective of the group was equal rights within the 
UK, although most of the members also aspired towards Irish unity. The group managed to 
get Harold Wilson to say that a Labour government would intervene to deal with 
discrimination.39 CSJ wanted to collect data on justice and fight discrimination in employment, 
housing electoral practices, political boundaries and public appointments.40 
 The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was formed on the 29th of 
January 1967.41 NICRA was the best known civil rights group, and the most important group 
within the civil rights movement. NICRA initiated the events that would lead to the creation 
of a mass movement. For a time it acted as an umbrella, under which the other civil rights 
groups could come together under.42 Even if the organisation was formed in 1967, its main 
impact came after the launch of the first civil rights protest in 1968.43 
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 The objectives of NICRA were to defend the basic freedoms of all citizens, to protect 
the rights of the individual, to highlight all possible abuses of power; to demand guarantees 
for freedom of speech, assembly and association, and to inform the public of their lawful 
rights.44 To achieve this they demanded: one-man, one-vote in local elections; the ending of 
gerrymandering of electoral boundaries; prevention of discrimination by public authorities; 
fair allocation of public housing; repeal of the Special Powers Act, and the disbandment of the 
special force the B-Specials.45 Since I will be using many of these terms throughout this paper, 
I will define some of them here. 
The definition of Gerrymandering is according to Merriam-Webster online dictionary: 
to divide (a territorial unit) into election districts to give one political party an electoral majority in a 
large number of districts while concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as 
possible.46 
There were examples where the electoral boundaries were gerrymandered in Northern Ireland. 
In Derry for example the unionists controlled 60% of the seats, with just 23.1% of the vote.47 
The local government franchise had democratic weaknesses, as it gave a small number of 
property owners more than one vote, while a large number of adults had no vote. This 
happened since the franchise was organised to give the vote to property owners or tenants, or 
the spouses of these. This meant that lodgers, or grown up children living at home had no vote 
at local elections.48    
 The B-Special was a part of Ulster Special Constabularies, and was built up by part 
time officers that operated in their own locality. Their numbers averaged between 11 000 and 
12 000, and its members were almost exclusively drawn from the Protestant population, 
where many had come from the ranks of the loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF).49 
 The Special Powers Act was one of the first acts passed in the Northern Irish 
parliament. The act gave the Minister of Home Affairs the authority to take all steps necessary 
to preserve law and order. The act gave the minister the power to ban meetings and 
publications, and to intern people without trail.50 The act said that “If any person does any act 
of such a nature as to be calculated to be prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or 
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maintenance of order in Northern Ireland and not specifically provided for in the regulations 
he shall be deemed guilty of an offence against the regulations.”51         
The first civil rights march took place on the 24th of August 1968. The march was 
arranged by NICRA, and the protesters walked from Coalisland to Dungannon. NICRA 
refused the demand from the police that they should only march through the Catholic area, 
since that would imply that it was a sectarian march. Ian Paisley’s Ulster Protestant 
Volunteers arranged a counter demonstration, and when some of the protesters tried to attack 
the counter-protesters they were beaten back by the police. The civil rights leaders called for 
restraint from the marchers, and reminded them that they were there to protest for civil 
rights.52 
The first civil rights march was a rather peaceful affair, at least in comparison with the 
troubles that were to ensue. The next civil rights march on the 5th of October 1968 would 
prove to have a much larger significance, and was in some ways the beginning of the end of 
Stormont parliament.      
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CHAPTER TWO: ESCALATION AND RECONCILIATION: 
OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1968  
October 1968 was in many ways a watershed in the history of Northern Ireland. Once again 
violence was to play a big role in the six counties of Ulster. Rather ironically the violence 
started after the IRA had called a ceasefire after the failure of the 1950’s campaign, and the 
Catholic community came together to demand equal rights with peaceful means. The civil 
rights campaign for reform forced the crystallization of political positions within the unionist 
party. The party’s political structure fell apart as the civil rights movement forced the unionist 
politicians to take a stand on reforms.  
In this chapter I will concentrate on three of the different points of views within the 
party, illustrated through the Prime Minister Terence O’Neill, the Minister of Home Affairs 
William Craig and the Minister of Development Brian Faulkner. I have chosen these three 
because they all had important positions in the party in the period between October and 
December 1968, and because their views were shared by many other unionists. The period I 
will look into in this chapter will be from the 5th of October and up to the end of December 
1968. I will discuss the following questions: 
• How did the unionist politicians perceive the civil rights movement complaints? 
• How the civil rights movement influence and change the Unionist Party from the civil 
rights march on the 5th of October and up to the end of the year?  
• What did the unionist politicians think of the movement’s method of protest? What 
different opinions might be identified about the movement?    
 
THE PATH TOWARDS THE CROSSROAD 
Above all else, at this critical moment we want a pause, a period of calm, an interval of restraint in word and 
action.53 
Terence O’Neill 
The period between the 5th of October and 31st of December 1968 was the golden era for the 
civil rights movement. They managed to attract international attention to the situation in 
Northern Ireland, and civil rights moved to the top of the politician’s agenda.   
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The riots in Derry 
The plea from Terence O’Neill, presented above, would fall on deaf ears. After the civil rights 
campaigners had attracted international attention, they would not easily give it up before they 
achieved their goals. The 5th of October was one of the highpoints of the civil rights campaign; 
but it was also the beginning of the end of the movement. What was supposed to be a peaceful 
civil rights march in Derry, developed into a confrontation between about 2000 protesters and 
the police.54 The civil rights march had been banned by the Minister of Home Affairs William 
Craig, which led to serious rioting. The media broadcasted the images of the police batoning 
the protesters.55 Once the seed of violence had been planted, the growth could not easily be 
stopped. Alongside the violence, however, came publicity and the civil rights movement 
attracted international attention. The unionist party could not ignore the movement, since the 
British and international press portrayed an image of a suppressed minority and a repressive 
government who had ruled for 40 years.  
 As most other unionists, the Prime Minister Terence O’Neill laid the blame for the 
riots in Derry on the civil rights protesters themselves.  He said that the trouble in Derry 
began when people decided they could choose which laws they would observe and which they 
would flout.56 He claimed that he for the last five years had tried to improve relations between 
the two sections of the community. What happened the previous week had certainly set his 
efforts back, he admitted, but he still believed that the situation could be turned around. But if 
the violence and disorder were to continue, O’Neill said it would lead to the collapse of “the 
slender bridges men of goodwill” had built. And if these bridges were to fall it would take 
years to rebuild them, he claimed.57 O’Neill did acknowledge the seriousness of the situation 
after the riots in Derry and feared they could damage his effort to renew the Northern Irish 
society, but what did he think of the accusations from the civil rights movement at this time?         
O’Neill said in an interview that it was a fact that the election system in Northern 
Ireland was the same system as in all the other parts of the United Kingdom up to 1948. 
People might not like it, but the system was based upon firm electoral support of a majority.58 
The local government franchise was already under review. The job would be big and take a 
long time, but the government was genuine in their desire to undertake long lasting reform, he 
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argued. 59 In other words, this shows that O’Neill was willing to at least consider changing the 
local government franchise, but he did not see much wrong in the government’s actions.  
O’Neill painted a picture of a government which had done much good for Northern 
Ireland. What had been presented by the civil rights movement as years of stagnation, had in 
fact been years of immense economic and social progress. The government had, according to 
O’Neill, not only accepted desirable change, but urged it. But he warned the civil rights 
movement that the violence had to end because if those who sought to impose changes 
through violence or other forms of coercion were to continue, they would most likely alienate 
the majority of the people. The place for politics was in parliament not in the streets he argued. 
Disorder was the way, not to equal rights, but to an equal share of misery and despair.60 This 
seems to indicate that O’Neill felt that he already had made the necessary changes, and that 
the reforms were already well underway. It is also clear that he did not think much of the 
methods of protest the civil rights movement used to get their message through.   
 On the 15th of October, the Derry disturbances were discussed in Stormont. Here the 
Prime Minister asked the house to accept that the decision to ban the march had been made on 
the advice of the police and in the interest of preserving public order. O’Neill said that the 
tragedy was that the organisers were not prepared to accept a decision taken in the widest 
public interest. By breaking the ban, the protesters had come in conflict with the law and in 
that situation the law had to be upheld.61 For O’Neill the maintenance of peace and order 
came before any other responsibilities.  
Concerning the causes for the widespread resentment since the events in Derry, 
O’Neill laid the blame on a distorted and unbalanced presentation of public affairs in 
Northern Ireland. The picture of a country which had shirked its responsibilities in areas such 
as housing and employment and where the Roman Catholic community were victims of 
widespread discrimination in almost every way, were wrong. O’Neill said that he did not only 
resent that portrayal, he repudiated it. 62  When speaking about the accusations of 
discrimination from the civil rights movement, O’Neill said that the allegations of 
discrimination of non-unionist were widely untrue and could not be substantiated. 2300 new 
government jobs in Derry and nine factories were evidence of the number one priority status 
of the city. These were jobs for all, not just unionists.  
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He also repudiated the claims of discrimination in the allocation of public houses. 
600 000 of the population were accommodated in post-war housing and according to O’Neill, 
everybody knew that the minority were occupying a substantial portion of those houses. He 
did, however, accept that the provision of adequate housing was one of the most pressing 
social needs, and that no single factor could do more to reduce tension and improve the 
condition of life .63 It seems as if O’Neill agreed with the civil rights movement that there was 
challenges to deal with in Northern Ireland, but he did not regard them to stem from 
discrimination against Catholics. Still he thought that something had to be done to stop the 
now further escalating discontent within the Catholic community.  
The support for the civil rights movement was great among Catholics. This can be 
seen when the Derry Citizens Action Committee (DCAC) staged a new civil rights march in 
Derry, and about 15 000 took part in a following sit-down protest.64 The Nationalist Party also 
adopted a policy of non-violent civil disobedience, and reaffirmed the party’s dedication to 
the ideal of social justice for all, irrespective of creed or class.65 The support for the new 
methods of protest was growing, and it would not take long before the Prime Minister O’Neill 
would try to remove some of the grievances of the civil rights campaigners.   
  
Towards reform and the five-point plan 
In a statement issued after an emergency meeting of the cabinet, O’Neill declared that a 
period of cooling down and restraint were absolutely essential to get the situation back to 
normal. He assured the civil rights campaigners that the government was closely examining 
the underlying causes for the disorder, and that further commotion and riots in the street 
would only serve to anarchy.66 In the statement O’Neill again asserted that the right of all 
citizens depended first and foremost upon respect for the law and the maintenance of public 
order. Everybody had a duty to deal with lawful constituted authorities in the maintenance of 
order. Further violence would risk not only the safety of one section of the community, but 
the safety of all.67 The law and order aspect was essential for the unionist politicians, and 
would be repeated many times during the civil rights campaign. 
With pressure from the streets and from the British government it was clear the 
O’Neill had to make some reforms, but the resistances from within his own party against 
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reforms were strong. O’Neill’s ability to implement reforms would be a stern test of his 
leadership, and since there were many unionist backbenchers who would dismiss the reforms 
simply one the basis that it gave the impression of a Government who gave in to pressure 
from the British and the street demonstrators in Derry, it would subsequently be hard for 
O’Neill to get trough reforms that would satisfy all sections.68 
The reforms were presented on the 22nd of November. They dealt with the most 
pressuring grievances of the civil rights movement. The business vote in local elections were 
abolished, and the local government franchise were to be reformed within three years, Fair 
allocation of houses were promised, and an ombudsman to investigate grievances arising out 
of central government administration were to be appointed. The Special Powers Act were also 
to be reviewed, and the Derry City Council was to be superseded by the Development 
Commission.69 In a statement the Government gave assurances that it was their intention to 
deal with any valid criticism of administration, however marginal such criticisms might be.70 
With this statement it seems as if the government felt that the criticism was marginal.  
The reforms received no immediately cheers from the civil rights movement. The civil 
rights organisation, the Derry Citizens Action Committee (DCAC), said that they would 
continue their struggle until the demand of one-man, one-vote had been achieved. The DCAC 
welcomed the government’s proposals in principle, but they criticized their vagueness and the 
cabinet’s total failure to tackle the issue of the local government franchise at the present time. 
The DCAC said that they regarded the local government franchise to be the root cause of the 
problems in Northern Ireland.71 The Northern Irish Civil Rights Association (NICRA) said 
that the reforms would do little to remove the evils which existed in the community. They 
could not accept the five-point plan as a genuine basis for reform. They called the proposal for 
reform a surrender to the right-wing of the government party. The allocation of houses was 
still left in the hands of the local authorities, they claimed, and an ombudsman without any 
power was virtually useless. They accepted the Derry area plan as the most radical of the five 
proposals; they welcomed the abolition of the business vote. But real reform in this area, 
NICRA argued, would be the introduction of universal adult franchise. NICRA also said that 
the statement on the Special Powers Act were in the nature of a confidence trick.72 Judging 
from the statements from DCAC and NICRA it did look like the reforms were not enough to 
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appease the civil rights movement, but O’Neill’s next move would bring about a fragile 
period of peace before Christmas 1968.   
                     
Ulster at the crossroads 
After the five-point plan for reform had got a lukewarm reception, O’Neill decided to speak 
directly to the people in a televised speech which went a long way in taking the heat out of the 
situation. O’Neill asked what kind of Ulster one wanted, a happy respected province or a 
place torn apart by riots and demonstrations. He said that the following days and weeks would 
decide the future of Northern Ireland.73 In Derry and other places a small minority of agitators, 
determined to subvert lawful authorities, had played a part in setting fire to highly 
inflammable material, he claimed. But he also admitted that the tinder for that fire, in the form 
of grievances real or imaginary had been piling up for years.74 This statement suggest that 
O’Neill was not ready to accept all of the accusations from the civil rights movement, yet he 
seems to acknowledge that it did not matter if the allegations were real or not, since the 
minority’s feeling of wrongdoing produced the same result as if the allegations had been true. 
It is also clear that he believed that there was a section of the civil rights movement who had 
sinister motives. He said to the protesters that their voice had been heard, and clearly heard. 
Their duty was to play their part in taking the heat out of the situation before blood were 
shed.75 The changes the government had announced were, according to O’Neill, genuine and 
far-reaching and the government as a whole was totally committed to them. He said that he 
would not lead a government who would water them down or make them meaningless.76 The 
speech was an attempt to sooth as many as possible. O’Neill said that he would deal with the 
complaints of the civil rights movement, but he also made it clear that he would not jeopardise 
the connection with Great Britain.  
Even though O’Neill did accept that reforms were necessary, it does look as if he did 
not fully support the claims of discrimination. Speaking to the parliament he said that public 
clamour did not always mean that the change demanded was justifiable, but if those demands 
could be met without any damage or danger to the community, the best thing would be to give 
them sympathetic consideration.77 This coupled with his use of the phrase “real or imaginary” 
when he spoke of the allegations in the “crossroads speech” indicates that he found the 
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allegations imaginary. He argued that the only restriction to human rights in Northern Ireland 
were those needed in order to protect all the people. According to O’Neill, the descriptions of 
Ulster of late had been unfair, and the lack of balance was evident to all.78 It does indeed look 
like O’Neill’s determination to implement reforms did not stem from a belief of wrongdoings 
against the Catholics, but more from the belief that it would cause trouble if he did nothing. 
O’Neill looked upon himself as a moderniser, and he thought that Northern Ireland was a 
somewhat backward society. He was therefore willing to initiate reform. The decision was not 
taken because he accepted the claims of discrimination, but stemmed from a belief that it 
would in the end benefit the society.    
In O’Neill’s opinion he had put the choice to the people, and they had answered with 
overwhelming support.79 And it did indeed look like O’Neill had weathered the storm. The 
Belfast Telegraph wrote in mid-December 1968, that O’Neill had resisted the immediate 
challenge to his leadership. This had not been done not without a cost, however further 
changes to the local government franchise would bring the discontent from the backbenchers 
back to the surface.80  
After the “crossroad speech” O’Neill received what the Belfast Telegraph described as 
massive support. The paper printed a ‘support O’Neill’ coupon, and asked the readers to send 
them in if they supported O’Neill.81 Two days later over 60 000 had expressed their support 
for O’Neill’s reform friendly policies. 82  Riding on a wave of support, O’Neill used the 
opportunity to fire William Craig from his minister post as Minister of Home Affairs. He said 
that the reason for Craig’s dismissal was Craig’s attraction to ideas of an UDI (Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence) nature. O’Neill said that Craig’s belief that Ulster could go 
alone was a delusion and he believed that all sensible people would see it so.83 The dismissal 
of Craig would however cause problems for O’Neill in the time to come. 
 At the one hand O’Neill had members of his own party who thought the reforms 
given were more than enough, and on the other hand he had the civil rights movement who 
would not leave the streets before one-man, one-vote had been granted. Still at Christmas time 
1968 it looked as if the situation had cooled down. 
As I have pointed out, while O’Neill was trying to appease the civil rights movement, 
he also had to fend off critics from within the Unionist Party. We will now turn our attention 
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to this opposition represented here by William Craig and Brian Faulkner. How did they react 
to the civil rights movement from the march in Derry on the 5th October, and what did they 
think of O’Neill’s effort to cool the situation down up to Christmas 1968?   
                         
THE OPPOSITION FROM WITHIN: OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1968 
At the same time as O’Neill had to try to appease the civil rights movement his policies faced 
opposition from within his own party. On the 4th of July 1968 the Minister of Home Affairs 
William Craig said this to the members of parliament: “By all means pursue your ideals, but 
once you overstep the rule of law, once you neglect the proper democratic procedure, you can 
expect little sympathy from anyone who believes in democracy.”84 William Craig decided to 
ban the civil rights march in Derry, with the reasoning that it would likely clash with the 
announced Apprentice Boys march, a Protestant group. But it is also clear that Craig did not 
support the movement’s right to march in Derry at all. On the 4th of October he said that 
contrary to usual practice, the civil rights movement proposed to move into an area which by 
tradition had long been agreed that they did not move into. Even if the Apprentice Boys were 
marching or not, Craig said that he would have to look at the public order aspect as a 
nationalist march would provoke extreme annoyance.85 He went on to say that “The civil 
rights marchers will have plenty of room elsewhere. If they want to hold meetings it would be 
proper for them to have them in their own quarters.”86 This was probably the traditional 
unionist view, but it did not fit well with O’Neill’s new policy, and was of course not 
acceptable for the civil rights marchers, who professed to be non sectarian. Also the Derry 
Labour Party stated that the citizens of Derry had a right to march through their own town.87 
 After the march, Craig denied the allegations of police brutality. He said that if the 
march had been allowed, they would have had riots on a scale that would have carried them 
back to the foundation of the state.88 He said that the protesters had received no provocation 
from the police, rather they had been treated with a tolerance that some would think of as 
undeserved.89 It seems that William Craig in general believed that the civil rights movement 
way of protest in Northern Ireland had no place in a democratic society. 
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Craig never attempted to hide his feelings towards the civil rights movement. Right 
from the start Craig proclaimed that the IRA was involved in the movement. On the 16th of 
October he asked the members of parliament to deplore the actions of the civil rights 
participants after the march in Derry. He said that it was clear that some elements were trying 
to create riot and disorder in Northern Ireland, and that they for the most part had the common 
bond of intent to overthrow the constitution. It was, according to Craig, two years since the 
IRA began the work to bring about unrest and disorder which the organization stated as a 
necessary prerequisite for its physical force program.90 The Civil Rights Association was only 
non-political and non sectarian on the face of it, because, as Craig explained, when one 
looked at the actual composition of the movement it became clear that it was: 
(…) an omnium gatherum made up of members of the Londonderry Housing Action Committee, the 
majority of whom are also members of the Connolly Association, of the Republican Party which 
includes well-known members of the I.R.A and Sinn Fein, of the Young Socialists and of the 
Communist Party. A body of this composition is obviously unacceptable to those of loyalist belief, 
particularly to those who are aware of the recent statement by Cathal Goulding that the I.R.A supported 
and intended to infiltrate and use the civil rights organisations.91 
This statement shows that Craig felt that the civil rights member’s political inclination was 
enough to prove that the civil rights movement did not have sincere motives, and for that 
reason the government had a right to stop them. With this in mind he used his position as 
Minister of Home Affairs in an attempt to stop the civil rights movement from marching. On 
the 13th of November he banned all marches in Derry for a month, except the customary 
parades. This in reality meant that he banned the civil rights marches, but allowed the loyal 
institutions to hold their parades.92 He said that the situation had been aggravated because 
much of the protests were indented to cause public disorder, and if he allowed the marches to 
continue it would produce not only resentment, but violent opposition and retaliation.93 He did 
support the right to march, but he also said that the “coat trailing demonstrators and 
provocative acts (..)had to be dealt with if they constituted a threat to the peace.”94 As Craig 
did not believe that the civil rights movement was a non-violent movement with sincere 
motives, it is no surprise that he did not accept their claim of discrimination either.   
Craig refuted the claims of discrimination in the local election franchise when he on 
the 4th of December stated that: “The very fact that one does not have universal adult suffrage 
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in local government in itself does not mean that there is a denial of a civil right.”95 This 
indicates that he was aware of differences in the local election franchise, but he did not 
consider the lack of universal suffrage to constitute a loss of civil rights. And if it did 
constitute a lack of civil rights, it would imply a great lack of civil rights in England, he 
argued, as England did not have its own parliament.96 He finished the speech with a statement 
which in many way sums up his view of the civil rights movement:  
I would repeat that whatever political discontent there may be in this country the right way to express 
that discontent is not by organising marches on the scale and on the frequency that we have had in 
recent weeks. It is not in keeping with the whole technique of democracy and everyone of us in this 
House should be prepared to say so. If there is any indictment the reason this Communist and Marxist 
technique is being adopted is probably because people who feel that they have discontent have lost 
confidence in hon. Members opposite who have purported to represent them for so long.97 
First of all, Craig did not think the civil rights movement way to express their discontent was 
fitting in a democracy; the techniques were of a communist nature. It was the nationalist 
politicians who were the reason that people took to the streets, not the Unionist Party. Craig 
said that even though there had always been marches and parades in Northern Ireland, these 
had been of a traditional nature, well disciplined without suspicious intentions. These new 
massive civil rights parades were apparently not that, and subsequently the police needed 
greater resources to deal with them. When the police had to use their resources it would 
necessary imply that some of the populations other rights suffered temperedly, such as the 
right to move freely, Craig claimed.98 
 Craig was allowed to express his discontent with the civil rights movement quite 
freely, but when he on November 28th in a speech criticised the government’s policies, it 
caused a political storm. The speech did, according to the Belfast Telegraph, display a 
“singular lack of enthusiasm for the government’s ombudsman plan.” 99 Craig also criticised 
the standard of democracy in countries where Roman Catholics were in the majority.100 In 
many ways Craig was a traditional unionist, with a traditional view on Catholics, but in some 
respects there were indications that he had a different view on the union with Great Britain. 
 Craig did say that he had not argued for an independent Ulster, but some of his 
statements do show a point of view that could be interpreted as support for an independent 
Ulster. After he was sacked from his post by O’Neill, for example, he said the following: 
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I think too much has been read into that section (75)101 and I would resist any effort by any government 
in Great Britain, whatever it complexion might be, to exercise that power in any way to interfere with 
the proper jurisdiction of the Parliament and government of Northern Ireland. (..) It is merely a reserve 
power to deal with emergency situations. And it’s difficult to envisage any situation it could ever be 
exercised without the consent of the Parliament and government of Northern Ireland.102         
He did also say that intervention would have been fair enough if Stormont misused its powers, 
but there had not been, and would not be, any danger of that.103 With that statement he 
dismissed all of the civil rights movement’s accusations, and denied any reasons for British 
intervention. It is clear that Craig believed that the Stormont parliament had the final say, so 
in any questions that concerned Northern Ireland, he would oppose any attempt by the British 
to interfere. This belief was of course not acceptable for O’Neill, but it was most likely 
Craig’s actions in dealing with the civil rights movement that made him a torn in O’Neill’s 
side, to the extent that O’Neill used the first possibility to fire him.  
After his dismissal Craig strongly criticised O’Neill’s policies. He said that the 
unionist politicians had taken the right decision when the battle for home rule was fought, and 
that they should not do anything that would betray or lessen what had been achieved then.104 
This shows that for Craig, the situation in Northern Ireland at that time was nothing less than 
a fight for the survival of Ulster. Craig believed that the Roman Catholic community had a 
different standard of democracy since their religious faith dictated that it had to be that 
way.105 This may also explain why he was so fervently against the civil rights movement. 
Craig’s opposition against the civil rights movement did earn him the label of Paisleyite, a 
label that was used for the followers of the loyalist and reverend Ian Paisley. Paisley spoke 
out in support of Craig by saying: “Thank God that in the battle which is going on in Ulster 
we have got a Minister of Home Affairs of the calibre of William Craig.”106 But Craig himself 
repudiated the label, and said that he did not support Ian Paisley. In fact the only thing he had 
done was to dare to disagree with O’Neill. Craig claimed that there was a tendency in 
Northern Ireland to claim that if one disagreed with O’Neill on had automatically to be 
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labelled as a Paisleyite. Craig stressed that he detested the way Paisley went about his work 
and much of what he stood for.107  
Craig did nevertheless accept that there was a place for Paysleyites in the Unionist 
Party. There were serious differences between traditional unionism and Paisley’s loyalist 
group, but Craig did believe that the difference could be resolved.108 Craig did thereby place 
himself somewhere in between; not a Paisleyite, not a supporter of O’Neill, but still a unionist, 
although a unionist with a somewhat different interpretation of the union with Great Britain.  
Craig’s description of the civil rights movement did frequently sound more like 
something Paisley would have said rather than O’Neill. In a speech in Shankill Road he 
claimed that the riots in Derry had been perpetrated by evil men and that those men had gone 
there with the purpose of not only breaking the law, but also to create disorder. He went on to 
say that he had no quarrel with any individual Roman Catholic, but their church at least as it is 
operated in Ireland meant a lesser form of democracy.109 This attack on the Catholic Church 
was something that one would expect to hear from a loyalist rather than a unionist.  
Craig was one of the most outspoken critics of O’Neill in this period, but he was not 
the only one. Brian Faulkner, the Minister of Development, was also one of the sternest critics 
of O’Neill from within the government during the civil rights campaign. Faulkner did not 
believe that the civil rights movement had sincere motives. In a speech at Cordrain Orange 
Hall on the 5th of October, when the streets of Derry where engulfed in violence, Faulkner 
dismissed the civil rights movement as a false movement. He said that those who professed an 
interest in civil rights where not really interested in civil rights but were seeking the complete 
upset of the constitution. 110  It was, according to Faulkner, a fact of history that many 
movements inspired by idealism and a desire to better mankind, had been taken over and 
exploited for other purposes by determined and ambitious men.111 He went on to say that the 
term civil rights conjured up a picture of oppression, of illegal imprisonment, of ghettoes, of 
apartheid in the worst meaning of the word, of a denial of liberties. It was therefore a very 
convenient banner for the republican movement to hoist aloft.112 Here Faulkner and Craig had 
a similar view. Craig formulated it perhaps a bit more straightforward, but both felt that the 
civil rights movement was an IRA plot. Faulkner believed that the nationalist community 
would see right trough that deception because:  
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Their growing sense of integration in the community, their welcomed participation in many social and 
economic affairs, the increasing prosperity they enjoyed in common with every unionist Ulsterman, 
gave the lie direct to these accusations.113  
This shows that Faulkner did not accept the civil rights claim that Catholics had been treated 
unfair. He was however concerned about the consequence the civil rights campaign would 
have on the economic situation in Northern Ireland. He said in the speech that the sensational 
political mudslinging would rebound, not only on orange and unionist Ulstermen, but would 
also endanger the pay packet of every nationalist citizen and the future of their children.114 He 
continued this tread of reasoning when he on the 5th of November said that it was time to 
come down from the clouds of distortion, exaggeration and prejudice which had developed 
the last couple of weeks. He went on to say that “Discrimination, gerrymandering, civil rights, 
Irish unity may be the stuff that martyrs are made of, but they will not but butter on the bread 
or one penny in the pay packet.”115 The fact that he mentioned Irish unity alongside the main 
complaints of the civil rights movement suggests that he did not believe the claim from the 
civil rights protesters that the border issue was not a part of their campaign.  
It is clear that one of Faulkner’s biggest concerns was the effects on the economic 
situation, and he urged the civil rights movement to recognise that it was the good economic 
situation which allowed them to protest: 
There has been plenty of talk about human dignity, the franchise, and civil rights. The mantel of “civil 
rights” sits comfortably enough over a well-filled stomach and a warm winter suit. But it is scant 
protection against the cold winds of economic reality.116 
Here Faulkner expresses that it was because of the good times for Northern Ireland that the 
civil rights movement could afford the luxury of protest. The statement also contains a 
warning that this prosperity could disappear if movement did not stop their campaign. The 
fact that Faulkner believed that the civil rights campaign stemmed from the improved 
conditions for Catholics, suggest that he did not support the movement’s complaints at all. 
The fact that Northern Ireland’s population was higher than ever before, and the living 
standard was rising, was proof that the allegations were wrong, he claimed. And moreover, 
Faulkner said that the Unionist Party had achieved this prosperity without any assistance from 
the Nationalist Party, which had consistently attempted to put any progress at risk by 
wrecking the constitution.117       
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Faulkner did say that it was a fundamental right for all the citizens in Northern Ireland 
to have a good house and a fair wage, but he could not believe that a man’s political or 
religious background would inhibit him in obtaining employment.118 Faulkner remained much 
in the background during O’Neill’s showdown with Craig, and he made it clear that he would 
have no part in any caucus over leadership.119 This indicates that he was closer to O’Neill than 
Craig.  
 
SUMMARY  
The period from the 5th of October 1968 and up to the end of the year was a significant period 
in Northern Ireland. Violence had once again played a role in the politics of Ulster. The civil 
rights movement had made a name for itself, and put the spotlight on Ulster in the eyes of the 
world. 
 The civil rights movement brought to the surface the difference of opinion within the 
Unionist Party. The movement’s protest was so successful that O’Neill implemented reforms 
in an effort to cool the situation down. The reforms caused opposition from within the 
Unionist Party. The political situation within the unionist movement involved a clash between 
the traditional unionist values and a new reform friendly government. O’Neill’s efforts to 
change Northern Ireland had started before the civil rights campaign, but as soon as it seemed 
like he was implementing reforms because of pressure from the civil rights movement, it 
caused discontent among many unionists. There are more than suggestions that Terence 
O’Neill did not accept that the complaints from the civil rights movement were true, yet he 
felt that the Northern Irish society needed to be reformed, and this was the main reason why 
he implemented the reform packages, even if he knew that it would be met with opposition. 
Still it is hard to envision that the reforms presented on the 22nd of November would have 
been implemented if it had not been for the pressure from the civil rights movement. It is also 
likely that O’Neill would have been able to implement reforms with less opposition, if the 
unionists had not seen it as a surrender to the civil rights movement.  
 The reforms did cause opposition from within the Unionist Party. Brian Faulkner 
dismissed the civil rights movement as a false movement, and claimed that their goal was to 
end the union. Faulkner’s language concerning the civil rights movement was stronger than 
that of O’Neill, but he refrained from strongly criticising the government’s policies. 
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 The same could not be said about William Craig. Even as a member of the government 
he criticised the policies of O’Neill. Craig was one of the sternest critics of O’Neill within the 
Unionist Party, and this would cost him his position as Minister of Home Affairs.  Craig did 
also right from the start dismiss the civil rights movement as an IRA conspiracy, and he was 
strongly against giving in to their demands. He did not think the civil rights movement form 
of protest had any place within a democratic society, and because of this he felt that the 
government gave into pressure when they implemented the reform package in the 22nd of 
November 1968. 
O’Neill had in this period managed to calm down the largest civil rights organisations, 
but not all. On the 20th of December the civil rights group Peoples Democracy, not satisfied 
with the government’s measures, announced that they would hold a march starting in Belfast 
on the first of January.120 The march was modelled on the Selma-Montgomery march in 
Alabama in 1966. The intent, as one of the organizers Michael Farrell has put it, was to test 
the government’s intentions. Either the government would face up to the extreme-right 
elements within the Unionist Party, or it would be exposed as “impotent in the faces of 
sectarian thuggery”, forcing Westminister to get involved, and thus opening the Irish question 
for the first time in 50 years.121 The result of the march would prove to do just that. The next 
chapter will focus on the period leading up to O’Neill’s resignation in April 1969. 
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CHAPTER THREE: O’NEILL’S DOWNFALL: JANUARY TO 
APRIL 1969 
The period of calm after O’Neill’s “crossroad speech” came to an abrupt end in the beginning 
of January. The People Democracy march from Belfast started on January 1st 1969 and right 
from the start there were confrontations between protesters and counter-protesters who 
showed up along the route. But the most serious confrontation came on the last day of the 
march. When the march reached Burntollet bridge the protesters were attacked by two groups 
armed with lead piping, crowbars and iron bars. The police could offer little protection against 
the aggressors; the attacks were brutal and relentless. The unresisting marchers were beaten, 
prevented from seeking shelter and then pursued when they tried to escape. The attacks were 
well prepared, piles of stones had been left in the fields, and the phone wires had most likely 
been cut the night before. The incident was good propaganda for the civil rights movement 
since, many of the attackers were members of the B-Specials.122 
This chapter will stretch from the Burntollet march in January 1969 up to O’Neill’s 
resignation in the end of April. It was in this period that the Unionist Party really started to 
split, and when O’Neill announced a general election the party became split into Pro and 
Anti-O’Neill candidates. The questions I will explore in this chapter are: 
• Did the unionist perception of the civil rights movement change in this period?  
• How did the civil rights movement influence the process that led to O’Neill’s 
resignation? 
 
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH 
O’Neill issued a statement concerning the Burntollet incident on January 5th. He said that 
enough was enough. He was clearly upset that his effort before Christmas had not lead to a 
better result. He said that “We have heard sufficient for now about civil rights let us hear a 
little about civil responsibilities.”123 His tone in this statement was much more condemning 
than in the crossroads speech. He said that the march, planned by:  
(…) the “so-called” Peoples Democracy was from the outset a foolhardy and irresponsible undertaking. 
At best those who planned it were careless of the effects it would have: at worst they embraced the 
prospect of adverse publicity causing further damage to the interest of Northern Ireland as a whole.124 
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It was time that certain students returned to their studies O’Neill claimed, for which they had 
the support of the tax-payers. They should learn a little more of the nature of the society 
before they again displayed such arrogance towards those who had built up the facilities they 
enjoyed.125 The way O’Neill characterised the Peoples Democracy was different from the way 
he had spoken about the civil rights movement before the Burntollet march. He was much 
more sceptical about the motives of this group than he had been about the other civil rights 
groups.     
But O’Neill also condemned the Protestants who he claimed had played right into the 
hands of those who were encouraging the current agitation. The right thing to do would be to 
treat the march with silent contempt. By turning their back to what he called irresponsible and 
misguided people, they would have won a new respect. Peaceful contempt would bring the 
marches to an end.126 This statement suggests that O’Neill did not support the civil rights 
reasoning for arranging these marches. But he did support their democratic right to express 
their views on the street, regardless “how foolish, ill-judged and untimely they may be.”127 
 The statement also contained a poorly concealed threat of the consequences if the 
marches should continue. If the warring minorities did not rapidly returned to their senses he 
would consider further reinforcement of the police by using the B-Specials. He would also 
have a look at the Public Order Act to see if he would have to ask the Parliament for further 
powers to control the elements that were holding, in his words, “the entire community to 
ransom.”
128
 It is clear that O’Neill did not believe that the Peoples Democracy had sincere 
motives, but unlike the backbenchers he did not give the organization all the blame, he also 
condemned what he called the extremist Protestants. It is also clear that his tolerance had its 
limits. If the movement refused to remain within what he saw as the normal democratic 
procedures, he would use force to make them conform.    
The Peoples Democracy march changed the situation in Northern Ireland. The Times 
wrote that it, after O’Neill’s political victory within the Unionist Party the previous month, 
had looked like the province had won another chance to outgrow its communal antagonism, 
but that this scenario looked less likely now.129 O’Neill’s statement did nothing to appease the 
civil rights movement; unlike the crossroads speech it did most likely inflame the situation. 
The Derry Citizen Action Committee (DCAC) called the statement a disgrace, and stated that: 
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“whether he agreed with the march or not, his attack on the conduct of the marchers is 
completely indefensible when one considers that the marchers preached and practised non-
violence in the face of the most extreme and horrifying provocation.”130 The image among the 
civil rights campaigners of a Prime Minister who stood on their side diminished, the DCAC 
argued, when O’Neill criticised people who had been attacked only because they tried to 
express their views. The Burntollet march showed that the problems in Ulster had not 
disappeared after O’Neill’s five-point plan for reform. The renewed tension demanded new 
measures from the government.         
 
THE APPOINTMENT OF THE CAMERON COMMISSION 
On the 15th of January the cabinet sat up an independent commission to investigate the 
disturbances in Northern Ireland.131 The reason for the commission was, according to the 
Attorney General, to invite to an “objective, unbiased scrutiny by competent minds into 
various factors of our recent problems. Objective findings by such a body are always of value 
to a wise Parliament.” 132  The commission would be lead by the judge, Lord Cameron.133      
 O’Neill was disappointed over the renewed conflict in the community. In an interview 
to the Washington Post he said that they had achieved peace before Christmas, but that the 
students broke that peace when they decided to hold a protest march. However he laid the 
blame on the counter demonstrators too. If only people had been sensible and left these 
“miserable, long-haired, bedraggled students” alone everything would have been alright, but 
there was a counter demonstration and everything was blown up. 134 He asked how they were 
to achieve reforms when one had this communal strife, and claimed that the extremist feed 
upon each other, when one did something the other one had to react.135   
Yet O’Neill also saw something new in the situation. There had always been extreme 
Protestants and extreme Irish republicans, but the anarchist and Trotskyites among the 
students were something new. These radicals were, according to O’Neill, different from the 
civil rights leaders in Derry. In Derry they had driven the Trotskyites and anarchists out of the 
movement.136 It is interesting that O’Neill separated the civil rights movement in Derry from 
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the Peoples Democracy. This may imply that he felt that the protesters in Derry had more 
sincere motives.  
It is obvious, however, that it was a frustrated Prime Minister who gave this interview. 
He complained the he could do nothing without being criticise; if he let the demonstrators 
fight among themselves he was abdicating to violence, and if he called in the police, he was 
guilty of repression.137  
The frustration did however not lead to a change of policy. O’Neill would continue his 
effort to bring the different sections of the society together. Speaking in Stormont he pleaded 
to the Roman Catholic leaders to recognise that his administration policy aimed to assure that 
justice would be done to all sections of the society. In return he asked the Catholic leaders to 
“render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s”, which according to O’Neill was to “to 
observe the normal courtesies towards the authorities of this State.”138 With this he probably 
meant that the civil rights movement should accept the normal parliamentarian methods of 
democracy, and refrain from politics in the street. He did not seem to fear what the Cameron 
Commission would uncover. On the contrary, he stressed that the future had to build on the 
truth:   
On the one hand there are those who see recent events as a struggle between honest idealism and the 
forces of reaction. On the other there are those who see them as a cynical plot by radical subversives to 
overturn the Government and all lawful authority. Where does the truth lie? And who, outside Northern 
Ireland, will heed our partisan interpretations? I say: let the truth be known, and let us build upon it. I do 
not fear the truth for Ulster. The words "The truth shall make you free" seem to me to be politically 
wise as well as morally right. Let us create a glass in which we may all see ourselves clearly, and with a 
determination not to shrink from what we may see.139      
It seems as if O’Neill wanted the truth to come out; he wanted a society which did not fear to 
right its wrongs. This strategy fitted well with his effort to modernise the Northern Irish 
society: all the possible wrongs of the past had to come out, so they could create a society 
above all suspicions.    
But the suspicions would not be removed so easily from the politics in Northern 
Ireland. However, the beginning of the end of O’Neill’s leadership was not directly caused by 
the civil rights movement; it started when Brian Faulkner resigned from his minister post on 
23rd of January.  
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In his resignation letter to O’Neill, Faulkner wrote that he had been unhappy about the 
setting up of the Cameron Commission. In his opinion it was a political manoeuvre and to 
some extent an abdication of authority. 140 The commission would, according to Faulkner, 
most likely pinpoint the local government franchise as one of the main matters leading up to 
the troubles. And it would be next to impossible for the government not to implement the 
findings of the commission. 141  The government had thereby, according to Faulkner, 
surrendered all initiative in dealing with the matter, both decision and the timing had been 
taken out of the government’s hands.142 The straightforward thing for the government to do 
would be to initiative discussions within the unionist party on universal adult franchise in 
local government.143 Faulkner felt that the government was better qualified to decide for itself 
what was to be done.144 In this matter he was united with Craig in opposition to the inquiry, 
but Faulkner proposed a totally different solution to the problem. Faulkner proposed to 
implement universal adult suffrage right away, and in this respect he went further than 
O’Neill was willing to go in reforming the society. 145  The economical development in 
Northern Ireland was threatened, Faulkner claimed, and unless something was done fast it 
would seriously damage all economic development in the future. This was one of the main 
reasons the government had proposed the reforms, and Faulkner believed that they would 
produce a desirable result. The rioting and violence had not, according to Faulkner, done 
irreparable damage to the country’s development.146 This shows that Faulkner still believed 
that the troubles could be turned around, but if they were to continue he was pessimistic about 
the future, both for the Unionist Party and the country. He said that the Unionist Party was 
tearing itself to pieces, and the situation in the country was such that the work in his 
department was imperilled.147  
 Faulkner’s willingness to concede to the civil rights movement greatest demand at that 
time did not stem from a newfound belief in the sincerity of the movement. A few days after 
his resignation he said: 
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Were it not for the historic divisions in our society, the civil rights marchers, with their inevitable 
connections of students, socialist, Marxists, republicans, evident as they are in so many other places in 
the world, would have been an embarrassment rather than a tragedy.148        
The only truly democratic way to exert political influence was through political associations, 
“not marching about the streets or sitting on the fence to offer advice.” 149 Faulkner could not 
accept the alligation that the minority had suffered grave social injustice in Northern 
Ireland.150 Faulkner’s support for one-man, one-vote came because he wanted the government 
to appear strong, not because he supported the civil rights movement’s accusations. Both 
Faulkner and O’Neill wanted to reform Northern Ireland, but Faulkner was more sceptical 
towards the civil rights movement. So when the government seemed to give into the pressure 
from the movement, instead of implementing the reforms of their own accord, it was enough 
to make Faulkner resign.  
 Faulkner and Craig would both oppose the decision to set up the Cameron 
Commission, but for different reasons. Craig found it hard to understand why the government 
had set up the inquiry to the causes and nature for the unrest and violence.151 He called it an 
act of appeasement to the civil rights movement.152 Craig demanded a promise from the 
government that there would be no change to the local government franchise until the review 
of the structures and functions of the local authorities had been completed.153 Both Craig and 
Faulkner felt that the civil rights movement had ulterior motives, but Craig separated himself 
from Faulkner by rejecting the necessity for reforms, thereby placing himself outside the 
group within the Unionist Party who felt that reforms would benefit the Northern Irish society. 
Craig felt that the Prime Minister had caused the split in the party by implementing the 
reforms. The only way to unite the party was, according to Craig, that O’Neill stepped down 
and gave way for a new leader, this because O’Neill had failed to give the sufficient 
assurances about the constitutional position and powers of the Stormont parliament. Craig 
said that even if O’Neill were to give those assurances now, it would be too late to reunite the 
party.154   
 It was the constitutional situation which concerned Craig the most at this time, but 
unlike the loyalist section in Northern Ireland it was not the integration into the Republic that 
he spoke of, but the concern for British intervention into matters of Stormont business.  
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I would say to hon. Members that as one looks at the legal argument it goes hand in hand with the 
common-sense approach because if devolution means anything at all and if legislative authority is given 
to certain people one cannot willy nilly take it away from them or undermine it without making a 
nonsense of it. The Northern Ireland Parliament has always used its powers rightly and properly and it 
is difficult to envisage any justifiable situation in which the United Kingdom Government would be 
entitled to legislate over the head of the elected will of the people of Northern Ireland as expressed in 
their Parliament.155         
Since Craig in no way agreed with the allegations from the civil rights movement and 
believed that the parliament had always used its powers rightly and properly, the British 
government had no authority to intervene in Northern Ireland. It does indeed seem like he 
believed that the British parliament had no jurisdiction over Northern Ireland.          
The situation for O’Neill took a turn for the worse when 13 unionist MP’s signed a 
letter calling for his resignation. They wrote that the only way to resolve the disunity of the 
party was a change of leadership.156 The support O’Neill had enjoyed since his “crossroad 
speech” was now rapidly dwindling away. The Unionist Party was in disarray about which 
course to take, and it looked like the party which had ruled continually for over 40 years was 
torn apart by the challenge from the civil rights movement. O’Neill had to do something, and 
it did not take long before he made his move.      
 
THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
On the 3rd of February O’Neill announced the dissolution of parliament and stated that there 
were to be an election on the 24th of February. Just months earlier, O’Neill had called such an 
election irresponsible, and the election was not well received among O’Neill’s adversaries. 
Craig said that an election would prove to be disastrous for both the party and for the country. 
Craig believed that an election would almost inevitable lead to riots and disorder.157  
It seems as if the election debates did not concern the disagreement with O’Neill’s 
policies as such, but his leadership. Faulkner said that it was an extraordinary election since 
many unionist, like himself, would support the policies “to the hilt”, but who could not find it 
in themselves to support O’Neill’s leadership.158 Craig said that he wanted to counter what he 
called “spurious propaganda campaign” mounted on behalf of the Prime Minister who 
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alleged that he challenged O’Neill because he wanted a change of policies rather than a 
change of leader.159  
Craig was fighting the election as a unionist candidate, and he claimed that O’Neill 
tried to bypass the traditional party procedures by taking the leadership election out of the 
hands of the unionist party members and give it to the people. I believe that Craig’s stern 
conviction that all matters should be handled within the parliament and the party was one of 
the reasons why he could not support Ian Paisley and his street-politics. Craig felt that the 
Unionist Party had always been an extremely democratic party and he accused O’Neill of 
only allowing one point of view within the party160, to which O’Neill replied: 
I am getting tired of having to correct Mr. Craig’s misstatements as an ex-minister as I had become of 
being asked to defend his blunders when he was a minister. (..) He wearies us with his talk of party 
unity. (..) is he or is he not fighting this election on the official manifesto of the Unionist Party?161      
O’Neill asked how Craig could say that he supported the government’s policies, when he 
previously had said that he would deny giving witness to the Cameron Commission if asked. 
More interestingly O’Neill also accused Craig of contributing the troubles in Derry with his 
“meaningless and quite unenforceable ban.”162  
Even if Craig denied that he and his followers had become a party within the party163, 
the Unionist Party was at this time tearing itself apart, and the election became an election 
over who were going to be leader in the Unionist Party. The party was split into Pro-O’Neill 
and Anti-O’Neill candidates.164 The view of the Pro-O’Neill candidates would be published in 
a political manifesto, which we will now turn to.           
 
The manifesto 
The election manifesto was published by the Unionist Party, and considering that O’Neill was 
the party leader, I will interpret it as the political views of O’Neill and his supporters. The 
manifesto was an attempt to satisfy as many as possible without alienating too many. O’Neill 
spoke to the Catholics when he wrote: 
The party acknowledges and proclaims the right of all citizens to equal treatment under the law, to full 
equality in the enjoyment of health, education and other social benefits, and to the protection of 
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authority against every kind of injustice…We believe in the creation of new opportunities in which all 
will share: new jobs: new houses: and new economic development for all parts of the country.165 
It was an attempt to say that he had heard the civil rights movement’s complaints, and that he 
was doing something about them. He also spoke to the Protestant community, saying that 
Stormont still enforced the rule of law, and would continue to do so: 
In all our policies, we will combine FIRMNESS with FAIRNESS. We believe in the rule of law and 
that no person is above the law. We believe that those who seek to disrupt society and benefit from the 
divisions they create or attempt to take the law into their own hands must be answerable to the 
law…We shall resist every attempt to usurp the authority of Parliament or to substitute the rule of force 
for the rule of law.166      
Even if the civil rights movement is not mentioned in the pamphlet it is clear that the 
manifesto still deals in a large degree with the complaints of the movement. It contains 
passages about the education system, the housing situation, the labour market, the election 
franchise, the situation in Derry, and it says that the Special Powers Act would come up for 
consideration within a short while.167 Therefore there is little doubt that the manifesto is 
intended to deal with many of the movement’s grievances.      
Faulkner came out in support of the Unionist Party’s manifesto, and embraced the 
philosophy of bridge-building. He did even take it a bit further, suggesting that Catholics 
should become actively involved in the Unionist Party. The only qualification required to join 
the party was a determination to maintain the constitutional position. He continued with his 
concern for the economical development, by saying that political consideration should never 
influence industrial development. 168  Faulkner remained supportive of the government’s 
policies even after he had left the cabinet.  
Faulkner may well be the one who was willing to give the greatest concessions 
towards the civil rights movement among the unionist politicians I analyse in this chapter, but 
he did not think much of the people who took to the street. He said that one of the saddest 
aspects of the situation was that: 
So many who have now become involved in politics for the first time have not have time to study the 
political situation objectively. They are riding out like knights in armour with bugles blowing and 
pennants flying, but they have not carefully considered where they are going, nor have they much 
knowledge or experience of the principles behind the campaign (..) emotions have too often replaced 
argument, and propaganda replaced facts.169             
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When the tumults died down people would still depend on the unionist government to win 
them their daily bread Faulkner stated, and he feared that the situation could lead to a fatal 
weakening of the Unionist Party if members of the opposition were given to much 
influence.170  
 
THE CROSSROAD ELECTION 
While party unity is important, it’s not more important than the unity of the country.171 
Today we decide our destiny.172 
Terence O’Neill 
 
While his opponents mainly focused on the split of the Unionist Party, O’Neill tried to move 
the spotlight to the splitting of the country. The civil rights question did not dominate the 
election campaign among the unionist candidates. This is quite striking considering that the 
civil rights movement to a great extent had facilitated the events which lead to the election. In 
general, this does seem to indicate that the general election had become an election for 
choosing the leader of the Unionist Party. O’Neill tried to paint a picture of himself as the 
Prime Minister of all the sections of Ulster, not just the unionists. In a televised interview he 
said that he thought that religion should be a private matter, religion had bedevilled Ulster 
politics for too long. He asked the people to work together, to put an end to the civil strife and 
repair Ulster’s damaged reputation in Britain and the world. The remarkable achievements a 
divided Ulster had achieved could be surpassed if the communities in Ulster were united.173 In 
O’Neill’s mind the election would be a judgment of the government’s measures. If the verdict 
at the ballot box said that the government had gone too far, it would be hailed with delight 
among their enemies and dismay by their friends.174  The result would turn out to be a 
disappointment for O’Neill.  
    Craig used the last speech of his election campaign to repeat his claim of IRA 
involvement in the civil rights campaign. He had warned of the danger of civil unrest two 
years ago, he claimed. On the founding of the civil rights movement, the IRA had been there 
to see if they could use the movement as a spearhead, and on every occasion one would see 
IRA involvement in some form or another, Craig argued. He went on to say that the civil 
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rights movement was “the shallowest and falsest movement that has ever tried to project itself 
on any democratic community” and that they were “nothing more than a crowd of reckless 
agitators”175 Craig saw himself as a saviour of the Unionist Party. He repudiated the label 
“rebels” which had been given to the twelve members who openly opposed O’Neill; the label 
the “twelve apostles of unionism” was more suitable. He said in his the speech that he would 
say, without fear or favour, anything he felt was necessary to defend the constitution of the 
party.176  
“The constitution of the party” is a somewhat interesting phrase since most politicians 
proclaimed that they would defend the constitution of Ulster. It might point to his displeasure 
with the British government at the time. He believed that the threat of British intervention 
from Harold Wilson had been a bluff, and it would take better men than Wilson “to bluff 
unionist Ulstermen.”177   
 The result of the election would not resolve anything in Northern Ireland one way or 
another. Of the 39 unionist candidates who were returned after the election, 27 were in 
support of O’Neill’s policies, while 12 were against or undecided.178  
 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTION 
Asked about what kind of Ulster the voters had asked for, O’Neill replied that he hoped it was 
the dawn of a new Ulster. The dawn had broken, but not as fully as he would have hoped. It 
would take time.179 O’Neill was disappointed that not more Catholics had voted for him. He 
said that there had been Catholic support after his television speech, but that had not 
transferred itself to the polling booths. The Catholics were willing to write a letter of support, 
but they had not reached the stage of putting an X to his name.180  
It is clear that he had expected that the Catholics would come out in support for him, 
and that the disappointing result came as a result of their reluctance to do so. O’Neill’s 
gamble of alienating some of the unionist vote to win the Catholic vote had failed. So as the 
Belfast Telegraph put it: Ulster still stood on the crossroads. Nothing had been resolved.181 
Still, O’Neill got renewed confidence as party leader on February 28th 1969. 23 members 
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supported O’Neill, whereas one (Faulkner) voted against. Ten walked out before the vote was 
held, and perhaps most surprisingly, Craig refrained from voting.182                    
 The election changed little in Northern Ireland. The Catholic community did not 
support the government; instead several civil rights campaigners were elected. O’Neill still 
remained in power, but his grasp on the premiership was more vulnerable than ever. His next 
move was designed to appease the right wing of the Unionist Party, but in the process, he 
would also alienate the civil rights movement and its supporters.     
 
Public Order Bill 
The 12th of March a new law was discussed in the parliament. Even though O’Neill said he 
wanted to reform the Northern Irish society, the law proposals which was introduced would in 
effect strip the civil rights movement of many of their ways to protest. The new Minister of 
Home Affairs, Morgan Porter, presented the law for the members of parliament. He said that 
even though some of the penalties would increase, the law was not designed to punish, rather 
it was designed to prevent the breaking of the law.183 The parts of the law that would directly 
touch the civil rights movement involved a doubling of the time limit to give notice of a 
parade to 96 hours. The law also made it illegal to participate in any unlawful processions, as 
opposed to organize or assist in organizing one, thereby in effect vilifying not just the leaders, 
but all the civil rights campaigners who defied a ban such as they had done in Derry. Sit-
downs were to be treated like any other form of protest. The penalty for partaking in actions 
like this were reduced from twelve to six months, this because the Magistrates` Courts Act of 
1964 stated that the accused could demand to be put before a jury if the sentence could 
surpass six months.184  
The method of protest the civil rights movement used did not belong in a democratic 
society, since in influenced the life of the “average citizen”, Morgan Porter said: 
We have been told that "the streets belong to the people." I wholeheartedly agree that the public are 
entitled to free passage on the highway, and the new Clause 3B is designed to preserve this right more 
effectively, to keep the streets for the people to use for the purpose for which they were intended. . 
Similarly, public buildings are for the service of the public and Clause 3C tries to ensure that the public 
will be able to use them for that service. To take these rights from the people by physical force is not 
democratic protest but an arrogant interference with their civil liberties.185 
                                                 
182
 Belfast Telegraph:28/2-1969 
183
 Stormont Papers:12/3-:1969: Vol. 72 
184
 Stormont Papers:12/3-:1969: Vol. 72 
185
 Stormont Papers:12/3-:1969: Vol. 72 
 41 
Porter said that the legislation could be labelled a law for the protection of civil rights since it 
was designed to protect the right of the average citizen to express his opinion or live his life in 
a peaceful and inoffensive way. The fact that the law would protect the public from 
obstructive demonstrators, did not represent a radical change Porter, claimed, since there had 
always been protection against types of behaviour which amounted to assault or trespass. It 
had also since 1851 been a statutory offence to prevent or interrupt the free passage of any 
person or carriage on any public road.186  
The law would cause a strong discontent among the civil rights campaigners as they 
felt that the government removed their fundamental right to march, to protect the non-
protesters right to move freely. The newly elected MP and civil rights campaigner John Hume 
said that the government should focus on dealing with the underlying causes for the unrest 
rather than putting the boot down on people’s necks.187 The difference between the civil rights 
movement and the parliament members of the opposition were increasingly blurred now. 
During a debate on the Public Order Bill, the members of the opposition had to be removed 
by force after staging a sit-down protest and singing the civil rights anthem “we shall 
overcome” during the debate.188 This shows that the way politics were conducted in Northern 
Ireland was starting to change, the civil rights movement way of protest had moved in to the 
Stormont Parliament  
The law seems to have been intended to give the government more opportunites to 
control or stop civil rights marchers. Since the reforms had not removed the people from the 
streets, the government needed more tools to enforce law and order. By making some of the 
civil rights methods of protest illegal, they could perhaps use more force without receiving 
more criticism from the British government.     
 O’Neill said, in a speech held at Randalstown Orangehall, that the allegation that the 
government was practising repression rather than reform, was utterly false. No one had cause 
to say that the parliament did anything else than represent the opinions of the people. 189  But 
there where people that did not accept the decisions of the democratically elected parliament. 
These people did, according to O’Neill, proclaim a right of the minority to blackmail the 
majority with the threat that what could not be gained by democratic means, would be 
pursued through disorder in the streets. For O’Neill, the primary right was that of the people 
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going about doing their lawful business.190 People had of course the right to protest, but it 
came a point when lawful protest merged into unlawful intimidation. And there came a point 
when the minority was clearly trying to subvert the ordinary democratic process and impose 
its will by any means.191 The speech showed how difficult the situation had become for 
O’Neill. Even when he spoke at a unionist rally he was heckled by around 50 protesters. They 
were screaming “Up with Paisley”, “Traitor”, “What about Lemass?” and “No surrender.”  To 
which O’Neill replied: 
People who just came here to shout must have very small brains indeed. I honestly think all you people 
who shout would far rather be employed under Paisley. You are only interested in sectarian 
bitterness.192 
O’Neill’s support was now rapidly dwindling away. At the annual meeting of the Unionist 
Council his leadership was only narrowly endorsed by a vote of 338 for and 263 against.193    
 
O’NEILL RESIGNS 
The work of reconciliation has, in fact, been the whole basis of my Premiership. Today I see that work 
threatened with disaster.194 
Terence O’Neill 
 
In his last speech in Stormont as Prime Minister, O’Neill made a last emotional appeal to the 
people to get over their differences and come together in peace. When he looked at the 
situation in Northern Ireland his reaction was one of sadness:  
Sadness that the hand of one Ulsterman has been turned against another and that so many of our hopes 
and plans for the future have been put at risk. Those who speak of civil war are using extravagant 
language which I cannot endorse. But it is certainly true that Ulster is in the process of inflicting a great 
injury upon herself.195    
Northern Ireland had been caught up in a process that could lead to the destruction of the 
province. They were now, according to O’Neill, in danger of losing one of the most 
fundamental of all rights, the right to work. If the madness that had been allowed to reign the 
last couple of months were to continue, it would become difficult to proceed with work as 
usual.196 
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O’Neill accepted that there were those who wanted to express their discontent with 
what they perceived as legitimate complaints in a peaceful and orderly fashion, but the 
movement had got out of hand and had become a monster the civil rights organizers no longer 
could control. He wondered what kind of interest stone throwing teenagers had in civil rights. 
He asked where one could find the peaceful protest in vicious assaults on police and 
property. 197  The Peoples Democracy had changed O’Neill’s opinion of the civil rights 
movement. He did not believe that this organisation was fighting for civil rights, but he still 
supported their right to express their views in a normal democratic fashion. This ambiguous 
perspective is highlighted when he also pointed out that one had to condemn those who tried 
to hinder people using their freedom to speak. He had little liking for the views and actions of 
Bernadette Devlin, but he defended her right to express those views in all the parts of her 
constituency.198 Bernadette Devlin was one of the leading members of the PD, and she had 
been elected as a Member of Parliament in Westminister in a by-election on the 17th of April 
1969.199  
O’Neill and his similar minded colleagues were, according to O’Neill, determined to 
implement universal suffrage in the next local election. He said that no decision had been 
made thus far, but he said that if the party did not support it, he could no longer continue as 
Prime Minister. The task of reconciliation had been the cornerstone of his premiership.200 In 
the previous months he had heard slogans like “we shall overcome”, but one had to remember 
that the man that so often had spoken these words, Dr. Martin Luther King, had not sought 
after one group’s triumph over the other, but that each man should be equals in dignity and 
respect. If this was the meaning of civil rights, then O’Neill said that he could support it.201 
 O’Neill made it clear that there could be no doubt about the way to confront terrorists 
or rioters, they would be met and defeated with absolute firmness. The streets would not be 
given over to rioters, and the government would not surrender to terrorists.202 He finished his 
speech with an appeal to both sides of the house:  
I ask all hon. Members to rise above sectional partisanship today. For our future, our livelihood, our 
reputation are all in danger; and if we go over the brink to disaster all we will have will be equal rights 
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in poverty and despair.  The hour is late, but we must make another attempt to set this country on a new 
course.203 
 But the course set by O’Neill was not acceptable for all. Craig said that it was the attempts of 
appeasement which had destroyed the confidence in the Unionist Party, and that the party 
could not be healed without a new leader.204 Craig felt no reluctance about criticising the 
government from his own party. Because as he put it: “We are a democratic party and 
everyone have a right to say exactly what they think and it should be taken in the spirit of that 
right, provided that it is being properly and democratically exercised.”205  
The possibility to express criticism towards the government’s policies from within the 
Unionist Party would diminish as the violence grew. With that change I will later show that 
Craig’s opinion of what was proper in a democracy changed as his channels of political 
influence disappeared. This would however not take place during the leadership of O’Neill.  
On the 19th of April there were serious clashes between NICRA marchers, loyalists 
and members of the RUC. RUC officers broke into the house of a civilian who had not taken 
part in the riots, and beat him with batons, causing a heart attack, and subsequently death.206 
A few days later bombs exploded in Silent Valley Reservoir. The RUC claimed that it was the 
IRA that was behind the explosions.207  Three days later there were new explosions that 
wrecked Belfast water supply Lough Neagh.208 Later it would come out that it in fact had 
been the loyalist, Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) that had carried through the attacks in an 
effort to further undermine O’Neill’s position.209  
The act would succeed, but not before O’Neill forced the Unionist Party to accept the 
principle of one-man, one-vote on the 23rd of April 1969. The vote was 28 to 22 in favour, and 
it would lead to further turmoil in the party. The Minister of Agriculture, James Chichester-
Clark resigned his post in protest.210 The end of O’Neill’s premiership came just five days 
later, when he resigned as Prime Minister.211 His efforts to reform the society had forced him 
out of office, but he insisted that he had no regrets about the reforms. In his last speech as 
Prime Minister he said to those who had supported him: “What you and I were trying to do 
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together was right- morally right, political right, and right for our country and all who seek to 
live in peace within it.”212 
 
SUMMARY 
The political situation changed much after the Burntollet march, and influenced O’Neill’s 
room of manoeuvre. He had tried to give the civil rights movement some of its demands, 
thereby making himself an easy target for the hardliners within the Unionist Party. When his 
efforts did not lead to an end of the street politics, he lost much support. He continued with 
his efforts to reform the society, but as the violence grew, more people asked for a harder line 
against the civil rights movement, not new reforms. The election did not give him the clear 
mandate he sought, and it showed that many Protestants felt that he had gone to far, while his 
efforts had not transferred into an increased Catholic vote. 
 His view on the civil rights movement did change during this period, and he spoke 
much more strongly about the Peoples Democracy than he did of the other civil rights groups. 
He expressed more scepticism about the PD’s motives, and condemned their actions after the 
Burntollet march.  
 Faulkner and Craig did not change their opinion about the civil rights movement 
during this period. Craig expressed a stronger condemnation of the movement than Faulkner, 
but both doubted the sincerity of the movement. Even if they were united in opposition 
against O’Neill, it did not mean that Faulkner and Craig were politically united. Faulkner was 
willing to give more to the civil rights movement than even O’Neill, and Craig demanded 
stronger actions against the movement. The difference between these two will be further 
explored in following chapters.   
 There is no doubt that the civil rights movement influenced the events that led to the  
general election in February 1969. The Burntollet march made O’Neill appoint a commission 
to investigate the causes for the unrest. This decision led to Faulkner’s resignation from the 
government, which made O’Neill’s position much more unstable, and made him announce an 
election. O’Neill’s concessions to the civil rights movement did cost him many Protestant 
votes, and since he received little support from the Catholics his position became more 
unstable after the election. 
The civil rights movement also changed the view on the proper way of protest in a 
democratic society. The Public Order Bill was designed to make it more difficult to express 
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one self in the way the civil rights movement had. The view that the street protest was 
dangerous and irresponsible grew in this period. 
The civil rights movement had a big influence in this period, but there were another 
movement that used many of the same methods of protest, but for a very different cause. The 
next chapter will focus on Ian Paisley and the loyalist’s reaction towards the civil rights 
campaign and O’Neill’s policies.           
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CHAPTER FOUR: ULSTER BETRAYED 
”Make no mistake about it. The dark eleventh hour draws on and sees us sold. The powers that be would do well 
to remember that there are still those in Ulster who are determined to defend their heritage and that the heritage 
of our fathers will not be sacrificed without a tremendous struggle.” 
Ian Paisley.213 
 
By using the first words of Rudyard Kipling’s poem Ulster from 1912, Ian Paisley connected 
the resistance against the civil rights campaign with the unionist fight against Irish home rule 
in 1912. Paisley wanted to show that there still were those who were willing to fight for the 
legacy of the unionist founding fathers, Edward Carson and James Craig. This was not a fight 
against civil rights, but a battle for the survival of Ulster, he argued. 
 The years 1966-1970 were some of the most momentous and significant years in 
Northern Ireland, and Ian Paisley was to play a significant role during the gradual breakdown 
of law and order.214 In many ways he would lead the procession which walked towards the 
troubles. In a time when the Unionist Party failed to provide the unionist community with a 
clear leader, Paisley shone like a star for a large section of the loyalist community, which felt 
abandoned in the dark. 
In this chapter I will discuss in which way the loyalist reaction to the civil rights 
campaign influenced O’Neill’s possibility to reform the Northern Irish society. To do so I will 
try to compare the loyalist view of the civil rights movement with that of O’Neill. The loyalist 
response to O’Neill’s reforms will be an important element in this chapter. The questions I 
will ask are the following:  
• How did the loyalists speak of the civil rights movement? 
• On what basis did Paisley and other loyalists criticise O’Neill’s reform policies?  
• How did the loyalist elements hamper O’Neill’s possibilities to take the heat 
out the situation in Northern Ireland?  
The sources for this chapter will be a mix of articles and interviews from the Belfast 
Telegraph, discussions from Stormont, secondary literature, and articles and interviews from 
the loyalist newspaper the Protestant Telegraph. The Protestant Telegraph was Ian Paisley 
own newspaper, and it is thus a good source for pinpointing his views. But when I examined 
the sources in Belfast, I discovered that the microfiches of the Protestant Telegraph at 
Linenhall Library had not been used before. This meant that they were not sorted in any 
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logical fashion, so I could not get as much out of that source as I would have liked. I will 
therefore rely slightly more on secondary literature in this chapter than in the previous 
chapters.  
Much of the attention will be on the actions of Ian Paisley, but I will also include other 
persons who had important position within the loyalist community. Among those will be 
Desmond Boal, a member of the Unionist Party. When he was in the party he was often at 
odds with the leadership. He started a backbench revolt against Terence O’Neill after O’Neill 
had met with the Irish Prime Minister at Stormont.215 The reason I will include him in this 
chapter and not as a part of the opposition to O’Neill in the previous chapters, is because he 
later would leave the Unionist Party, and together with Paisley, form the Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP).                       
 Another politician that will be mentioned in this chapter will be Major Ronald Bunting. 
He was a leading loyalist activist in 1968-70. In those years he was leader of the Ulster 
Protestant Volunteers (UPV), the Loyal Citizens of Ulster, and associated with other groups 
that were opposed to the civil rights campaign.216 
  These individuals would all influence the events during the civil rights campaign, but 
it was Ian Paisley who became the closest thing to a leader of the loyalist community. 
   
IAN PAISLEY’S PATH TO STREET POLITICS 
Ian Paisley was born into the Orange tradition of politicized Protestantism in County Armagh 
in 1926. His grandfather and great-grandfather had both served as District Masters of the 
Orange Order, and his father had been an Ulster Volunteer.217  His father, Kyle Paisley, 
resigned as a reverend in the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland because too many 
English congregations were becoming too “modernist” and were getting involved in 
interdenominational meetings and associations. 218  Kyle Paisley was followed by a few 
members of his congregation and began to hold services in a warehouse. This strong religious 
conviction was passed on to his son, and became the guiding star of Ian Paisley’s political 
career.219  
 Considering the strong political legacy of his family, it was a natural step for Ian 
Paisley to become involved in politics when he moved to Belfast. Paisley became a member 
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of the Unionist Party, but from 1949 to the late 1950`s he was part of a fringe faction of 
unionist politics. In his early years, he got involved in marginal groups such as the Ulster 
Protestant Action, who was pressing for an employment policy that would reward loyal 
Protestants, and campaigned for the right to hold marches.220          
 Paisley’s increasing popularity as a preacher led to an invite to lead a small group of 
disaffected conservative Presbyterians, and in 1951 he founded the Free Presbyterian Church 
of Ulster (FPC). It grew slowly, and in 1966 it contained only 13 congregations, but during 
the years of civil unrest it increased with 23 new congregations.221 Even though politics came 
do dominate much of Paisley’s career, it was religion that was most important to him. Politics 
became a way for him to realise and further his religious goals.222     
  Even though Paisley was an outspoken critic of O`Neill, he was as late as 1964 
willing to render his support to unionist candidates he found acceptable. When O’Neill began 
forming his political plans, conservative unionist began to organise against him at two levels; 
within the Unionist Party and in the street. It was on the street that Paisley were to build his 
reputation.223  
 It is a interesting point that some aspects of Paisley’s movement appeared before the 
movement for civil rights. That means that the religious part of Paisley’s movement was not 
established as a defence against the civil rights movement and their claims for civil rights.224 
Paisley’s three months imprisonment in 1966 for unwillingness to be bound over to keep the 
peace after the disturbances outside the Presbyterian General Assembly, earned him an 
upsurge of interest for his church and politics.225 So Paisley was a well known figure in Ulster 
before the civil rights troubles started, but his fame would grow, as the troubles increased.  
 
The fight begins 
At the same time as the General Election in 1966 the RUC started getting complaints about an 
Irish tricolour hanging in the window of the Republican headquarter in Falls Roads. Paisley 
announced that he would organise a march if the police did not remove it. James Kilfedder, a 
unionist hardliner sympathetic to Paisley, wrote a letter to the Minister of Home Affairs, 
Brian McConnell, calling for the removal of the flag, because its intent was `to provoke and 
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insult loyalist in West Belfast´. 226   So on the 28th September the RUC broke in to the 
republican headquarter and removed the flag by force. Still Paisley went ahead with a rally 
outside City Hall, which attracted over a thousand people. At the same time, between one and 
two thousand people blocked the Falls Road, singing republican songs, waving republican 
flags and throwing missiles at passing buses. 227  When a new flag was up hung and 
subsequently removed it led to three nights of rioting. When the riots settled down 72 persons 
had been arrested, 46 police officers had been injured, 53 business premises had been 
damaged, and 14 police vehicles and 20 public transports damaged or destroyed. It was the 
worst rioting since 1935.228       
  O’Neill looked upon Paisley and his supporters as a small group of rabble, and failed 
to see how widespread the discontent had become in the protestant community. Paisley and 
his followers were, according to O’Neill, “a fascist organization masquerading under the 
cloak of religion(…)deluding sincere people(…)hell-bent on provoking religious strife in 
Northern Ireland.”229 This point of view may have made it difficult for O’Neill to understand 
the threat Paisley posed for his reform-friendly policies. O’Neill failed to muster the support 
he needed to secure his position in the general Election in 1969. His attempt to win over the 
Catholics did not pay out at the ballot-box, and at the same time the loyalist candidates grew 
in strength. In previous elections had almost all Protestants voted for the Unionist Party, but 
the political climate had changed, and the protestant vote had been split.230      
 Many unionist hardliners objected to O’Neill’s attempt to approach the Catholic 
community, and found it easier to support Paisleys loyalist populism.231 O’Neill’s minimal 
concessions towards the Catholics led to a revival of the old sectarian animosities towards the 
end of 1964.232 Paisley’s fundamentalist pressure, combined with uncompromising attitude of 
the Peoples Democracy, ensured that there could be no accessible middle-ground. In 1968-69 
Paisley resurrected the Orange tactic from the 1880s of arranging loyalist demonstrations to 
coincide with Catholic protest.233 The demonstrations started before October 5th, and were 
therefore not caused by the violence. On 11th of May 1968 thousands attended a 
demonstration in Armagh organised by the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee 
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(UCDC)234 and UPV. On the 1st of June Paisley led a “Protestant demonstration and loyalist 
parade” in Dungannon. When NICRA announced plans to march, the loyalist organised 
counter-demonstrations, and on the 24th of August the civil rights protesters and UVP 
protesters had to be kept apart by a police cordon.235 The situation was already tense before 
the events in October 1968, but the next months would change Northern Ireland forever. 
Before the events in October O’Neill was not the only one to be strongly criticised by Paisley. 
William Craig became a target for a “Craig must go” campaign because of his reluctance to 
ban the civil rights marches. Paisley said that compromise was the key word in Craig’s policy, 
and he called him incompetent, inconsistent, and unpopular. This attitude would change 
dramatically in the following months.236        
The fact that O’Neill faced opposition from both Protestants and Catholics, was 
nothing new in Northern Ireland. Previous Prime Ministers had been forced to deal with 
problems stemming from both communities, but what was unique with the situation O’Neill 
had to face, was the extent of the problems. The anger from the civil rights movement, the 
threat of intervention from both London and Dublin, and the Protestant protest produced an 
impossible situation.237  
Paisley had, according to Dennis Cooke, never any sympathy for the civil rights 
movement, neither the Northern Irish or the American. 238  The Protestant Telegraph printed 
this statement when Martin Luther King was shot on the 4th of April 1968:  
He laid great empahsis upon the brotherhood of man rather than the Kingship of Christ. He chose liberal 
theology rather than fundamentalism. He chose ecumenism rather than separation. He chose pacifism, 
looking to Gandhi as his guru and to the Pope as his friend, but his pacifism could not adequately be 
transmitted to his followers…The people that he led have now taken to riot, arson, looting and murder. 
The smouldering racial tensions have once again been rekindled. The Communist agitators have 
whipped up grief and emotion into xenophopia and uncontrollable rioting; and America is on the brink 
of civil war.239  
It was the experiences from the American fight for civil rights that would influence Paisleys 
view on the Northern Irish civil rights movement.240 If one assumes that Paisley agreed with 
the quote above, something which is likely since it was printed in his newspaper, it seems 
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evident that Paisley only saw one outcome of a civil rights campaign, and that was chaos and 
violence. This was a view shared by a lot of unionist politicians, so what was the difference 
between the unionist and loyalist view on the civil rights movement? 
 One difference between Paisley’s view on the civil rights movement compared with 
the unionist backbenchers concerns the political perspective and leadership of the civil rights 
movement. Whereas the conservative unionists proclaimed that the civil rights were just 
another IRA plot to topple the state, Paisley saw another enemy behind IRA. In the pamphlet 
Which Way Ulster it says that: “The IRA- the armed wing of the roman Catholic Church- has 
now officially admitted its part in the present rebellion.”241 So even though Paisley, as the 
unionist backbenchers, thought that the IRA was behind the civil rights campaign, it was the 
Catholic Church that was the true enemy according to Paisley.  
Dennis Cooke refers to an article in the Protestant Telegraph where Paisley’s view on 
the background for the conflict becomes clear: 
There are those who mistakenly analyse the Ulster situation in terms of social and economic factors, in 
terms of politics, or philosophies. These theories and analyses collapse because they ignore, deliberately 
or otherwise, the main key, and to us the most obvious factor: Protestantism versus popery. The war in 
Ulster is a war of survival between opposing forces of Truth and Error, and the principles of the 
reformation are as relevant today in Ulster as they were in Europe in the sixteenth century.242 
The idea that the situation in Ulster came down to protestantism vs. popery is a view that 
clearly can be separated from the view of the conservative unionists, and Paisley’s perspective 
was miles away from the reform-friendly policies of O’Neill. With a political outlook like that 
it would be difficult for Paisley to accept even the smallest gesture towards the Roman 
Catholic community, since it would bring the pope one step closer to the threshold.      
 
THE RIOTS IN DERRY AND THE AFTERMATH 
The events in Derry in October 1968 were not only a turning point for the civil rights 
campaign, it would also give Paisley support among the angry loyalist community, which felt 
abandoned by O’Neill and his government and therefore searched for a different policy. 
Paisley would waste no time, and his campaign against O’Neill intensified fast during the first 
months of the troubles. 
Paisley supported Craig’s decision to ban the march, and he defended strongly the 
actions of the police during the march. Paisley warned that the march was a sign of the IRA 
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planning a massive campaign.243 In a special edition of the Protestant Telegraph the blame for 
the riots was laid at O’Neill’s feet. According to the editorial, it was O’Neill’s policies of 
appeasement that had caused the troubles in Derry, and the folly of this appeasement was now 
seen in all its ugliness and hideousness.244  There could be no doubt that they had been 
betrayed by O’Neill, it was argued. O’Neill had according to the editorial, used every 
opportunity to smear the Protestants and eulogise and condone the action of the Roman 
Catholic Church and her puppet politicians and her puppet priests, cardinals and canons.245 
This reasoning would be used by Paisley throughout O’Neill’s premiership. By trying to 
reform the Northern Irish society O’Neill had betrayed the Protestant community.  
The attack on the Roman Catholic Church would also be repeated many more times. 
In mine mind this is one of the factors that would separate the hardliners in the Unionist Party 
from the loyalist outside. The great fear for what the Catholic Church would do if the Catholic 
community got any influences in Northern Ireland, did separate Paisley and his followers 
from most unionists. One can clearly see Paisley’s fear in the editorial after the riots in Derry. 
According to the paper, when Rome was on a plane of equality it was like a fox, and Rome 
was now starting to believe that she was in the equality in regard to strength in Ulster, thus 
when Rome came from a place of minority, to a place of majority, she became a “tiger with 
barred teeth,” the PT argued. The barred teeth had, according to the paper, been seen in 
Derry.246 This indicates that the Protestant Telegraph felt that the civil rights movement’s 
claim that it was non-sectarian and non-violent, was only a ploy to in the end achieve a united 
Ireland. When this was achieved, the Protestants would be battered down. In this way the 
loyalist leaders played on the inherent protestant fear of what would happen if the Catholics 
took control over Northern Ireland.  
 
Not on my land 
When NICRA announced that they would march in Armagh on the 30th of November 1968, 
Paisley got furious. According to Dennis Cooke, Paisley said that nobody were going to 
march there; that was his city, his birthplace, and nobody were going to desecrate it. He said 
that if the march would go on, he would take the appropriate actions.247 Major disturbances 
were only avoided because of a significant police presence. Paisley was warned that he was 
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holding an unlawful assembly, and for this he was later found guilty and sentenced to three 
months imprisonment.248 The fact that Paisley demanded the right to march wherever he 
wanted, but denied the civil rights marchers the same right, demonstrates his view of Ulster as 
a Protestant territory. The Protestants should have the right to go wherever they wanted, but 
the Catholics should not go outside their own quarters. It was the Protestants, not the 
Catholics that were under attack, Paisley claimed.      
In an editorial in the Protestant Telegraph from October 1968, the allegation from the 
civil rights movement that the Catholics were discriminated in Ulster was repudiated; in fact 
the loyalist felt that it was they who had been discriminated against. According to the editorial 
there had been the reign and rule of two laws in Ulster, a rigid and hard law of blatant 
injustice against Protestants. Neither did the Protestants receive justice from the courts, and 
there had been an effort to beat traditional Protestantism into the ground, and to beat those 
who raised a “standard for truth and righteousness” into the ground.249       
 This reasoning was followed up by Paisley in a speech on the 7th October, he said that 
the real appeasement policy of O’Neill worked to: “batter down the Protestants, and 
encourage the Romanist the do so.” 250 Paisley said to O’Neill that he was in Ulster because 
Protestant people kept the law, because Protestant people did not break the law, because the 
Protestant leaders had called upon the people to work within the framework of the law, and 
consequently, O’Neill was safe in Ulster because of the tolerance of the Protestant people.251  
O’Neill’s warning that if the situation did not cool down, the British government 
might withdrew its financial support, did not affect Paisley. Paisley did not fear what would 
happen if Britain withdrew its financial support. If he had been Minister of Finance he would 
get the millions of pounds the Country wanted by removing the children’s allowance after the 
third child.252 This was a kick towards the Catholic community, and the belief that Catholics 
produced many more children than the Protestants. He did also say that he would remove the 
support of Catholic schools.253 The Catholics were presented as a burden for the Northern 
Irish community, and it seems as if Paisley saw them as foreigners in Ulster.  
Paisley was not the only one who did not fear the threats from the British prime 
minister. The, at that time, unionist Parliament Member Desmond Boal did not accept that the 
British Prime Minister should interfere in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Boal called the 
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British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s remarks, that there would be a reappraisal of the 
relationship between Northern Ireland and Great Britain if O’Neill was overthrown, an 
unwarranted and unwelcome intrusion into the affairs of the Unionist Party. Boal would not 
accept any interference in his freedom of action.254 At this time Boal, like most other unionist, 
focused on the maintaining of law and order, but he did not like the way everybody who held 
strong views was labelled extremist. 
 Like the other unionist hardliners Boal had the “greatest contempt” for the “so-
called” civil rights movement. 255 He found it pathetic that the movement could do nothing 
better that to borrow their political thinking, political dross and musical encouragement from 
the Negros in America. It made him sick to his stomach to see these unthinking masses 
marching and chanting like parrots phrases they did not understand. 256  Yet, however 
misguided the movement was, he defended their right to move through the streets. Their way 
of protest had a place in a democratic society, as long as the movement conducted their 
protest in a peaceful way and did not threaten with the use of force, Boal claimed. But if the 
demonstration most likely would cause disorder, for example if the rout went through an area 
which did not share the marcher’s beliefs, it should be stopped. Considering this, Boal said 
that he could not condone the actions of the Protestants that gathered together during the 
march in Armagh.257 Still, even though he did not defend them, it is clear that he had much 
more sympathy for their cause than that of the civil rights protesters. Concerning the loyalist 
protesters’ reasons Boal said this: 
I think they were there as the result of confused thinking. No doubt a great many of them, if not all, 
were very sincere. No doubt they regarded themselves as being in a desperate plight and no doubt they 
regarded themselves as being competent in fact, they probably thought it was necessary for them -to 
express in an overt way the feeling of frustration, an understandable feeling of frustration, that they have 
had looking at the spectacle of these fellow citizens of theirs throughout the community chanting at the 
police, making vulgar signs at the police and flaunting authority. No doubt they felt frustrated at that 
over the past couple of months. No doubt they felt that in order to play their part in showing their 
contempt and their disgust for such behaviour they had to resort to the overt and regrettably physical 
actions that they did on Saturday.258 
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Even if he said that he could not support the loyalist protesters, Boal had sympathy for the 
reason for their, in his words, misguided way of protest. He laid the blame on the civil rights 
movement, which had provoked the Protestant community to the extent that they felt no other 
choice but to respond. He was willing to appear in court for the defence of the people who had 
gathered in Armagh, but that did not mean he was condoning or justifying their actions, in 
fact he felt that it was quite distinct.259 It does seem as if Boal had different standards for 
Catholics and Protestants. His willingness to defend the civil rights movement right to march, 
as long as they did so in a peaceful manner may stem from his belief that the movement’s 
intention was not non-violence. On the 20th of November he said that those who was 
concerned about civil rights, was in reality only intent upon disrupting the community.260 
In the same speech, Boal gave his support to William Craig after his O’Neill critical 
speech. He said that the speech could possibly loosely be called a strong speech, a speech of 
conviction, and he had every right to make it. 261 In this period Boal was a part of the fraction 
within the Unionist Party who openly opposed O’Neill, but his belief that it was right to 
march in the street separated him from the other unionist hardliner who focused most on the 
maintaining of law and order.  
Paisley also supported Craig after his speech. He said that the allegation from Craig 
that there was a lesser standard of democracy where there was a Roman Catholic majority was 
“absolutely correct.” One could not, according to Paisley discuss Popery without being 
branded as an extremist and fanatic.262 Major Bunting said that by firing Craig, O’Neill had 
committed political suicide, and asked if they now could expect that Eddie McAteer263 was 
appointed as minister of Home Affairs.264  Craig did in general receive support from the 
loyalist community after his actions as Minister of Home Affairs after the events in October. 
When O’Neill fired Craig, the loyalist felt that the Prime Minister would fire the only one 
who was willing to fight for their cause in the cabinet.  
This probably increased their determination to remove O’Neill from his post. The 
support from the loyalist community was not reciprocated from Craig however. He denied 
that he supported Paisley. This did not go over very well with Paisley, and he claimed that this 
was not what Craig had said to him in private, but if it was true, then Craig had cut himself 
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from the vast majority of Protestant support in the province.265 But even though Craig did not 
support Paisley, he did certainly believe that there was room for Paysleyites in the unionist 
movement.266  
The fact that Craig, one of the most outspoken critics of O’Neill, did not want to be 
associated with Paisley shows that there was a marked difference of opinion between the 
unionist hardliners and the loyalists. So far it looks as if the greatest difference was the 
loyalist insistence to express their views in the street, and the fact that Paisley spoke so 
harshly about the Catholic Church. But even though Craig did not want to be associated with 
Paisley, he avoided the furiously attacks from Paisley that O’Neill had to face. 
When O’Neill fired Craig it became clear that something had changed in Northern 
Ireland since October. From calling Craig incompetent and unpopular, Paisley now called the 
decision to remove him from office a “capitulation to the Romanist and republicans, the 
anarchists, the civil rights agitators and the communist.”267 This implies that Craig, at least in 
Paisley’s mind, had moved closer to the loyalist position.     
Paisley called O’Neill’s “crossroad speech” on the 9th of December 1968, a complete 
capitulation to the civil rights movement. O’Neill had indicted the unionism of the past, and 
showed that he had more in common with the enemies of Ulster, than with her true 
defenders.268 For Paisley this was the time for Ulster to prepare for the final conflict, the time 
for Ulster to arise and acknowledge their God, because it should be no surrender, no 
compromise.269 For Paisley there was no middle ground, and this would show in the way he 
spoke. The language Paisley used resonated with the Protestant community as many saw the 
situation growing increasingly violent. Paisley would use any opportunity to make a very 
clear distinction between himself and O’Neill.   
O’Neill’s call for people to show where they stood was, according to Paisley, an act of 
the basest hypocrisy, since the only way people could show where they stood was at the ballot 
box.270 This is an interesting statement, as O’Neill when calling for the General Election in 
1969, was accused by the Protestant Telegraph of tearing the country apart in order to secure 
his own position.271  
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As 1968 drew to an end it looked as if O’Neill had weathered the storm. He had 
managed to appease most of the civil rights movement, and he had managed to hold on to the 
moderate Protestant support, and by doing so, managing to fend of the challenges from 
Paisley. But as seen in the previous chapter, the peace would not last, and O’Neill would not 
be able to control the situation. And even though the Peoples Democracy (PD) was those who 
would light the fire again, Paisley and his supporters would pour on enough gasoline so it 
would burn the Stormont parliament straight out of existence.    
 
THE BURNTOLLET MARCH AND THE NEW OPPOSITION  
The participants of the Peoples Democracy march from Belfast to Derry were warned, by 
Major Bunting, before the march started that they would do best to stay away from loyalist 
areas or accept the consequences.272 The government did not ban the PD march, hoping that it 
would peter out on its own. When the march started there were minor skirmishes right from 
the start. The RUC stopped the march several times, and did not allow the marchers to follow 
their intended route on several occasions. Paisley and Major Bunting met with the Minister of 
Home Affairs; to try to convince him of banning the march, if he did not they would continue 
with their “harassing and hindering” campaign. According to one of the PD leaders, Michael 
Farrell, what happened on the 4th of January was nothing less than a planned ambush. The 
spot of the ambush was well chosen. The loyalists were on a height, heaps of stones had been 
collected and the crowds had been gathering since early morning. RUC did not stop the 
attackers, and according to Farrell did some of them join in the attacks. The attacks followed 
all the way to Derry. When the PD marchers finally reached the city, they received a hero’s 
welcome. That night there were confrontations with the RUC, and the people build barricades 
to keep them out, and “Free Derry was born.”273          
 It was not long after these events that O’Neill announced his intentions to set up a 
commission to investigate the underlying causes for the troubles since October 1968.274 
Paisley called the setting up of the Cameron commission “a complete capitulation to false and 
insidious propaganda emulating from those who wanted to destroy the Ulster constitution.”275 
Just a glance at the activities the previous months made it clear that the civil rights movement 
was in fact the IRA plot in operation. The central positions of leading republicans high up in 
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the civil rights movement were evidence enough for the IRA involvement, Paisley argued.276 
The loyalist movement felt that it was under attack from pretty much everybody else. The 
Protestant Telegraph claimed The Catholic community was trying to bring down the 
constitution, the Northern Irish and British prime ministers were helping them, and the Press 
was concealing the real truth about Ulster.277 The loyalists saw themselves as the true unionist 
Protestants and the last true defenders of the constitution.       
Paisley, in accordance with O’Neill, did not fear what the Cameron commission would 
uncover, since he believed that the Ulster unionists had nothing to hide. He expected that the 
commission would investigate the attitude of the press and the discrimination by O’Neill 
against the Protestants.278   
On the 29th of January Paisley and major Bunting were arrested, after having been 
found guilty of unlawful assembly they were sentenced to three months of imprisonment. 
Paisley was released after paying the bond the next day, and he proclaimed that he would not 
appeal the sentence.279 However, he would later have to serve the sentence, and he used his 
various prison sentences to paint a picture of himself as a man who do anything to protect the 
Protestant heritage in Northern Ireland. By doing so he would try to distinguish himself from 
O’Neill, the man who, according to the loyalists would do anything for power. The Protestant 
Telegraph wrote late in January 1969 that O’Neill had jeopardised the future of Northern 
Ireland. O’Neill had betrayed Ulster in order to safeguard his own position. He had sold 
Ulster to the man who had declared that he wanted a united Ireland, the British Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson.280  
Paisley’s strong resentment for the British Prime Minister may seem like a 
contradiction to his commitment to fight for the union, but as Paisley explained, he was loyal 
to the Crown and the flag, not any particular political party.281 But there is no mistaking the 
loyalist movement’s dislike for the British Prime Minister Wilson. The Protestant Telegraph 
characterized him as “A bully who had not fought the fascists during the last war” and 
claimed that a man like that should not criticize the standard of decency of the Ulster 
Protestants. O’Neill’s meeting with Wilson was as despicable “as a crawl of a half starved fly 
into the web of a well-fed spider.”282 The reason for these remarks was a statement from 
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Wilson where he said that he was glad that the response of all decent thinking people in 
Northern Ireland was to support the reform movement and reject the courses which would 
lead to fascism.283 Paisley felt that his heritage was being attacked from every section of the 
community who was not of his own. And When Paisley got a chance to challenge O’Neill in 
the general election; he would fire all his canons in an effort to stop the man he felt destroyed 
Ulster.  
 
The Protestant Unionists 
Even if Paisley had asked for an election several times, he expressed scepticism when the 
election was announced. He fronted the same view as Craig, and he did still believe that he 
and Craig had a lot in common. He said that they agreed that Ulster had to be an integral part 
of the United Kingdom, and that the leadership of the Unionist Party ought to be settled by the 
Unionist Party, not an election.284 
            In the Protestant Telegraph he took it even further. The paper called the election a 
plan to wreck the country. Terence O’Neill had only one interest and that was Terence 
O’Neill. He cared nothing about the Unionist Party, the parliament or the country; these were 
only steppingstones over which he tramped in the “madness of his dictatorship.”285 The paper 
wrote that O’Neill had run scared from the meeting of his own parliament party because he 
knew that they would not support him. O’Neill was a destroyer, he had destroyed the stability 
of Ulster’s constitution, he had destroyed the unity of the Unionist Party, and he had 
destroyed the protestant people’s faith in the justice of Ulster’s administration.286 The PT 
expressed that it was the loyalists that were the victims in Ulster. Loyalists could according to 
the paper no longer expect a fair treatment from the police and the courts. The only crime 
loyalists were guilty of was loyalty; “Loyalty to the Crown and constitution.” 287  The 
government had abdicated its authority and was no longer fit to rule, it was claimed. The 
police had failed to protect the Protestant community, and when the loyalists tried to protect 
themselves they were jailed.288          
Paisley told 4000 supporters outside Ballymena town hall that he would contest the 
Bannside constituency, O’Neill’s seat. Paisley told the audience that O’Neill had done enough 
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to jeopardise the 50 years of consolidation and progress the province had enjoyed. He had at 
this time decided that he would appeal his sentence, and that meant that he would be a free 
man during the election campaign.289 The election would indicate how much support Paisley 
had taken away from O’Neill. A strong result for Paisley would make it even more difficult 
for O’Neill, and his attempts to reform the society. O’Neill could not ignore the threat Paisley 
posed, and he hit hard against Paisley when he in a statement on the 12th of February, asked 
what positive suggestion Paisley and his kin ever had made about any aspect in their life, what 
could they offer the electorate but empty and angry words? They were only against him; they 
had no policies O’Neill argued. The loyalists were in O’Neill’s mind a collection of “canutes 
vainly trying to hold back the tide of the 20th century.”290   
It did not take long before Paisley announced what direction he wanted for Ulster. He 
wanted an Ulster which was so strong in constitutional standing and in its link with Great 
Britain that no southern politicians, the Roman Catholic lobby in Westminister or any traitor 
inside the Unionist Party could assail. He wanted an Ulster where the police was strong 
enough to cope with the IRA front-organizations, and an Ulster whose parliament would have 
the confidence of all loyalist citizens.291 Paisley and the others who campaigned with him, 
called themselves the Protestant Unionists. This was a kick towards O’Neill and the Unionist 
Party, which they felt had betrayed the traditional Protestant unionism. Ulster and 
Protestantism was one and the same for Paisley. First and foremost he wanted justice for the 
Protestants, the Catholics were outsiders. This perspective separates Paisley views from that 
of O’Neill and Faulkner, and even Craig did not completely ignore the Catholics place within 
Ulster, even if he did not make an effort to win them over.  
Even though Paisley spoke of the civil rights movement as an IRA plot, he did want to 
reform some of the same sections of the Northern Irish society. He called for a reform of the 
local government, so that every citizen would obtain his full democratic rights; he wanted a 
crash program on housing; a program that would improve the existing houses and speed up 
the slum clearances, and he wanted an Ulster with full employment.292  Several of these 
demands coincided with that of the civil rights movement’s demands. Yet at the same time the 
loyalists also wanted to stop or hinder many of the reforms that the civil rights movement had 
been granted the last months. The Protestant Unionists wanted a strengthening of the B-
Specials, which they regarded to be the real bulwark against Ulster’s enemies. The loyalists 
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also demanded the restoration of confidence in the parliament by removing the bodies set up 
by O’Neill which infringed on the parliaments sovereignty (the Cameron commission). In 
addition the loyalists asked for the absolute demonstration that justice was done in the courts, 
a reorganising of the local government with reform of its taxation system, and a crash 
program on housing.293      
The Protestant Unionists did not concern themselves with the Catholic community; 
instead they took a judgemental attitude against their church. In a rather condescending 
statement they wrote: “We stand for full civil and religious liberty for all the people of 
Northern Ireland, particularly Roman Catholics, whose freedom from authoritarianism is of 
great concern to us.”294 It seems as if it was a popular belief among the loyalists that the 
Roman Catholic Church was authoritarian and undemocratic in nature, and that the Roman 
Catholics were repressed by their church. In an article in the PT, Avro Manhattan295, wrote for 
example that the fact that the Catholics owed their first allegiance to the pope made them 
dangerous instruments for a foreign power: they would obey the pope first and the law 
second.296 Modern democracy was contrary to the Catholic faith. A Catholic had to be anti-
liberal and anti-Protestant; so a good Catholic could never rightly claim to be a good democrat, 
since it would not only be a contradiction in term, but an impossibility.297 Paisley had a 
similar opinion. He would make no apology for his Protestant conviction, but he did say that 
he would not deal with his constituencies on the basis of their religion. Just because he was 
against the Roman Catholic Church for constantly attacking the constitution, and rejecting to 
stand for the singing of God Save the Queen, it did not mean that he was against the Roman 
Catholics.  
Paisley’s religious and political views were, according to Thomas Hennessey, 
diametrically opposed to those of O’Neill.298 The election would be a test of which one of the 
two that had been most successful in their strategy: O’Neill’s attempt to attract the moderate 
population or Paisley’s attempt to fuel the always underlying Protestant fear of what would 
happen if Ireland was united.   
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THE RESULT AND CONTINUING FIGHT 
Even though not a single Protestant Unionist candidate was elected, Paisley considered the 
election as a success.  His result of 6331 votes against O’Neill’s 7745 was the highest number 
for the Protestant Unionists. The election was a disappointment for O’Neill who had hoped 
that the moderates from both sides would come together to support him. Instead it was Paisley 
who would get conformation of his increasing popularity. Paisley expressed delight over the 
election result. Losing to O’Neill by only 1414 votes was enough to make Paisley proud. He 
said that if the election campaign had lasted a week longer, he would have won.299 The 
Roman Catholic priests had, according to Paisley, exhorted the people of Bannside to vote for 
O’Neill, and the fact that O’Neill depended upon the votes of the enemy meant that he was 
open for all sorts of pressure.300 
            In a televised speech, printed in the Protestant Telegraph, Paisley said that O’Neill 
had a threefold policy: first, he wanted to break up the Unionist Party, in which he had 
succeeded, second, he wanted a collation with the nationalists, and thirdly, he wanted a united 
Ireland. The Protestant Unionists on the other hand stood for the constitution it was claimed, 
they stood for everything their fathers had fought and died for, and they stood for religious 
and civil liberty for all. Paisley continued with the claim that it was the Protestants that were 
being discriminated against. The civil rights campaigner’s who burned police tenders and 
were guilty of acts of violence was not punished, but protestant leaders was imprisoned. The 
IRA plot was now moving over in the second phase. 301 The first phase was IRA’s incitement 
of civil unrest. That had succeeded, and now they could start with the second phase which 
meant a quickening of the acts of civil disobedience, and the occupation of public and crown 
buildings. 302 The PT claimed that the Peoples Democracy was now announcing plans along 
those lines. The PD was now virtually in control of the Civil Rights Association, and that was 
evidence of the success of the IRA plan, according to the PT.303           
 After the election, Paisley said to a crowd of 3000 people at a Limavady rally, that his 
campaign against O’Neill had only begun. He would arrange a march that would show 
O’Neill that he was not wanted to lead Ulster. The civil rights people could go on the streets, 
so now the loyalists should show that the Protestant people also could, and would, go on the 
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street.304 Paisley himself would not get the possibility to protest in the street much longer. 
With his sentence still in effect it would not take long before he had to go to jail. 
On the 25th of March 1969 Paisley and Major Bunting began to serve their prison 
sentences. Desmond Boal, counsel for both, said that the only reason that the loyalist 
gathering had armed themselves during the march in Armagh November 1968, was because 
they feared for what the counter protesters would do to them. Paisley himself had only been 
armed with a walking stick.305 The imprisonment would be used for all it was worth by 
Paisley. He would paint a picture of a man who had been unjustly jailed for following his own 
conviction. During his prison sentences he would publish letters from jail in the Protestant 
Telegraph.       
Even as Paisley served his prison sentences, he was still able to remain in control over 
the fight against O’Neill. The plan forward was presented after a special session of the Ulster 
Constitution Defence Committee (UCDC), and a statement signed by Paisley was published 
in the PT. Paisley reminded the government that those who they smeared as Paysleyites had 
also rights, and they would no longer be trampled on. He called for an inquiry into “the 
strange actions of the Attorney General, and his campaign to indict loyal Protestants and to 
excuse Romanist who had rioted, burned police tenders, looted, damaged property, and 
savagely attacked Protestant people.”306 Paisley obviously felt that it was only the Protestant 
that were punished, and that the Catholics could do what they wanted, since they had the 
support of O’Neill.   
The UCDC planned to launch a campaign called “justice for Protestants”, and as a part 
of this campaign they would demand their right, as British citizens, to parade and demonstrate. 
They refused to allow that their town and cities was taken over by an IRA front movement. 
These movements and their illegal activities could not be ignored.307 The campaign would 
focus on those areas where the police, according to the UCDC, had abdicated their power to 
the so-called civil rights stewards, who were only thugs of the rebel movement.308 So to sum 
up: Paisley would fight for the right to protest in the street, and fight against the right for the 
civil rights movement to do the same.   
On the 4th of April the PT criticized the Belfast Telegraph for being engaged in a 
conspiracy to rob the Protestant of their civil and religious liberties. This conspiracy was from 
                                                 
304
 Belfast Telegraph:4/3-1969 
305
 Belfast Telegraph:26/4-1969 
306
 Protestant Telegraph:5/4-1969 
307
 Protestant Telegraph:5/4-1969 
308
 Protestant Telegraph:22/2-1969 
 65 
time to time uncovered, it was alleged, such as when the Belfast Telegraph, enraged by 
Protestant victories, uncovered its true objective and goal. The reason for this was that the 
Belfast Telegraph had not published the statement mentioned above in full.309  
Paisley blamed O’Neill for the splitting of the Unionist Party, but he blamed the 
Catholic Church for the troubles. Speaking to an audience at a Reformation rally in 
Enniskillen, he said that one should not blame the politicians for the troubles, because the 
troubles started in the pulpits of the churches. Because, as Paisley put it, when leprously 
curses a nation, it is in the churches that leprously begin. He went on to say that he was 
against the pope, and that he was against the ecumenical movement with every fibre of his 
body.310  
O’Neill never managed to fulfil his attempt to reform the society. When the bombs 
exploded, he had to go. But not before he sat in motion the removal of what had been one of 
the biggest complaints of the civil rights movement.   
 
Reactions to O’Neill’s resignation 
O’Neill’s last act in power made the PT furious. O’Neill’s decision to grant the civil rights 
movement’s demand of one-man, one-vote, was an act of a government that had ceased to 
rule; it was the O’Neill’s final capitulation to the republican movement. O’Neill had only 
been willing to give into the demand when it became clear for him that he would not be able 
to remain in power, it was alleged, and cowardly he had sized the possibility when Paisley 
was in jail, thereby fulfilling his six year treachery against Ulster. The paper claimed that the 
act had cast hundreds of thousands of Protestants into a terrible fury, which would be used to 
make sure that all of O’Neill’s policies and puppet supporters would be forced out in 
obscurity.311             
There was no regret from the loyalist community over O’Neill’s resignation. The PT 
wrote that his “reign of terror” had been characterised by broken pledges and blatant 
association with Ulster’s enemies. 312  O’Neill had allied himself with the civil rights 
movement and the Roman hierarchy, the paper alleged. He had believed that the Roman 
Catholics were loyal to the crown and that they should come together and form a political and 
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religious utopia, this could not the PT accept. There was not, and could never be any common 
ground for Protestants to unite with those who ravaged the town and cities of Ulster.313  
 Yet the fight was not over even though O’Neill was gone. The Protestant Telegraph 
warned that anybody who believed that was dreaming. The problems in Ulster had been 
created by sophisticated enemies of partition. These enemies had made the Unionist Party a 
victim rather than the master.314 The paper also made it clear that the loyalists would not make 
it any easier for the next Prime Minister, since the Unionist Party had yet to produce a man 
“with vision and spiritual insight into the root causes of the disintegrating political 
situation.”315  
 
SUMMARY 
The fact that Ian Paisley played a big role in the downfall of O’Neill is not disputed. O’Neill’s 
room of manoeuvre became reduced because of Paisley’s and the loyalist’s opposition 
towards the Prime Minister’s reforms. If O’Neill had been able to deal with the civil rights 
movement without Paisley’s interference, the situation would probably have turned out 
different. The loyalist populist policies attracted a large section of the Protestant community, 
who felt that the government was giving too much to Catholic community, without getting 
something in return. Paisley played a big role in making the situation into a Catholic vs. 
Protestant dichotomy, instead of a question of modernisation as O’Neill tried to make it.  
The reason why Paisley criticised O’Neill to the extent that he did, can be explained 
by his fear of what would happen if the civil rights movement was granted their demands. 
O’Neill did not fear Catholic influence, and could therefore try to modernise the Northern 
Irish society. Paisley would fight against this, not primarily because he was against 
modernisation as such, but because he believed that this would lead to more power to the 
Roman Catholic Church, a process which would endanger the union with Great Britain. The 
political and religious beliefs of Paisley and O’Neill were so far apart that there could be no 
common ground, and no compromise. This goes to show that O’Neill and Paisley were 
fighting different fights. O’Neill fought a political fight for modernisation, while Paisley 
fought a religious fight for Ulster’s survival and the survival of its Protestant heritage.  
 When it comes to the civil rights movement, there is no doubt that Paisley and the 
other loyalist saw it as a front. Sometimes they expressed the belief that it was a front for the 
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IRA, and a step in their plan to end partition, sometimes they said it was a front for the Roman 
Catholic Church and communism. In any case, discrimination against the Catholics in 
Northern Ireland was not the real reason for the campaign it was alleged. In fact it was the 
Protestants that experienced discrimination at that time, the loyalist claimed: Protestants were 
not allowed to express their views in the same way as the civil rights movement, and as long 
as the Premiership was in hand of one of Ulster’s enemies, they would be discriminated 
against by the police and courts. 
 The main issue that separated the loyalist politicians from the hardliners in the 
Unionist Party, was the fact that the loyalists insisted on their right to express their views on 
the street. The hardliners in the Unionist Party put law and order before the right to march. 
The fact that the loyalist demanded their right to march in the street, did not mean however 
that they accepted that the civil rights movement could do the same. It was an accepted belief 
among the loyalists that the Roman Catholics should only march within their one quarters, 
whereas the Protestants should be able to march were they wanted. Another difference was 
Paisley’s strong criticisms of the Catholic Church. This also separated him from Boal, who 
did not lashed out on the Catholic Church in the same way. 
 Paisley would get his wish fulfilled when O’Neill resigned, but this would not end his 
fight. The next chapter will focus on the period leading up to the suspension of the Stormont 
Parliament.                   
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE FALL OF A PARLIAMENT: MAY 1969 
TO MARCH 1972 
During the last years of the Stormont period the Unionist Party crumbled, the loyalists grew in 
strength and the civil rights campaign were to be replaced by mayhem with a magnitude not 
seen on the Irish isle since the 1920’s. On the 1st of May 1969 Major James Chichester-Clark 
was elected Prime Minister and unionist leader by seventeen votes to sixteen over Brian 
Faulkner.316  As we have seen in the previous chapters O’Neill received much resistance 
during his effort to reform the Northern Irish society, and the situation would not turn out to 
be much easier for his successor.    
This chapter will focus on the last years of the Stormont parliament, the years from 
1969 to 1972. Towards the end of O’Neill’s premiership the situation in Northern Ireland 
deteriorated fast, but it would seem like smooth sailing compared to the troubles that were to 
come. Since the violence in this period became an overshadowing element, the cries for civil 
rights were muffled by the chaos that was to ensue. It will therefore be more difficult to sort 
out the different views on the civil rights campaign during this period. Even so I believe that it 
will be productive to look into the actions of the civil rights movement and the perceptions of 
the civil rights campaig in an effort to explain how the situation could turn out so bad. I will 
in this chapter focus on the loyalists, unionists, and the civil rights movement’s actions 
concurrently. The reason why I have not split the different groups into different sections, as I 
have done in the previous chapters, is that the actions and events in this period got so 
intertwined that such a structure would conceal the intrinsic dynamic of the process.  The 
questions I will discuss in this chapter are: 
• How did the different views on the civil rights movement, and civil rights within the 
Unionist Party develop? Did the change of Prime Minister represent a change in the 
unionist opinion of the civil rights movement? 
• Did the new PM change the government’s policy on civil rights and reforms? 
• How did the civil rights movement continue to affect the development within the 
unionist movement? 
• How did the loyalists perceive the Unionist Party’s actions towards the civil rights 
movement, and in what way did the loyalists influence the Unionist Party’s 
possibilities to act? 
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THE HONEYMOON PERIOD  
This is not war, and please let it never be.317 
Major James Chichester-Clark 
 
The first period of Chichester-Clark’s premiership was calmer than one could expect. The 
different fractions who had stood so far apart in the last months of O’Neill’s term, gave the 
new PM a chance to prove that he would take care of their interests. 
The election of the new Prime Minster was a tight race, and rather ironically it was 
Terence O’Neill that should cast the deciding vote. It was the history between himself and 
Faulkner that made his decision. In his autobiography O’Neill wrote that he could not make 
himself to vote for the man (Faulkner) that had tried to bring him down for the last six 
years. 318  Chichester-Clark was a relative unknown name in Ulster politics. The Belfast 
Telegraph wrote that his narrow win over Faulkner had brought him from comparative 
obscurity to the province supreme political office.319 Chichester-Clark did not display a great 
overconfidence over the tasks ahead. Asked if he would be able to unite the Unionist Party, he 
said that he would give it a good try. And asked if he would be able to get the protesters of the 
street, he answered that he could not know that, but that he would do his best.320 If he did not 
display an overwhelming confidence, he did say that he would continue along the same path 
as O’Neill. He was fully behind O’Neill’s last act, the introduction of one man, one vote in 
1971. He would also consider meeting the Irish Prime Minister, and he saw no reason that 
there should not be a good relationship between the north and south.321 The policies would 
therefore be much the same, but how would that affect his support among the Unionist Party 
members? 
Chichester-Clark received support from some of O’Neill’s most outspoken critics, 
Faulkner said that he would fully support the new PM, and Craig said that the Unionist Party 
was united again, and that the new PM had a better chance of dealing with the situation.322 
Chichester-Clark tried to reunite the party by picking cabinet members from both the Pro-
O’Neill and Anti-O’Neill sections of the party. Faulkner accepted the position as Minister of 
Development.323 The fact that Faulkner was willing to go back into the cabinet even if the 
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new Prime Minister announced that he would continue with the policies of O’Neill, supports 
the conclusion that his departure from the previous administration came about because of a 
personal conflict with O’Neill, and not so much the policy.  
Chichester-Clark had managed to calm down some of the opposition within the party, 
but he would also have to deal with the civil rights movement. He asked the civil rights 
movement for patience. There was a great deal do be done before the local government 
franchise could be changed, and it would be foolish to make the changes now, only to realise 
that they had to change everything a year later, he said. Chichester-Clark felt that if the civil 
rights movement had any goodwill they would accept the government’s word, which had been 
given so clearly.324 The civil rights movement did not see it the same way, and they were not 
very pleased with the new cabinet. The Dungannon Citizens Action Committee called it a sob 
to the right wing, and claimed that the Prime Minister tried to appease the “wild men” of the 
party, rather than to dispense justice to all the community.325 The appointment of people who 
had spoken strongly against the reform policies of O’Neill might have given the civil rights 
movement the impression that the new PM was closer to the hardliners in the party. 
 Even if the new cabinet did not please the civil rights movement, Chichester-Clark 
would manage to obtain some goodwill when he, as one of his first acts in office gave an 
amnesty for all offences connected with the demonstrations since October 5th, a decision that 
would make Ian Paisley and Major Bunting free men. His hope was that all would see that 
this had been done in order to restore the peace, and that the community would respond in a 
spirit that showed that they recognised a shared responsibility with the government to achieve 
this. If they did not, Chichester-Clark claimed, disharmony would persist, and the economic 
situation would be in danger.326 
 The decision was received with enthusiasm from both loyalists such as Desmond Boal, 
who called it a bold and adventurous act, and by civil rights leaders such as John Hume, who 
expressed the hope that this would be an indication of the spirit in which the government 
would deal with the situation.327 In a rare instance, the government had managed to please 
both the loyalists and the civil rights campaigners. Judging from my material, the launch of 
the amnesty was one of the main reasons why Chichester-Clark received a period of goodwill 
in the beginning of his premiership. It was one of the few times both the civil rights 
movement and the loyalists saw a government action as a genuine act of goodwill, and not a 
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trick to appease one side over the other. But even though the motion was greeted with 
optimism, it would not take the people of the street.  
In early May 1969 Paisley announced that he would lead a parade through Belfast.328 
Even though the loyalists remained on the street, there was something new about their protests. 
The Protestant Telegraph wrote that the loyalists would not organise counter-demonstrations 
to the “CRA-IRA” front, they would leave the government to deal with them.329 Speaking to a 
crowd of several thousand after his release, Paisley announced that O’Neillism was dead, and 
that it was worth going back to prison to rid the country of O’Neill once and for all. He said 
that if a civil rights demonstration moved trough a Protestant area, damaging property, the 
Loyalist would step up. But as long as the new Prime Minister stopped the civil rights 
marchers, and did not disband the B-Specials, Paisley would give him his full support.330 
There was a willingness among the loyalists to give the new PM a chance to show that he 
would not be dictated by the civil rights movement the same way they felt O’Neill had. The 
civil rights movement was also willing to give Chichester-Clark a chance to show that he 
would deal with their complaints.    
NICRA announced that they would call off their civil disobedience campaign for the 
time being. The organisation was sceptical, but they decided to give the government a chance 
to prove that they were sincere in their intent to deal with the grievances at the local 
government level.331 There was at this time something that looked like a fragile peace. The 
new Prime Minister tried to balance the same line as O’Neill, by trying to assure that he 
would make changes, but not too drastic changes. He continued with a promise that the 
government would propose positive proposals for the reorganising of the local government. 
He also assured that there would be no wavering in the governments resolve to maintain the 
link with Great Britain.332 It did not look like much had changed with the new Prime Minister. 
He had given cabinet posts to some of the hardliners, but it looked like he would continue 
along the path set by O’Neill. So what would separate him from O’Neill? 
For one thing he attacked the civil rights movement right from the start. Speaking to 
the Mid. Ulster Scout Council in Cookstown, Chichester-Clark said that “the social parasites” 
could make their protest since other people provided them with a livelihood. 333 The only 
reason the minority could choose to opt out, was that the majority was opting in, he claimed. 
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Because they were so noisy they did not realise what a “tiny and unrepresentative minority” 
they were.334  This was strong words, and he most likely was talking about the Peoples 
Democracy, still most Catholics would probably take offence. This separated him from 
O’Neill, who for the most part had tried not to speak down to the civil rights movement, and 
had done so only on a few occasions. Chichester-Clark made it perfectly clear the he did not 
regard the Peoples Democracy as a sincere organisation. Because as he said “never was a 
name so ill chosen as the Peoples Democracy.” 335 They did not represent the people and they 
had scant respect for democracy, according to Chichester-Clark. Where was the democracy if 
militant groups were to dictate to parliament what laws should be passed, he asked.336 He told 
a unionist rally that the “rabble-rousers” was deadweight around Ulster’s neck. He knew that 
there were moderate elements within the civil rights movement, and he felt that it was high 
time that these would separate themselves from the anarchist like Michael Farrell and 
Bernadette Devlin. 337  Even if he still believed that there was a sincere element within the 
civil rights movement, he could not have it seem as if he implemented the reforms because of 
their pressure. If he did so, he would most probably face opposition from the loyalists.  
Chichester-Clark made it therefore clear that he would not yield to pressure from 
NICRA. 338  Chichester-Clark continued with argument that proper democratic procedure 
belonged within the walls of the parliament. In fact he compared the demonstrations in the 
street to holding a gun to the government’s head.339 
Faulkner was at this time fully behind the government again. He refused to accept that 
it was the actions of the civil rights movement that had lead to the reshaping of the local 
government. He said that it had not come as an atoning of a sinful past; the work had started 
long before a single civil rights banner had been raised. 340  This goes to show that the 
government felt it necessary to stress that the reforms had not come as a result of the civil 
rights campaign. There can be several reasons for this. One can be that they wanted to avoid a 
British perception of a backwards Northern Irish government who only had given the 
Catholics reforms because of a civil rights campaign. It can also be because the government 
did not want the loyalists to perceive the reforms as a result of pressure from the civil rights 
movement. This might explain why Chichester-Clark used stronger words to characterise the 
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movement than his predecessor had. Regardless the reason, the government pressed on with 
the reforms.       
On the 9th of May the unionist delegates endorsed the government’s plans to introduce 
one-man, one-vote in 1971. It seems as if Chichester-Clark received less opposition than 
O’Neill because of the fear that the party would split again. The former Prime Minister Lord 
Brookeborough carried the motion, and he said that it was only through unity that the Prime 
Minister could resist the pressure from Whitehall and the streets.341 The British perception of 
the situation was always an aspect the government had to deal with. As long as the British 
government pushed for reforms, the Northern Irish government would have to deal with the 
civil rights movement in a way that made it seem as if they took the complaints seriously. Yet 
at the same time they could not act in a way that gave the loyalists the impression that they 
were giving into pressure. This may help to explain why they pressed on with reforms they 
knew the loyalist community would object to, but at the same time said that the reforms had 
not come as a result of the civil rights campaign. At this time it seems as if the acceptance of 
the civil rights movement’s way of protest, and the belief in their allegations was somewhat 
weakened with the new administration. But the government still said that there were problems 
to be dealt with, and they would therefore continue with the reforms.  
The opposition MPs accepted the government’s timetable for the introductions of the 
reforms, this after they had private talks with the Prime Minister. The decision was published 
in an all-party statement.342 The fact that the opposition got to be a part of the decision 
process was something new. The situation seemed to be much calmer than during the previous 
months under O’Neill, but there were mutterings of discontent over the reorganisation of the 
local government. Chichester-Clark still managed to remain in control, but there were small 
signs that indicated that the party was not completely united.343    
This is for example demonstrated when Chichester-Clark lashed out against the “so-
called” unionists, who he felt kept throwing stones at the government. He said that if Carson 
and Craig had been forced to look over their shoulders in 1912, Ulster would not have been a 
part of the United Kingdom.344 By using Carson and Craig, Chichester-Clark did the same as 
Paisley, and presented himself as the protector of their heritage.  
Paisley posed a real threat to the Unionist Party, since as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, his support among the Protestants was growing. But he did not attack the policies of 
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the new government right from the start. Chichester-Clark did manage to get the support from 
Paisley. After giving Paisley assurances that the government would continue the traditional 
unionist policy, and that he would not meet the Irish Prime Minister before the Irish Prime 
Minister acknowledged the constitutional position of Northern Ireland, Paisley promised the 
Prime Minister his full support.345 This did not mean that Paisley would remain quiet. When 
he and some of his supporters gathered to salute the Queen as she travelled to the Church of 
Scotland general assembly, he also had with him a banner that said: “the Pope of Rome is a 
man of sin, and the anti-Christ.” 346 On the other side of the road, NICRA held high placards 
which called for an end to bigotry and ignorance.347 This goes to show that the goodwill only 
extended to the government. The animosity between the civil rights movement and the 
loyalists persisted.  
Even so, Paisley did remain much more in the background in this period than he had 
during the last months of O’Neill’s leadership. When a civil rights march was to be held in 
Strabane, Paisley said that he would not interfere as long as the government did not break 
down, and he could not see that happening.348 There where however some mutterings of 
discontent among the loyalists as the new proposals for local government did not go well over 
with the loyalists. The Protestant Telegraph asked if Ulster was being betrayed. The reason 
for this was a statement from Faulkner stating that the plan was a legacy from the O’Neill 
days. If the plan were to be implemented, it would mean the loss of Derry for the Protestants, 
and fuelled by this victory, the Catholics would, according to the paper, move to the next area 
for their attack, and soon would even Belfast itself be doomed.349 The fear about what would 
happen if the Catholics were given any concessions would make the loyalists fight almost all 
government proposals that would change the status quo.  
If there was something new under Chichester-Clark, there was also something that 
would not change, and that was Craig’s insistence on criticising the policy of the government. 
Craig said that it was time to hit back, and hit back hard. He said that the speeches by the civil 
rights campaigner and MP Bernadette Devlin were nothing more than the language of 
Connolly socialism.350 This language was reminiscing of the language used in 1912, 1914 and 
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1916.351 By connecting the current situation at that time to these years, Craig implied that 
there was nothing new with the civil rights movement. Their goal was not one of modernising; 
it was as it always had been a question of a united Ireland. So even though Craig said that he 
hoped that Chichester-Clark would succeed, he also made it clear that he would not accept 
that the new PM gave into pressure from “the revolutionary groups” within the community.352  
It caused strong discontent among Unionist Party members, when Craig once again 
called for a new administration. Craig described most of the reforms the government was 
implementing, as foolish and unnecessary. He felt that the only thing that had changed since 
O’Neill was the Prime Minister. The cabinet was still the same, he claimed.353 Craig felt that 
the government’s intent to implement the reforms were an indictment of the unionists of the 
past, and this would make people feel ashamed of the Unionist Party, and eventually destroy 
it.354 The claim that the reforms were “foolish and unnecessary” was not a new allegation. 
Those who viewed the civil rights movement as a front movement did not accept the need for 
reforms. So when the government had implemented the reforms, it meant that they had 
succumbed to pressure. This was a view that would be frequently expressed in the time to 
come, but in the beginning it seemed like Craig was the only one who strongly hit out at the 
new PM. This would not last, however, and Chichester-Clark’s honeymoon period came to an 
abrupt end when the violence started up again. 
The first months of Chichester-Clark’s premiership was characterised with a fragile 
period of calm. This did not come as a result of a new policy. The new Prime Minister 
continued with the reforms the last Prime Minster had sat in motion. The calm came because 
of a perception among the civil rights movement and the loyalists that the new PM would 
implement a new policy. Chichester-Clark earned himself the period of calm by granting 
amnesty to all that had been arrested or charged with offences relating to the troubles caused 
by the civil rights movement. This pleased both the loyalists and the civil rights movement, 
and gave Chichester-Clark a chance to prove that he was sincere in his effort to deal with their 
grievances. The animosity between the civil rights protesters and the loyalists did not go away, 
however, and the peace was therefore an artificial one. The two movements had so different 
perceptions of what the new government would have to do to show that it was sincere, that it 
was only a question of time before Chichester-Clark would be forced to do something that 
would alienate one of the groups. With the civil rights movement, the loyalist movement and 
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the British government pressuring he had to do something, but he did not find the balance the 
troubles could ignite again. 
The unionist view on the civil rights movement changed somewhat with the new 
Prime Minister. Chichester-Clark used a stronger language than O’Neill had used to 
characterise the movement, especially the Peoples Democracy. In addition it seems as if the 
acceptance of the civil rights movement’s way of protest became more frowned upon within 
the Unionist Party. Yet there still was a belief that some part of the movement was sincere in 
their cause.  
Paisley and the loyalist stopped arranging counter demonstrations against civil rights 
demonstrations during the first few months of Chichester-Clark’s premiership. They did not 
do this because they had changed opinion on the civil rights movement, but as a gesture 
towards the new PM.         
 
BACK TO THE STREET 
The fragile peace that had lasted since Chichester-Clark took office would come to an end in 
July 1969 when a new period of violence erupted.  
It soon became clear that the new PM had not made the civil rights movement 
friendlier towards the Stormont parliament, or more willing to accept the jurisdiction of the 
parliament. On the 4th of July something new happened as NICRA announced the plans for a 
“signing of the covenant”, which meant the signing of a document which called for British 
intervention in Northern Ireland. In the document they wrote that they demanded justice and 
civil rights for all, and pointed out that Westminister had the constitutional responsibility to 
remove these grievances.355 This was a new demand from the civil rights movement, and it 
would most likely fuel the suspicion that the movement’s real goal was the destruction of the 
Northern Irish state.   
The fact that the loyalists had stopped to arrange counter-demonstrations to the civil 
rights demonstrations, did not mean that they removed themselves from the street. Paisley 
announced in July of 1969 that he would hold a march in Newry. He said that it was time that 
the Protestants took back Newry, after the “tragic happening” when the civil rights movement 
and the IRA had marched trough the town for the first time for 49 years.356 He went on to say: 
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We shall march through the town with the flag of our country and demand civil rights for Protestants. 
We shall never rest before we have civil rights for Protestants.(..) We want to tell the CR agitators and 
the IRA that we just as good men as our forefathers. Let them not mistake our tolerance for weakness(..) 
We are taking up the gauntlet that has been thrown down at us.357                      
Paisley still said that he would support Chichester-Clark, but only as long as the Prime 
Minister stuck to the constitution, defended the province, and did so by ruling firmly. But if 
he let the civil rights movement march trough Protestant areas they would say “no surrender, 
Paisley argued.”358 For Paisley it was not a right for Catholics to parade through a Protestant 
area, and if they did so, Paisley seemed to regard is as a breach of Protestant civil rights. It 
seems as if Paisley thought of the civil rights gains of the Catholics as a loss for Protestant 
civil rights. This was on of the reason for his ‘Protestant civil rights campaign’. 
The relative peace that had lasted since Chichester-Clark became PM came to an 
abrupt end when the violence flared up again, and once again Derry was the stage for the 
violence. On the 13th of July youths fought fierce fights with the police, in riots which, 
according to the Belfast Telegraph, overshadowed all other incidents in the city since the 5th 
of October 1968. The rioting was not instigated by the civil rights movement. The Derry 
Citizens Action Committee strongly condemned the “wanton hooliganism and looting”. 359 
They said that the ones responsible for the rioting were not representative for anyone in the 
civil rights movement or any Roman Catholic.360 The important new element with this event 
is that the violence did not come as a result of a demonstration by the civil rights movement, 
and this indicates that the movement was no longer able to control the actions of the Catholic 
community to the same extent as before.  
 The violence spread to Belfast the following days when violence erupted between 
Protestants and Catholics in Shankill Road. The BT wrote that the city had the Derry air, a city 
chewed up by violence. The riots lasted for two days, and 55 persons were arrested, and 32 
policemen injured. Paisley had pleaded for people to calm down and go home, but to no 
use.361 This shows that Paisley was not in control over the loyalists, a development similar to 
the way that the civil rights movement was losing control over rioting in the Catholic 
community. The fact that the violence did not come as a result of a civil rights march, and the 
fact that Protestants participated in the violence, did, however, not stop people from blaming 
the civil rights movement.   
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The Protestant Telegraph wrote that the civil rights movement had put street bands of 
accomplished rioters who were “trained in the art of street warfare and revolutionary tactics” 
on the street. 362 The paper said that the Protestants could not wait to find out what their 
enemies would do next, they had to prepare for any event.363 The civil rights movement was 
not the only one the loyalists blamed for the troubles. On the 19th of August the Ulster 
Constitution Defence Committee and the Ulster Volunteer Protestants issued a joint statement. 
They stated that it was the “abysmal failure” of the government that had lead to the situation. 
Now they were “reaping the dreadful harvest of the O’Neill years.” 364 The organisations 
“utterly condemned the acts of violence”, but the acts of loyalist violence had come as a result 
of a terrible frustration and disillusionment from the Protestant population they claimed. The 
government had forced the situation when they, because of fear, had let the “CRA-IRA” 
conspiracy unfold, and at the same time hit hard down on Protestant processions. It was 
alleged that the government had been exploited by the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and had no 
longer any mandate from the people of Ulster to continue it policy of appeasement.365 The 
honeymoon period was definitely over for Chichester-Clark. The violence had started up 
again, and the loyalists were no longer willing to give Chichester-Clark the benefit of the 
doubt.    
The worsening situation did not stop Paisley from pressing on with the arranging of 
the loyalist march in Newry on the 16th of August. The march was a collaboration between the 
UCDC and UVP. Both organisations rejected that they had any association with the rioters in 
Belfast, but the organisations felt that if the government had not condoned the violent actions 
by the IRA, PD and NICRA front organisations, the riots would never have occurred. The 
statement warned the government that they should not try to stop the loyalist processions. 
Catholic agitations should not be used as an excuse for turning on the Protestants.366 This fit 
nicely in with the reasoning the loyalists used. They felt that it was the Catholics that stood 
behind the violence, and if the violence was used as an excuse to stop what they saw as a 
lawful loyalist protest, it would be an infringement of their rights. Whenever this happened 
they warned that they would intensify their Protestant civil rights campaign. This is another 
similarity between Paisley and his followers and the civil rights movement. Both sides refused 
to give up their right to protest in the street, even if the protest could cause disorder.  
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The reintroduction of violence produced something new in Northern Irish politics. In 
an attempt to achieve peace, the opposition joined the government in a joint appeal to the 
community to restore law and order. The statement said: 
While putting forward different views on the origins and background of the recent disturbances there 
was general agreement that all those who had political or other influence in the community should in the 
present situation use it for a reduction in the temperature.367           
The new situation had brought the moderate elements in Northern Ireland closer together, and 
they were willing to put away some of their differences in order to restore the peace. 
 The appeal achieved little, however, and on the 12th of August 1969, there were new 
confrontations between loyalists and Catholics in Derry, as an Apprentice Boys parade was 
attacked by Catholics from Bogside. Among the marchers was the former Minister of Home 
affairs, William Craig.368 
 Chichester-Clark made it perfectly clear that the recent violence had not come as a 
result of a minority seeking political rights by lawful means. Rather, he viewed it as a political 
conspiracy seeking to overthrow the government and constitution. Those who “cry so loudly 
for British intervention” saw it as a halfway house on the road to an Irish republic.369 
NICRA’s demand of British intervention had made Chichester-Clark more convinced that 
there were ulterior motives behind the campaign. The statement also shows that the civil 
rights movement was being blamed for troubles it had expressly condemned, and had taken no 
part in. At this time Catholic rioting was labelled as civil rights rioting, and this led to further 
doubt of the movement’s intentions.    
 As a method to stop the rioting Chichester-Clark restricted the right to hold ordinary 
processions, because it “was a plain fact” that any demonstration, however well organised and 
inoffensive could provide the occasion for disorder.370 This was not enough to restore the 
peace, however, so on the 15th of August the British Army moved into Northern Ireland. The 
army was ordered into Belfast by the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, after an 
emergency request by Chichester-Clark. The mission was to restore the peace after the latest 
rioting.371 The introduction of the army made Chichester-Clark’s position more vulnerable 
since it became harder to profess control when he gave away much of the security policy to 
the army and British government. Chichester-Clark experienced how much discontent it could 
cause if the loyalists thought he was giving into pressure from the British government, when, 
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as a result of talks between himself and British Prime Ministers, it was suggested that the B-
Specials should be disbanded. This pleased some of the civil rights campaigners. Bernadette 
Devlin said that “Mr. Wilson had given hope that now things are going to be for the better for 
the people in Ulster.” 372 But not all were pleased. Civil rights leader Frank Gogarty said that 
he was dissatisfied by Wilson’s remarks, since the Stormont government had no right to 
continue.373  
The news was not well received by the unionist hardliners and the loyalists. Craig said 
that if this were to be, the government would have no choice, but to resign. Ian Paisley said:  
Mr Wilson has capitulated to the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church by destroying at a stroke by 
the pen the Special Constabulary- Ulster loyalist’s last line of defence(..) He has done exactly what the 
Civil Rights Association and the IRA wanted him to do. Ulster’s Protestants must now join themselves 
together as their fathers did in 1912.374 
Under O’Neill the British government made threats to force the unionist dissenters to fall 
back in line. But during the increasing violence the British government could not put 
Chichester-Clark in the same situation. In a joint statement, published in a commentary to the 
Cameron rapport, the British government gave Chichester-Clark full support. They gave the 
assurance the Northern Ireland would always be a part of the United Kingdom unless the 
Northern Irish people wanted different, and that the affairs of Northern Ireland were “entirely 
a matter of domestic jurisdiction”375 It was important for both the Unionist Party and the 
British government that Chichester-Clark looked like a strong leader, but with the violence 
increasing and the army coming in, the Northern Irish PM was weaker than ever.                        
Chichester-Clark refused to take responsibility for the situation in Northern Ireland. 
The unionist had governed fairly and well for nearly 50 years he said. He had not turned back 
or slowed down any of O’Neill’s reforms. This was not the reason for the disorder; the reason 
could be found in the “activities of extreme republican elements and others determined to 
overthrow the state”.376  Chichester-Clark’s language was now much more similar to the 
unionist hardliners, than that of O’Neill had been. Chichester-Clark only avoided a backbench 
revolt by promising that the B-Specials were not to be disbanded, and blaming Harold Wilson 
for the misunderstanding.377 Instead Chichester-Clark appointed a non-Ulster commission to 
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inquire into what changes that could be made in the police structure.378 The committee was 
lead by Baron Hunt, and its intent was to: 
Examine the recruitment, organisation, structure and composition of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and 
the Ulster Special Constabulary and their respective functions and to recommend as necessary what 
changes are required to provide for the efficient enforcement of law and order in Northern Ireland.379  
The conclusion of the report would prove to be vital, and as I will show later in this chapter, it 
would make the situation more difficult for Chichester-Clark when it was presented.      
As the situation deteriorated, more and more people pleaded for peace. Chichester-
Clark asked people to refrain from actions and words that could worsen the situation. Craig 
joined in and said that he would support any appeal for peace. Ian Paisley asked the people to 
take down the barricades.380 But the pleas went unheeded. The rioting in Belfast continued. 
The ones who did the rioting were mainly young people, who according to the Belfast 
Telegraph, roomed the streets looking for trouble.381 This shows how out of hand the situation 
had become. The civil rights campaign had been pushed into the background by acts of 
violence. The people who had been in the foreground during the campaign had lost control 
over the situation. There was at this time no one who could step up as a leader in any camp, 
and restore the peace. 
 The government continued to insist that reforms were the right thing to do in order to 
achieve peace. Faulkner urged for the implementation of the reform plan, and said that this 
would be in the interest of all. Faulkner did still not believe that there was any truth in the 
allegations from the civil rights movement; in fact he said that evidence of real grievances 
were rare. But he also said that it did no matter if the grievances were real, since the sense of 
grievances was real.382 This was pretty much the same reasoning as O’Neill had used when he 
was Prime Minister and it shows that there was not much that separated Faulkner from 
O’Neill when it came to their political conviction. They both felt that modernising was the 
right course for the country. The prospect of further reforms seemed more limited at this point, 
however, since Chichester-Clark also felt that the grievances had been met. In a dramatic tv-
broadcast, he made it clear that the barricades in Belfast had to be removed, and that there 
would be set up a “peace-line” between Divis Street and Shankill Road. The government 
could not tolerate a further shift to anarchy, and Chichester-Clark would not give into pressure 
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from the minority, as all the legitimate demands had been met, he said.383 The situation in 
Northern Ireland had changed dramatically since October 1968. The “peace-line”, which was 
a physical barrier between the Catholic and Protestant streets, demonstrated the increased 
separation between the two Northern Irish communities; now there existed an actual wall 
separating them.  
The separation was enhanced through the speeches of Paisley. In a speech he said that 
the Roman Catholic Church was getting closer to communism day by day. 384 He continued 
his argument that it was the Roman Catholic Church that stood behind the troubles and 
claimed that many misunderstood the situation in Northern Ireland as a class conflict, when it 
according to Paisley, was a religious conflict.385  
When the British PM reorganised his cabinet in October 1969, he gave four of the 
positions to Roman Catholics. This infuriated the Protestant Telegraph. The paper warned 
that Wilson was out for Ulster’s destruction. It was the removal of Lord Stonebam, which was 
“no friend of Ulster”, but a Protestant, as Minister of the Home office, the concerned the 
paper the most. 386 This position had for the first time in 50 years been given to a Catholic, 
Mrs Shirley Williams. Since she was a Catholic, the PT, argued that she owed her first 
allegiance to the Pope, and therefore would be “bent on the destruction of Ulster 
Protestantism.” 387  The paper called for Chichester-Clark resignation, and asked the 
Protestants prepare “for the final confrontation”.388 The loyalists were becoming more and 
more sceptical over the motives of the British government. This is demonstrated in their 
criticism of the appointment of Shirley Williams, and through an increasing discontent over 
the army presence.            
The Protestant Telegraph strongly opposed the army presence and what they saw as 
blatant discrimination against Protestants. The paper claimed that the army protected the 
lawless Roman Catholic areas, and attacked peaceful Protestants. Chichester-Clark was now, 
according to the paper, nothing more than a puppet to “the socialist government” at 
Westminister and its leader Harold Wilson, and Wilson was the puppet of Cardinal Heenan.389 
The strong feeling of wrongdoing in the loyalist community still made it difficult for 
Chichester-Clark to give too much to the Catholic community, but when the Cameron 
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Commission delivered its rapport, it became impossible for the PM not to go on with the 
reforms. 
To sum up; the return of the street violence had removed any goodwill Chichester-
Clark had received since he took office. The fact that the civil rights movement continued 
with their campaign made the unionist politicians turn against it. It was a belief that the 
movement had received all their legitimate demands, and that their continued campaign meant 
that the movement had ulterior motives. NICRA’s call for British intervention increased this 
doubt. The belief among unionist politicians that there existed sincere elements within the 
movement was now rapidly dwindling away. The government assured that they would 
continue with the reforms, but at the same time they claimed that all legitimate claims had 
been met.     
The loyalists in Northern Ireland blamed the civil rights movement for the violence, 
and blamed the unionist government for not dealing with the civil rights movement with more 
force. The feeling among the loyalists was that they were under attack from the Catholics, and 
Protestants acts of violence was only a defence. There was a growing discontent over the 
actions of the British government, and when Harold Wilson suggested that the B-Specials 
should be disbanded the loyalists felt that the British government was selling them out. At the 
same time there was a pressure from Westminister for the continuation of the reforms, 
something that significantly reduced Chichester-Clark’s room of manoeuvre. His chances of 
introducing stricter actions towards the civil rights movement became even more diminished 
when Lord Cameron presented his report on the causes for the unrest following the events 
around the 5th of October 1968 in Derry.  
 
THE CAMERON COMMISSION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The Cameron Commission had been set up by Terence O’Neill to investigate the reasons for 
the troubles in 1968 to early 69. When the report was presented it passed a crushing judgment 
over the unionist rule in Northern Ireland. The commission upheld the civil rights 
movement’s complaints of discrimination in local government appointments; they confirmed 
the allegations of gerrymandering of local government electoral boundaries, and an unfair 
allocation of houses. This they said had led to a “powerful sense resentment and frustration 
among the Catholic population.”390  The Catholic resentment towards the B-Specials as a 
partial and sectarian force was confirmed, and the Special Powers Act was highlighted as one 
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of the causes of the civil rights campaign.391  The commission concluded that the former 
Minister of Home Affairs, William Craig’s decision to ban the civil rights march on the 5th of 
October 1968 had: 
Swelled very considerably the number of persons who ultimately took part in the march. Without this 
ban the numbers taking part would in all probability have been small and the situation safely handled by 
available police forces .(..) The police handling of the demonstration in Londonderry on 5th October 
1968 was in certain material respects ill co-ordinated and inept. There was use of unnecessary and ill 
controlled force in the dispersal of the demonstrators, only a minority of whom acted in a disorderly and 
violent manner.392    
This statement implies that Craig was given a large share of the blame for the violence on the 
5th of October. The commission did however not accept that the entire civil rights movement 
had sincere intentions, when they concluded that the Peoples Democracy was an: 
Unnecessary adjunct to the already existing and operative Civil Rights Association. People's Democracy 
provided a means by which politically extreme and militant elements could and did invite and incite 
civil disorder, with the consequence of polarising and hardening opposition to Civil Rights claims.393   
The commission acknowledged that there were elements within the civil rights movement that 
had an interest in causing disorder, and this had led to a “hardening of opposition to civil 
rights claims.”394 Among this opposition, Paisley and Major Bunting was attributed most of 
the blame for the increasing violence. The report stated that: 
The deliberate and organised interventions by followers of Major Bunting and the Rev. Dr. Paisley, 
especially in Armagh, Burntollet and Londonderry, substantially increased the risk of violent disorder 
on occasions when Civil Rights demonstrations or marches were to take place, were a material 
contributory cause of the outbreaks(of violence) which occurred after the 5th of October(..)395  
The commission expressed a conviction that the implementations of the reforms “already 
promised or foreshadowed by the government with the least necessary delay” was one 
“essential step towards the development of a lasting peace.”396   
To sum up, the report was a vindication for the civil rights movement and its 
allegations, and it laid much of the blame for the violence on the actions of Craig, Paisley and 
his followers, and called for the fastest possible implementation of the reforms.  
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The response of the government   
When the report was presented, Chichester-Clark gave his support and thanks to the 
commission. He said that the report was not an indictment of unionist rule down the years as 
some had claimed. Nevertheless they had to accept that there were real grievances and 
tensions in Northern Ireland.397 This did not, however, mean that he was willing to accept that 
it come into being because of discrimination. He said that this fact could not be allowed to 
obscure the remarkable progress over almost a half century. Chichester-Clark said that there 
still were problems, in housing, particularly; there still were many living in unacceptable 
conditions. But he could not accept that the government had readily or complacently tolerated 
such conditions.398 He denied that sectarian politics had played a part in such matters as the 
placing of new industry. Chichester-Clark said that he had been a member of the government 
at the time of the decision to establish a new University at Coleraine,399 and:  
(..) there was absolutely no plot to persuade the Lockwood Committee to recommend a place other than 
Londonderry as a location for the New University. We had no other motive than to do what was best for 
higher education in this Province.400 
Chichester-Clark could neither accept that the local government, in general, had been 
conducted on any other than perfectly proper lines. But he said that they had to accept that 
some authorities in a number of instances had fallen below these high standards. And in the 
future, the government would not tolerate any cases of allocations based upon other criteria 
than a proper and objective assessment of need. Clark made it perfectly clear that he could not 
continue to lead the government if reform did not come. 401 The report had forced Chichester-
Clark to moderate his statements that all legitimate claims had been met, but there can be no 
doubt that the government was sceptical towards the commission’s conclusions. When one 
reads the motion concerning the commission it is obvious that the government’s support was 
not so clear. The motion reads: 
That this House in taking note of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, expresses its thanks to Lord 
Cameron and his colleagues for their investigation into disturbances in Northern Ireland, declares its 
determination to remove from our society any legitimate causes of fear, distrust or injustice(...)402 
Nowhere does it say that the House support the findings of the commission, it takes note of it. 
It confirms the government’s determination to remove the reasons for fear, distrust or 
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injustice, without mentioning what they may be. But what is clear is that Chichester-Clark did 
not accept that the unionist side should get all the blame. He said the following to the 
members of the opposition:  
You must accept that fear and suspicion in this community of ours has never been one-sided. A fear 
which one does not share and may not understand can often seem absurd, but that does not make it less 
real. The people you represent will now again have the opportunity to play a full and constructive part 
in the public life and activities of Northern Ireland.(..) I say "again" because I believe it was never the 
intention of the founding fathers of our State to debar our Catholic citizens from a full part in affairs. If, 
later on, attitudes developed which were harmful to the cause of communal understanding, was this not 
due in very large part to a standing aside, to a refusal of allegiance, and to a policy of public boycott?403 
Chichester-Clark wanted to divert the blame away from the government. This is why he said 
that the opposition’s lack of participation had contributed to the lack of Catholic influence in 
the Northern Irish society. In addition he defended the actions of the unionist governments by 
saying that one had to accept that there were those who had an interest in strife, who tried to 
subvert the constitutional position of the state. Clark asked all sides of the house to come 
together and resist those elements: One should come together and condemn alike Burntollet 
and Newry and the mentality represented in the events which took place there.404 Condemning 
Protestant acts of violence is something Chichester-Clark did not do much. He was more than 
willing to condemn the violent actions by Catholics, but he was more hesitant to condemn 
Protestant violence. The PM’s position did not change much with the report. He removed 
himself somewhat from his earlier position which implied that all grievances had been dealt 
with, and promised to continue with the reforms.  
Chichester-Clark was not the only one within the government who felt that the 
unionist should not get all the blame. During the debate Brian Faulkner tried to clarify the 
rights of those who wanted the change the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. As long 
as they were determined that it should be done in a democratic fashion, they had the same 
rights as everybody else.405 But at the same time he said: 
When people complain that they are prevented from playing a full part in Northern Ireland's affairs 
because they are opposed to the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, when they 
differ not only from the Government party but from majority opinion in Ulster, they create distrust and 
fear in the minds of hundreds of thousands of ordinary people. They must really understand that. It is 
for that reason that it has been hard to take critics into full consultation or full partnership. Ordinary, 
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responsible people have asked again and again how people who are constantly ready to deny our 
position in the United Kingdom can be accepted as partners.406 
The nationalist and Catholic community had, according to Faulkner, right from the start the 
full chance of getting their opinions heard.407 So according to Faulkner people had the right to 
pursue a change of constitutional position, but if they did they could not expect the 
government to heed to their criticism. So in Faulkner’s opinion the criticism levelled against 
the unionist governments could be explained by the Catholics opposition against the 
constitution.  
There was a feeling among the moderate unionists that they should get something in 
return for their willingness to implement the reforms. Chichester-Clark said in a speech to 
young unionists that the choice ahead was one “between absolute fair and just government, or 
no government.” 408 But as they did that, he felt that they had the right to demand something in 
return. The minority had to accept that the decisions of the majority on the basic constitutional 
issue were democratic decisions, they had to play a full part in the life of the country without 
inhibitions, and the representatives from the opposition had to shed their bitterness resulting 
from the recent strife.409 The government issued a statement where it said that it there had 
been well-meaning organisations, that tried to put the spotlight on genuinely held grievances, 
but these organisations had been exploited by “ill-disposed people for their own ends”.410 The 
faith in the civil rights movement was rapidly dwindling away. The belief became more and 
more that the civil rights movement had been taken over by people with sinister motives.  
Chichester-Clark was disappointed over what he felt as the lack of support from both 
unionists and the opposition. He had expected more involvement in the debates from the 
unionists, and he deplored the “Inability of the opposition to rise to the needs of a critical 
hour in Northern Ireland’s history. Every old grievance or imaginary grievance has been 
trotted out again, quite regardless the change of train.” 411   This statement shows that 
Chichester-Clark still held to his opinion that all grievances had been dealt with. It was time 
for the opposition to ask themselves what they could do to improve the situation, he said. 412 
The fact that the opposition not had participated fully in the parliamentarian process was the 
unionist excuse for the opposition’s lack of political influence.  
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Even though the unionist Prime Minister criticised the opposition, my material 
demonstrates that the opposition and the minority had a much bigger say in Northern Irish 
politics than ever. In a speech about the situation in Derry the PM said that “only by planning 
together, achieving together, working together, can its people (…) work out the future we 
want for them”.413 Chichester-Clark also gave assurances that Catholics were welcome in the 
Unionist Party, and he believed that an increasing amount of Catholics saw themselves as 
unionists.414 
 The Cameron rapport did not change the opinions among the Northern Irish politicians 
much. Those who had supported the claims of discrimination, took it as proof that they had 
been right, whereas those who had been sceptical said that there where grievances, but that 
this did not mean that they stemmed from discrimination. Those who had denied that 
discrimination existed dismissed the rapport as false. What the report did do was to give 
creditability to those who fought for civil rights in the eyes of the British government. This 
would make it harder for the unionist government to use more force against the civil rights 
movement or delay the reforms. The situation was not made easier when the loyalists 
completely rejected the conclusions of the commission. This gave Chichester-Clark and his 
government very little room to act.  
 
The loyalist response to the commission 
The loyalists made if very clear that they did not accept the Cameron reports conclusions. 
Major Bunting said that the commission had not “got to the bottom of all the lies submitted to 
it as bona-fide evidence.” 415 When the truth came out, the loyalist would be vindicated, and 
the world would see that Ulster was not a divided country, but a victim of an international 
Trotskyite movement and conspiracy. Desmond Boal called the rapport an “enormous damp 
squib.” 416 The press had, according to Boal, already begun to try to convince people that the 
rapport was some sort of divinely revealed truth, but he hoped that people understood that it 
was nothing of the sort.417        
Craig continued his denial of the existence of discrimination in Northern Ireland. 
Craig stated that the report had little to offer or contribute to the problems of Northern Ireland. 
He felt that the appointment of the Cameron Commission was not only an abdication of 
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authority, but since it came to being in a time when a serious effort was being made to 
undermine the rule of law: “it gave some credibility to those who with the utmost recklessness, 
were coming to the streets, disrupting the peace of the community and using vicious tactics, 
including the use of weapons which could case death and destruction.”418 Ulster had paid a 
heavy price for those tactics, he said. Those who, according to Craig, had set out deliberately 
to create massive civil disorder with the purpose of undermining the parliament and 
government of Northern Ireland, had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams.419 
 Paisley dismissed the conclusions of the commission. In a speech delivered at Bob 
Jones University, Paisley said that the conclusions of the commission could not be valid, since 
all the evidence before the commission had been given anonymously. 420  The Protestants 
would, according to Paisley, not have anything to do with a commission of that sort, and had 
therefore not given their side of the story. He went on to say that it was because of this that 
the commission had come to the conclusion that he was “the big bad wolf, running around 
Ulster.” 421 The commission had condemned the unionist government, the police, William 
Craig, and the B-Specials, on the “basis of evidence that never saw the light of day”.422  
 The loyalist opposition to the Cameron report was unison. They said that the 
commission’s conclusions had been made without testimonies from loyalists, and could 
therefore not be valid. The loyalist’s point of view made it difficult for the government to act 
upon the report without criticism. If they did nothing the British government and civil rights 
movement would object, and if they followed the recommendations, the loyalists would 
express their discontent.  
The situation was not made any easier by the continuation of the violence on the 
streets. In the middle of October 1969 Constable Victor Arbuckle became the first policeman 
to be killed during the troubles. For two nights loyalists rioted in Shankill Road, resulting in 
the deaths of three people, and 66 injured.423  With the violence came also the calls for 
responsibility.   
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Calls for responsibility 
As the situation worsened, Paisley called for people to get off the street. Pleading to a crowd 
roaming around Belfast, he said that they had already proved their point and that they were 
only “playing into the hands of our enemies”.424 Desmond Boal was appalled by the acts of 
violence that had lead to the deaths of three people. In a statement he issued on behalf of the 
Shankill Residents Association, he said that he did not condone the acts of violence that had 
occurred, but it was because the people of Shankill had endured weeks of humiliation the 
violence had started. The confidence in the government had rapidly evaporated, and when the 
government had denied the Protestants “the safety valve” of open air meetings and parades, it 
did not, according to Boal, take long before frustrated people turned to violence.425 There was 
a tendency among the loyalist to if not defend, at least explain the Protestant violence as a 
result of the Catholic violence. Since they saw the Catholic violence as an effort to undermine 
the constitution, they were inclined to say that the Protestant violence was justifiable. Yet, at 
this time, they started to express the belief that the Protestant rioting also benefitted the 
Catholics. The unionists did not condemn the Protestant rioters in the same way as they did 
the Catholics, but they warned strongly of the consequences if the violence would continue.    
Faulkner said that it was not through a terrorist rebellion that Irish reunification would 
come, but as a result of “traditionally minded who through confusion of a religious-doctrinal 
issues with civic-political ones, allow themselves to be driven by fear and short-sightedness 
into acting against their own best interest”.426 There seemed to be a general agreement on the 
Protestant side, that future Protestant violence would benefit the republicans, whereas the 
reasons for the violence were disputed.  
   The civil rights movement was considered more and more irresponsible. On the 2nd of      
December the Minister of Education William Long asked if the would there would be no end 
of demands from the civil rights movement, if the hand never would be outstretched in 
cooperation, but always with a clenched fist.427 It was a feeling among the unionist that the 
civil rights movement had received much without giving much in return. Long said that the 
movement changed their slogans and demands every time they were given concessions.428 
Chichester-Clark also said that it was time for people to start to act responsible. The 
minority could not ride roughshod over the majority, if they continued; it would not matter if 
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they had one man, one vote, because it would mean the death of democracy. 429 This did not 
mean that Chichester-Clark denounced the movement entirely as a republican conspiracy as 
many other unionist, he did still believe that there were sincere people in the movement.430 
As most tried to calm the situation down, Craig came out with a controversial 
statement. Addressing Pottinger Young Unionists he said that if Westminister were to take 
over and suspend Stormont and removing the Northern Irish people’s right to decide their 
future in relation to the Irish republic, they would oppose this with any means, and including 
out the use of arms.431 Speaking at a unionist meeting in Glenarm, Craig denied that he 
supported an independent Ulster, instead he suggested that Northern Ireland should be 
organised in a federation.432 Craig was moving further and further away from the traditional 
unionist policies, but at the same time he did not move closer to the position held by the 
loyalists such as Paisley. He was carving out his own niche within Ulster politics. 
The situation was growing increasingly difficult for Chichester-Clark. Paisley said that 
the only thing Chichester-Clark could do to remain in power was to destroy him and his 
Church, and that was exactly what the government had set out to do.433 Paisley did not believe 
that the British army acted impartial, it protected the rebels in Bogside and the Falls, and 
attacked law abiding Protestants, he claimed.434 Soon the loyalists would also lose what they 
saw as Ulster’s last line of defence, the B-Specials.  
When the Hunt report was published on the 10th of October 1969, the situation became 
even more precarious for Chichester-Clark. Among the recommendations were that the B-
Specials should be disbanded, and that the RUC should become an unarmed police force.435 
This would definitely anger the loyalist population, and make the situation worse for the 
Prime Minister.  
1969 had changed Northern Ireland for ever, but even at the end of the year 
Chichester-Clark was hopeful for the future. Summing up the year, he said that: 
When people would look back to 1969 not as a year of feud and near disaster, but as the year in which 
the province came to full maturity, realised its own strength, shed its unnecessary weakness, and made a 
new name for itself in Britain and the world.436    
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This was an overly optimistic statement considering the hardships that had come about during 
1969. The phase after Chichester-Clark’s honeymoon period ended was an ambiguous period 
for the civil rights movement. The violence that had erupted was not instigated by the civil 
rights movement, nor did it come as a result of civil rights parades. Even so, the movement 
was blamed for the recurrence of the violence. As a result many unionist politicians expressed 
more disbelief in the sincerity of the movement. Unionists now felt that the movement had 
been given all their legitimate demands, and that the movement’s insistence to continue their 
campaign meant that they campaigned for a united Ireland.  
When the Cameron report was presented, it vindicated the civil rights movement, and 
upheld most of its allegations of discrimination. This made it more difficult for the 
government to say that the movement was a front movement. Not because they changed their 
mind, and accepted that the movement should be given more concessions, but most likely 
because the report confirmed the movement’s allegations in the eyes of the British 
government. The British government had called for the continuation of the reforms since 
O’Neill had begun them, and they would not ease up the pressure after the report gave the 
civil rights movement credibility. The report put the government in a squeeze between the 
British government and civil rights movement demands for more reforms, and the loyalist 
population who felt the government gave into pressure, and thereby endangered the 
constitution. The pressure would increase the split within unionism.          
 
UNIONISM DISUNITED: 1970-1971 
                            
I believe we have weathered the storm437 
                                                        Chichester-Clark 
                                   Make no mistake, we have been sold out.438 
                                                              Ian Paisley 
 
The allegations from Paisley and an increasingly number of both loyalist and unionist 
politicians that the government had succumbed to pressure, put Chichester-Clark in a 
precarious position. No one could doubt that the government had given into many of the civil 
rights demands since the reforms were on or on the way into the statute book. Since the Prime 
Minister could not deny that the reforms had been given, he denied that they had been given 
as a result of the civil rights campaign. On the 3rd of January 1970 Chichester-Clark denied 
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the allegations from within the Unionist Party that the government had yielded to pressure 
from the civil rights movement and Westminister.  
Speaking at a meeting of Central Armagh Unionist Association Chichester-Clark 
stated that “Every reform on the statute book is there because we put it there. It was our 
decision, not the decision of the civil rights marchers, nor the decision of the Westminister 
politicians.”439 He also lashed out on those who spoke of “50 years of despotic rule in Ulster” 
because that “nothing could be further from the truth. The achievements of the Unionist Party 
are there for all to see- we don’t need to apologise for them”.440 It was more important than 
ever to show that the government was in control. This was not made any easier since 
Chichester-Clark had accepted the recommendations from the Hunt committee, and accepted 
that the B-Special should be disbanded. The Belfast Telegraph wrote that this had led to an 
outcry of horror in the unionist ranks, but Chichester-Clark refused to accept that he had let 
the police or the B-Specials down.441  
The decision would not go well down with the loyalists, but the government stood 
fully behind the decision, and said that they had to take action. Even if the government said it 
had not given into pressure, it is difficult to imagine that the B-Specials would have been 
disbanded if it had not been for the recommendations from the Hunt report, and pressure from 
the British authorities. It would be important for the government to convince the Protestant 
population that this was not the case, and that the government was in control.     
Faulkner said that he had felt that the government had been indecisive the last time he 
had been in the cabinet. He implied that it was because the government had shirked its 
responsibilities, that the troubles had grew to the to the extent that it had.442 Faulkner said that 
he had always warned of the dangerous element at work, and the need to isolate the hard core 
of militant republicans, and this had been done. The government’s reforms had not weakened 
unionism.443 Even if the government felt that the reforms had not weakened unionism, it is 
very clear that they had weakened the Unionist Party. Soon it became clear that the umbrella-
like structure that had been the Unionist Party, could not survive the new political situation 
that had arisen.     
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A less tolerant Unionist Party 
For almost 50 years the Unionist Party had been a party with one main political goal, and that 
was the preservation of the union with Great Britain. Apart from that, there had been plenty of 
room for different political views, but as the situation worsened, and criticism of the 
government’s policies increased, the acceptance for criticism from within the party became 
more frowned upon. This did however not stop some politicians from speaking their mind, 
and soon they would have to face the consequences for this.     
Craig was one of those who felt that the government policy was on a wrong path, and 
he was not afraid to say what the government had done wrong. He said that the biggest 
mistake the government had done was to call in the army. Speaking to the Ulster Loyalist 
Association at Magherafelt he said that the government had the constitutional right to call in 
the army, but they had not the right to surrender control over the security forces, and by doing 
that they had “committed the province to another period of violence.”444  The army had, 
according to Craig, allowed the creation of lawless areas by parleying with lawbreakers.445 As 
a result of this 
Stupid blunder on the part of the army, we have allowed a situation to develop which I think has been 
exploited by an ugly element and where decent law abiding loyalists have become so frustrated that they 
indulged in quite inexcusable conduct.446           
He said that there could not be any excuse for the violence on Shankill Road; it was a product 
of the “government’s incompetence and the army’s blunder as well as the Belfast peace line 
and the army’s dealing with the IRA element.” 447 Craig felt it was time for the government to 
start to reverse some of “things it had done.”448 He was willing to face a constitutional crisis, 
rather than to “betray unionism”. The government should carry out the policies it felt was best 
for the country.449 Here Craig displayed the typical loyalist explanation that the Protestant 
violence came as a result of the Catholic violence, and that the right thing to do was to strike 
back at the Catholic rioters, and removing the reforms the civil rights movement had been 
given. This was of course not within the lines of the government’s policies, and he faced 
opposition when he expressed a view that collided with that of the government. 
 Craig felt that one could not debate the differences of opinion that existed inside the 
Unionist Party without someone “trying to evade the debate by attaching labels which are 
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indented to be derogatory.”450 Those who was labelled as hardliners and right-wingers, was in 
fact, according to Craig, the people who carried the burden of thinking progressive and 
imaginative terms for unionism.451 This shows that Craig was staring to feel marginalised 
within the Unionist Party, and this belief was not without merit. 
 Chichester-Clark made it clear that he would no longer tolerate that people had the 
“luxury of remaining under the party umbrella” and still fight against the party’s policies. 452 
Chichester-Clark said that the members had to choose what kind of government they wanted, 
a sensible and moderate, or if they wanted the policies of “the strong arm, and the jack-boot 
which could only in a time lead to sectarian bloodbath in this province”.453 The majority in 
the party was growing increasingly frustrated the minority within the party which they felt 
tried to dictate over the majority. The Minister of Home Affairs Porter, said that the rebels, 
led by Craig, who continually feel the need to attack the party, should leave.454 
 Tired of the opposition from within the party, it was decided to expel five of the 
biggest dissenters, among those: Craig and Boal. The reason was that the five voted against a 
vote of confidence in the government during a debate in the Commons.455 This would mean 
that they no longer were under the Party Whip in the Stormont Parliament, but they could still 
remain as members of the Unionist Party.  
During the debate Craig clarified why he felt it necessary to publicly criticise the 
government. He said that he was disappointed that the decision to accept the Hunt reports 
recommendations had been taken without a debate in the commons, and claimed that they had 
not been given the opportunity to discuss it within the Unionist Party. He said that he could 
not let loyalty to the party to stop him from saying what he meant.456 His frustration and the 
decision to expel him and the other members who voted against the confidence motion, shows 
that the Unionist Party had become a more closed party since the beginning of the civil rights 
campaign. It seems as if the government would prefer that critics would stop making their 
discontent known, and go along with the government’s policies in an effort to restore the 
peace. There was no longer room for views that conflicted with the government’s policies in 
the Unionist Party. In addition the government was also upset that the opposition made their 
discontent so clear.              
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Chichester-Clark hit out at both Catholic and loyalist opposition when he on the 2nd of 
February said that people should not waste their time making political speeches, instead they 
should prepare their case for the review body, and he hit out on the “so-called loyalists” who 
demonstrated in Belfast in the defence of law and order.457 
Even after the expulsion of some of the most rightwing members of the Unionist Party, 
there was an element within the moderate fraction of unionists who felt that the Unionist Party 
did not represent the policies that O’Neill had begun. The split in the unionist fraction 
increased on the 21st of April when the Alliance Party was formed. The Party grew out of the 
New Ulster Movement, and many of its members came from there. The New Ulster 
movement had been established in early 1969 to urge moderation and non-sectarianism in 
politics and to press for reforms. The Alliance Party would be a unionist party with a small u, 
which meant that it would be a party that supported the constitutional link with Britain.458 In a 
statement the party announced that they had succeeded in:  
Creating a province-wide political organisation of the moderate people, which is firm on the 
constitutional issue, provides a viable alternative to the existing splintered Unionist Party, and combines 
Catholics and Protestants together in a partnership which is the essential prerequisite for a new deal in 
Northern Ireland.459 
John Hunter presided over the press conference at which the party was announced. He said 
that the split had not come as a result of the government’s policies; rather it had occurred 
because they felt that the Unionist Party did not fully support the government’s efforts to 
reform the society. He said that the Unionist Party no longer was a “credible political force” 
and that they believed that the party would “never recover from its present division”.460  
The party would not make any great imprint in the period which I write about, so I will 
not give the party much attention in this thesis. The establishment of the Alliance Party, 
however, shows that the alliance that had been the Unionist Party was falling apart, and that 
personal political convictions were starting to play a greater role than ever before. It is also an 
example of an event that probably would not have occurred if it had not been for the civil 
rights campaign. The civil rights campaign had forced the unionist politicians to take a stand, 
and this had brought to the surface the great political differences within the Unionist Party. 
The party was losing support among those who was against reforms, and among those who 
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supported them. The party’s ambiguous policies made people turn to those with more clear-
cut opinions.  
Alongside the increasing conflict within unionism, there developed a new conflict 
within Northern Ireland. Up to this point it had been the Protestants who had displayed the 
greatest discontent over the army presences in Northern Ireland. The Catholics had mainly 
regarded the army as protection from the loyalist forces. On the 1st of April 1970 the first 
violent confrontation between the British troops and the civilian Catholic population came, 
when the army was attacked in Ballymurphy housing estate in Belfast.461 As tension between 
Catholics and the army grew, loyalist anger increased when one of the traditional defences for 
the union was abolished.   
 On the 30th of April the B-Specials were officially disbanded, and were replaced by a 
new Ulster Defence Regiment.462 The removal of the B-Specials had been one of the demands 
from the civil rights movement, since the Catholics felt that the all Protestant police force 
could not be trusted. This would cause a strong discontent among the loyalists since they 
tended to stress that it had been set up by the British government in 1920 to counter the 
IRA.463 The extent of the loyalist disproval over the government’s policies would be shown 
when Paisley once again would fight an election.     
 
The By-elections and the intra-unionist conflict 
When O’Neill was made a Lord and took his place in the House of Lord’s, the Bannside seat 
opened up. Paisley announced that he would contest it. His main platform would be the 
restoration of law and order in the “whole of Northern Ireland”.464 The law and order focus 
was the same as the unionist party members used, but for Paisley there were just one section 
that escaped the law. Paisley felt that there still were Catholic areas where the law was not 
enforced, and he said that there had been issued an order from the head of security in the army 
to the RUC and USC, which said that they should stay out of some Catholic areas. This 
statement was rejected by the army.465         
 Chichester-Clark and the Unionist Party organised in an effort to hold on to the seat. 
Chichester-Clark went on a tour with the unionist candidate Bolton Minford.466  Faulkner 
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issued a statement to the electors in Bannside in which he asked the people to think of the 
“disastrous consequences” the policies of Paisley would have.467 This shows that the party 
took the threat Paisley posed seriously. The election would show who was the most 
successfully in attraction support from the Protestants; Chichester-Clark’s moderate policy or 
Paisley’s loyalism. 
Considering the effort the Unionist Party put in to holding the Bannside seat, it was a 
major blow when Paisley won the by-election. The Belfast Telegraph wrote that for the first 
time since the reforms were implemented a substantial portion of the Protestant population 
had showed opposition to the changes that had been made. 468  Paisleys growing support 
became even more evident when he beat the unionist candidate, and became MP in 
Westminister for North Antrim.469 The reform-line in Northern Ireland was loosing Protestant 
support rapidly.  
 In his maiden speech in Stormont, Paisley showed that he would not change his tone 
when speaking in the parliament. As one of his first statements, Paisley said that he would 
like to use a canon on the Minister of Commerce Bradford. He went on to say that the 
previous MP for the Bannside constituency, O’Neill, had talk about the British standard and 
way of life, and talked about himself as “the apostle of progress” but neglected his own 
constituency.470                    
Paisley said that he would be the same man in the commons as he was in Bannside. He 
would not “stoop the way the Unionist Party stooped at a previous election” when the party 
had tried to win over Catholic voters.471 For Paisley it would not be natural to try to convince 
any other than the Protestants to vote for him, in fact he felt that it would be dishonest if he 
did. He did, however, demand the loyalists should be heard. Paisley hoped that the 
government would start to take his and the other Protestant unionists seriously. He said that he 
hoped that the Minister of Community relations would listen to them, even if they were a 
menace to his seat. Paisley was sick of the government efforts to jackboot the people he 
represented, his people were entitled to get their voices heard: There was only one basis for a 
fair society, and that was that justice was done, and seen to be done to all sections of the 
society.472  
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The demand for the minority to get their voice heard, sounded like something the civil 
rights movement demanded, and the civil rights leader and MP John Hume, said that Paisleys 
remarks was something that most could agree with, but one could not forget that the thing that 
hurt community relations was that some people held their religious views at the expense of 
other people. Hume said that Paisley did so when he continued to make speech after speech 
that were offensive to a section of the community, to which Paisley replied: “I will continue to 
make them.”473 The language used by the civil rights movement and by Paisley had many 
similarities, but the meaning was very different. This shows how the civil rights movement’s 
language had contributed to a change in the political language in Northern Ireland. The civil 
rights movement had been so successful that its opponents were starting to use the same 
language. This may explain why Paisley often called his campaign a loyalist campaign for 
Protestant civil rights. 
On of the most pressing rights for the Protestant was now the right to defend one self. 
Speaking in the commons, Boal said that it was because of the government’s failure to impose 
its will on the people that, the civil defence groups had appeared. The lawbreakers, in the 
Catholic street, Falls Road had, according to Boal, been made into public heroes, the police 
was cordial with them, and the army sought consultations with them. When the people from 
his area (Shankill Road) saw this, they started rejecting the law. The Government had to start 
enforcing law and order.474 The right for Protestants to use violence defend themselves was 
defended among the loyalists in the parliament. The Catholics who committed violent acts did 
not receive the same support. 
 Paisley would criticise both sides of the house. He called the members of the 
opposition petrol bomb throwers, stone throwers, murders, and revolutionaries, and he blamed 
the government for giving into the demands from them. He said that the government did not 
have the courage to stand up and say no to the opposition. This had, according to Paisley, 
made the opposition believe that the members of the opposite side of the house would stand 
by, and see the members of their society being murdered without raising their voices. All the 
government’s assurances could not allay the loyalist fear. Paisley said that the B-Specials had 
done a good job in keeping the security, and had been disbanded just because the government 
had given in to the pressure from the “so-called” civil rights movement, which was nothing 
more than an IRA front. 475 There had never been a greater need for loyalist demonstration, he 
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claimed, and until the government started protecting the Protestant people, they could not 
have the security, progress and prosperity they wanted. The government had “utterly failed” 
the Prime Minister had “utterly failed”, and the people where “prey to gunmen and thugs”476 
Paisley continued to blame the civil rights movement for the troubles, and the government for 
not using enough force to deal with it. It was a similarity between the loyalists and unionists 
that that the civil rights movement was blamed for all violence, even the one that occurred 
without any connection to a civil rights protest. The fact that he condemned the actions of the 
civil rights movement did not stop Paisley from advocating the use of the same methods of 
protest. Because of this there were now several unionists who felt that Paisley’s way to 
express himself contributed to the violence, just as much as the civil rights campaign, and just 
as they had tried to stop the civil rights movement with the Public Order Bill, they would try 
to stop Paisley by legislation in the parliament.      
 The extent of the government’s dislike of Paisley and his methods became clear when 
they proposed the Prevention to Incite Hatred Bill. The Bill was intended to give protection to 
people distinguished by their religious belief.477 But it would also make it illegal to spread: 
(..)harmful rumours. Such rumours have during the past year or so led directly to widespread violence 
and there has been some evidence that the rumours have been deliberately manufactured and spread for 
that purpose. It would theoretically be possible to use this Clause against persons who publish or 
broadcast false information(..)478 
This shows how much the government felt that Paisley and his counterparts contributed to the 
increasing violence, and made it more difficult to achieve peace. The new modernising 
government found it hard to deal with the traditional Protestant beliefs of Paisley. Paisley 
himself felt that this was a law directed against him.479 He said that the purpose of the bill was 
to:  
(..)curb the speeches of the people whom he cannot defeat at the polls with all his skulduggery in the 
Press and all his lying attacks upon the loyalists of the Province. He will now seek as best he can to 
keep the Protestant Unionists from expressing themselves and putting forward their views.480   
How much the language of the moderate unionists and Paisley differed can be seen when 
Paisley compared his fight to that of Jesus. Speaking in the commons, Paisley said that the 
same charges that had been made against him had been “made against the person of the Lord 
Jesus Christ and against His Apostles. He was called a sedition-rouser by the members of the 
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establishment of those days”.481 Paisley said he would to give into those who tried to make 
him “dilute the views that are based on and agreeable to the Word of God”.482  
This is an example that the moderates of the Unionist Party, and Paisley were fighting 
different battles. The fight for the moderates was for the most part a political one, but for 
Paisley it was a religious one. The moderates saw that Paisley’s statement would worsen the 
situation, and introduced the law to try to stop him. Paisley saw this as a gross impeachment 
of his rights, since what he said was the creeds of his religion.483 Northern Ireland was in 
general becoming less tolerant than ever before. The relationship between Catholics and 
Protestants were less tolerant, and the tolerance to express views that would make the 
situation worse was gone within the government. In addition, the relationship between the 
army and the Catholics were becoming much worse.   
      
More violence and a new oppositional party 
Between the 3rd and 5th July the army imposed a curfew in Falls Road in Belfast. The decision 
came after there had occurred serious rioting, in which five people had been killed, and many 
more injured. The curfew was so strict that the inhabitants of Falls Road were only allowed to 
leave their house for two hours to do their shopping. During the curfew the army searched the 
houses after weapons, and a significant number of weapons were found.484  Paul Dixon, 
Professor at Queens University, writes in his book Northern Ireland, The politics of war and 
peace that the curfew was one of the worst decisions made in Northern Ireland, because as a 
result of the curfew, many Catholics became alienated from the army, and turned to the 
IRA.485       
On the 27th of July the government announced a ban on all parades in Northern Ireland 
until the end of January. This meant that the traditional Protestant parades, like the 12th of 
August would be banned.486 The Apprentice Boys called the decision ridiculous, and said that 
it would most likely cause serious trouble. They said that the celebrations would most likely 
go on regardless of the government’s ban, since they were “entitled to march”.487 They called 
the decision the “ultimate surrender of shameless and discredited government (..) to the forces 
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of subversion and rebellion”.488 The South Derry division Of the Ulster Protestant Volunteers 
said if the Apprentice Boys did not march on the 12th of August, they would march instead. 
The UPV could not accept a ban, since they felt it was obvious that if a loyalist march was 
held again, the Catholic rebels would use it as an excuse to defy the lawful authorities.489 The 
Protestant Telegraph said that this showed how “bankrupt of loyalty, honesty and courage” 
the cabinet was. They went on to say that one should praise God that the Apprentice Boys had 
showed signs of defying the ban.490 Loyalists and civil rights campaigners both saw parades 
as a valid method to express ones political beliefs, and when they were denied this possibility 
they felt as their freedom to speak was curbed. This was probably not the intent of the 
government, as they saw parades at this time as a threat to the peace not, a political expression. 
This is an example of how the new and old ways to express one self politically collided.  
As the pressure from the loyalist community increased, the pressure from the British 
government increased too. At this time the Home Secretary, Reginald Maulding, warned that 
if there was any backtracking of the reforms, Westminister might assume direct responsibility 
over Northern Ireland. He said that if the reforms, implemented from the “ideal of impartially 
and reconciliation”, were reversed, it would endanger the constitutional position of Northern 
Ireland.491 This put Chichester-Clark in a precarious situation. At this time he could not afford 
to look weak in front of Westminister, since this would give fuel to the loyalists. He warned 
that if Westminister introduced direct rule, it might produce a very violent reaction from the 
Protestant-loyalist population. In a pleading statement he said to Westminister: “For goodness 
sake, you must realise that we in Northern Ireland are very independent people. We want to 
be allowed to run our own affairs.”492 As the situation got worse and worse, the discussion of 
whether the government should start to intern people without trial under the Special Powers 
Act, started among the unionist hardliners.493 
 The troubles that had occurred, made the nationalists politicians come together to form 
a new political party. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) was launched on the 
21st of August 1970. The party was a build up of members of the old Nationalist Party, 
Republican Labour, and Northern Ireland Labour Parties, in addition to the civil rights 
movement’s MPs.494 The party became the political driving force for the Catholic community. 
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The party’s strong link with the civil rights movement was demonstrated in one of the party’s 
main political goals, which were to “secure civil rights for all citizens, irrespective of race, 
creed, or political outlook.” 495  The civil rights movement had thus resulted in the 
establishment of a traditional political party. Yet, at the same time as the nationalist 
population was coming closer together, the unionist collation was falling more apart.         
On the 26th of August the Minister of Home Affairs Robert Porter resigned his post. 
Chichester-Clark would not appoint a new minister, but take the reigns of the office himself in 
an interim period.496 The Protestant Telegraph was pleased with the decision, because they 
saw the resignation as a sign of Porter’s failure, and claimed that it heralded the collapse of 
the government.497  
As Chichester-Clark got attacked from all sides, he became more and more fed up with 
the civil rights movement. It was no longer only the Peoples Democracy who where labelled 
as a front organisation for the IRA, now NICRA was also described as such. Chichester-Clark 
said in a speech to the Strandtown unionists in Belfast that the right of minority groups to 
“flaunt and foist and ultimately force their opinions on others” had been established. He went 
on to say that “perhaps its time for revolution. For the revolution of majorities (...) who are 
sick of being pushed around.” 498 Chichester-Clark was sick of people using the slogans of 
democracy, when they showed no respect for the elected representatives of the people.499 He 
said that NICRA’s call for people to return to the street demonstrated the “total moral 
bankruptcy” of the organisation, and claimed that this revealed that it was nothing more than a 
front organisation for forces who sought to undermine the development and progress of the 
country. He asked that all moderate people should rally, “not to the government, not to the 
Unionist Party, not to any single vision of Northern Ireland’s future, but to the cause of 
democracy itself”.500 The statement is significant as for the first time since the civil rights 
movement had begun the whole movement was dismissed as a plot against the constitution by 
the Prime Minister. 
Trying to avoid the return of “politics in the street”, Chichester-Clark introduced the 
immediate introduction of one-man, one-vote in council by-elections.501 Even if Chichester-
Clark and the government said that they did not give into pressure from the civil rights 
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movement, they could not ignore it, and the government had now given into most of the 
demands of the movement. This did not lead to a halt in violence, however, and the civil 
rights movement did not go away. This is also one of the episodes that one can see clearly 
demonstrated that the civil rights movement influenced the unionist government. Since 
Chichester-Clark dismissed the movement as a false movement, it is unlikely he would have 
implemented the immediate introduction of one-man, one-vote unless he had felt pressured to 
do so.   
1970 would prove to be one of the most violent years in Northern Irish history thus far. 
About 100 explosions had occurred in 1970.502 2 police men and 23 civilians had been killed; 
in addition 191 policemen and 620 soldiers had been injured. The civilian total was 
unaccounted for.503 The next year would be worse still.  
To sum up; 1970 was the year in which the last belief in the sincerity of the civil rights 
movement vanished among the unionist politicians. The fact that NICRA called for the return 
to the street at a time when the violence plagued the province, was enough to remove any 
doubt among the politicians in the Unionist Party. Even so, they went on with the reforms, 
and introduced one-man, one-vote with immediate effect. This most likely happened because 
of the pressure from the civil rights movement, as well as pressure from the British 
government who threatened with direct-rule, if the reforms were stopped.  
The success of the civil rights movement started to change the way politics was 
conducted in Northern Ireland. Paisley and his “Protestant civil rights movement” adopted 
much of the same language that the civil rights movement used. The civil rights movement’s 
effect on how politics were conducted in Northern Ireland would prove to be even more 
significant in the following year.  
The acceptance of different political views diminished within the Unionist Party, and 
this led to the expulsion of some of the government’s strongest critics. There can be little 
doubt that the civil rights campaign was an important factor in bringing about a more closed 
Unionist Party. The political landscape was changing. The nationalist community formed a 
new party, based to a large degree on the civil rights platform. At the same time the most 
moderate elements within the Unionist Party withdrew, to form a party which they felt would 
better follow the reform policies of O’Neill.  
Chichester-Clark’s position was becoming more and more unstable, as he received 
pressure from all sections of the society. The Unionist Party struggled to keep up with the 
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constantly changing political situation, and it would not take long before the conflict would 
cost another Prime Minister his job.      
 
STORMONT’S SWANSONG: 1971-1972 
On the 25th of January, following more riots in Shankill Road, 170 leading unionists called for 
Chichester-Clark’s resignation. They signed a statement which said that the government had 
failed to maintain the law and security in the country, and called for a new administration.504 
The next day 250 unionists signed a statement in which they said that they would support 
Chichester-Clark.505 There were still more unionists that supported the Prime Minister, than 
there were unionists that opposed him, but the split in the party was greater than ever before. 
 Faulkner said that there had been a change since last year, and that was that the 
government had established beyond any doubt that is was an administration of “integrity, 
progressive ideals determination.” 506 At the same time the republicans had been exposed for 
what they really were, Faulkner claimed. He went on to say that no responsible citizen could 
have any reservation about letting the security forces deal with the troublemakers and 
criminals. Faulkner made it clear that one should not confuse political activity with criminal 
activity. A person had, according to Faulkner, the right to push for an end to partition, but if 
he used force the government had the right to stop him.507 Faulkner said that the republican 
diehards had exploited the civil rights movement for two years, but because of the actions of 
the government, had they now been exposed, and stood alone.508 At this time the word civil 
rights was not much used, even by the most moderate in the Unionist Party. The unionists did 
no longer have any doubt that the troubles that plagued the province, came as a result of 
republicans deliberately trying to unsettle the situation. The ones who committed the violence 
were not civil rights campaigners, but rioters. This did not, however, mean that the 
government would abandon their efforts to get the minority involved in peaceful participation.  
In a debate on cross boarders relations, Chichester-Clark said that he could understand 
that a person would prefer to be a first-class citizen in a poor country, rather than a second-
class citizen in a rich one. That is why it was the policy of the government to insure that there 
were no second-class citizens. He accepted that this meant something more than just fairness; 
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it meant the possibility to participate in every section of the society and in every aspect of the 
institutions.509 This statement shows how much the perception of minority rights had changed 
since the start of the civil rights campaign. In the over 40 years of unionist rule, the minority 
had never had the possibility to participate in upper levels of the government. Chichester-
Clark’s statement indicates that the Prime Minister thought that they should have a possibility 
to get their voice heard even in the government. When one combines this with the fact that the 
opposition now had been consulted in some cases, one can see that the possibilities for the 
Catholics to get their point across had increased since the start of the civil rights campaign. 
Since then, they had gone from relative political obscurity to in many ways directly 
influencing the political agenda.  
The Prime Minister distinguished himself from Paisley, since he still would appeal to 
the Catholics to join in, when he in the same speech said that he did not think of unionism as a 
sectarian faith, but a political one and he hoped that the minority would profess it with him 
some day.510 But if some were getting more influence, there were certainly others that felt that 
they got less.      
At this time it is clear the Craig was displeased with his opportunities to express his 
views. He said that the government ridiculed all that had a different view than themselves, and 
that they try to make it seem like nobody but themselves could contribute with something 
good.511 Craig’s growing dissatisfaction with the Unionist Party can be seen on the 23rd of 
February lashed out at the Unionist Council, the governing body of the Unionist Party, and 
said that it was “sick with senile decay”. He went on to say that if nothing was done to save 
the Unionist Party soon, there would have to be a new political organisation, “freed from the 
dishonesty and quilt of the two last years”.512    
 
A change of Prime Minister 
As the situation deteriorated, more and more unionists called for internment under the Special 
Powers Act. Faulkner said the he would only be in favour of internment if it was the only way 
to stop the violence.513 The fact that many unionists wanted to imprison people without trial, 
show how much the situation had spiralled out of control, and that the call for stricter 
measures had now been adopted by most unionists.      
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On the 13th of February 1971, the Protestant Telegraph declared that Northern Ireland 
had been enveloped in a war. The paper asked about how many more explosions, riots and 
murders that had to happen before the government woke up. The B-Specials had to been 
reconstituted, and a people’s militia had to be formed. 514 According to the PT there could not 
be a method drastic enough to stop the rioters, since the rebels rioters had “no rights”.515   
On the 16th of March Chichester-Clark flew to London to demand more troops to deal 
with the crises. He would ask for an increase of soldiers from the 8 000 at the time to 12 000. 
If this was not granted he threatened to resign.516 The British government did not give him the 
troops he demanded, so on the 19th of March the time was up for Chichester-Clark. He 
decided to resign from his post as Prime Minister.517  
This time it would be Brian Faulkner and William Craig that would try to become the 
next Prime Minister.518 Last time Faulkner lost with one vote, this time he won with 22. When 
the votes had been cast, Faulkner had received 26 votes against Craig’s 4.519 The support for 
the policies of the previous administrations was still great within the party, and Faulkner 
assured that the program of progress that the previous administrations had embarked on would 
be continued. Faulkner said that what was needed were practical results in dealing with the 
terrorism, sabotaged, riots, and disorder.520 He refused to let sectarianism enter Ulster politics, 
and claimed that it did not matter to him where a man went to church.521  Even though 
Faulkner said he would continue with the previous administrations policies, he was another 
step closer to the right wing of the Unionist Party. This can be seen when he appointed Harry 
West, a hardliner who had fought against both the previous Prime Ministers, as Minister of 
Agriculture. This appointment was not well received among the liberal wing in the party, and 
one PM, Anne Dickinson resigned the party whip in the commons in protest.522 There seemed 
to have been a slow orientation to the right since Terence O’Neill’s premiership. The Unionist 
Party had lost much of its liberal support to the Alliance Party, and people who had been 
backbenchers had moved into position of power.   
It is indicative for how much the civil rights movement had changed the political 
situation in Northern Ireland that one of the first subjects Faulkner talked about in the 
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parliament was his administration policy on parades. There he made it clear that the 
government would try to reserve the right to processions as far as possible. Nevertheless he 
saw that there were particular routes that could pose a threat to the peace, and these parades 
would be rerouted or banned.523 This he followed up when he on the 9th of April announced a 
ban on parades in the Loup area in Derry, and that only traditional parades, or those already 
announced would be allowed to proceed over the Easter. The Loup area was the place for two 
parades, one republican commemoration parade and one loyalist rally arranged by the Free 
Presbyterian Church, which had been scheduled at the same time.524 The hope that the limited 
ban on parades would ensure that reaming parades would proceed peacefully, would not pay 
off when both Belfast and Derry saw violence erupt during the Easter parades.525    
 Faulkner would not receive any honeymoon period from the loyalists. Paisley said that 
Chichester-Clark should have resigned long ago, but Faulkner would not be acceptable for the 
loyalist community, in fact he said that if he had to choose, he would prefer Chichester-
Clark.526 Boal said in the Commons that he could not support the new administration, since it 
was nothing new from the old. He said that he had only opposed the previous administration 
on one issue, and that was the law and order issue, and he had been proven right on that. 527 
The new Prime Minister was not, according to Boal, something new from the previous. Boal 
expressed confusion over how some of the hardliners in the Unionist Party could accept 
cabinet positions in an administration that had the same policies as they had protested against. 
He made it clear that he would not join the Unionist Party again, even if he was allowed. He 
would not change his opinion, or be afraid to express it no matter what happened.528    
The Protestant Telegraph declared that there could be no doubt that Faulkner would 
continue with the suppressing of loyalist activity by banning loyalist processions. The paper 
also predicted that Faulkner would consider interning Protestants. 529  This would be an 
infringement of the rights of Protestants, but the paper did not feel that the same should count 
for the “IRA rebels.”  On the 29th of May, the PT called for “the internment of known IRA 
men (including some politicians.)”530 The Protestant Telegraph continued to say that the fight 
was a fight for the survival of Ulster, and that a “weak government have already conceded too 
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much”, and that Ulster should “metaphorically (..)stick to its guns”.531 This statement was in 
many ways typical for Paisley and his paper. They had up to this time not directly called for 
the use of force, but they used a language that easily could be interpreted as such. Something 
similar can be seen on the 29th of May when the paper wrote that if the army could not control 
the situation, then the Protestants of Ulster would hold the province.532  
After the outbreak of violence during the Easter processions, the Protestant Telegraph 
called for an inquiry into the actions of the army towards the Protestants in Newtownards 
Road. The paper dismissed the “papist propaganda” that “harmless, unarmed prosecuted 
papists” had been provoked and harried by savage Orange extremists.533 Paisley said in the 
commons that he could not accept that it was only when Roman Catholics were fatally injured, 
that inquires should be held. When one looked at the patterns of events it was clear that this 
was the situation, Paisley argued.534  The feeling among the loyalists that their grief was 
overlooked, while the Catholics had been given several inquires to investigate their 
complaints was growing, this may help to explain why the loyalists continued to call out for 
Protestant civil rights.   
Even with the increasing violence the Protestant Telegraph protested when the Orange 
Grand Lodge of Ireland after consultation with Faulkner abandoned plans to arrange “the 
greatest Protestant march in the history of Ireland.” 535 The paper called the act a betrayal, 
and said that the responsible would be removed from their ranks.536  
The insistence of both the civil rights campaigners and the loyalists to protest in the 
street, lead the government to allow the army to use more force. Up to this time the army had 
caused relative few civilian casualties, but on the 25th of May Faulkner announced that a 
soldier that saw someone with a weapon, or who was acting suspiciously could fire in 
warning or with effect without waiting for orders. This did not go well down with the SDLP, 
and they warned that if the powers of the parliament would be given to soldiers, they would 
withdraw from Stormont.537 The PT wrote that the IRA had intensified their campaign, and 
that they where holding Ulster ransom. There were no signs that the rebels were on the run, 
and now was the time “to shed the velvet glove and softly-softly tactics.” 538  Faulkner’s 
statement that soldiers could shoot at bombers and people who were acting suspiciously could, 
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according to the paper, only be credible if it was made effective.539 This was a direct call for 
the use of deadly force against the Catholics, and shows how extreme measures the loyalists 
called for. The loyalists felt that the Protestant community got the worst of the situation, while 
the Catholics got treated with velvet gloves, and given all their hearts desire in an effort to 
stop them from causing violence. The animosity towards the army was growing among both 
loyalists and Catholics, and both sides called for an inquiry into the actions of the army, but 
for very different reasons. 
  On the 8th of July, after four nights of riots between Catholics and the British army in 
Derry, a civilian was shot and died from the injuries. The army claimed that he had aimed at 
them with a gun, something that was denied by the other rioters. The incident led to more 
rioting, and on the 9th another man was shot and killed. This time the army claimed that the 
man had been about to throw a nail bomb. This was also denied by the local people, who 
claimed that the man had been unarmed. The SDLP announced that they would withdraw 
from Stormont if an inquiry into the murders was not held. This did not happen; so on the 12th 
of July the SDLP withdrew from the Stormont parliament.540 The Catholics were now without 
political representation at Stormont, but the civil rights movement would once again be the 
main political vehicle for Catholics, as the movement experienced a revival when the 
government started to intern Catholics without a trial.   
 
Internment 
On the 9th of August, Faulkner announced that he would implement internment of suspected 
IRA leaders under the Special Powers Act, and at the same time he announced a 6 months ban 
on all parades. The same day more than 300 people were taken in to custody. The decision 
came after one of the worst weekends of violence in Northern Ireland. One soldier died, six 
soldiers and 4 civilians were injured by gunfire, and several bombs exploded throughout the 
province.541 Faulkner told the members of the parliament that since the 1st of January and up 
to the first week of August, 38 people had died and there had been 327 explosions. The 
government could not tolerate this situation to continue, and Faulkner said that the most 
obvious measure was internment.542  
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Faulkner defended the decision by saying that every other means had been tried to 
make “the terrorist amendable to the law”, they had been successful in some extent, but the 
terrorist campaign continued on an unacceptable level and Faulkner concluded that ordinary 
law was not enough to deal with the situation. 543 He said that the government was not acting 
to suppress freedom, but to allow the overwhelming mass of people to enjoy freedom. 
Faulkner said that he did not for one moment confused the Catholic community with the IRA, 
and that the acts of violence had been committed in their name or with their approval. He 
pleaded for the Catholics to join in to save the community, and said that his door would 
always be open.544 Concerning the civil rights members who were interned, Faulkner said that 
they were interned only if they also were members of or actively involved in IRA.545  
Faulkner said that he had banned all processions because the defeat of terrorism had to 
come before anything else. For that reason he had also decided that the security forces could 
not be diverted from their essential task. In addition he saw that parades resulted in violence, 
and that would hurt commerce, the industry and the community. 546 He said that he was sorry 
that this would interfere with rights and traditions cherished by so many, but they were at war 
with the terrorists, and in a war many sacrifices had to be made.547     
The SDLP called the decision further proof of the total failure of the system of 
government in Northern Ireland, and said that they would give their full support to 
organisations that would organise meetings against internment. In a statement they called for 
all who held public positions to withdraw from them in protest, and they called for the 
government in Westminister to immediately suspend the system of government in Northern 
Ireland.548 NICRA announced that they would start a campaign of civil disobedience, which 
would include non-payment of rents and rates. They said that they would pay no more 
attention to Stormont.549 The decision the intern people to restore the peace, would prove to 
be counterproductive. After a period in which it seemed like the civil rights movement had 
lost momentum and fallen into the background to the violence, internment provided the 
movement with a renewed energy and a new fighting cause. The decision would also backfire 
because it removed the goodwill of the moderate Catholic opinion. The hope of a settlement 
based on the moderate elements in Northern Ireland seemed distant after this decision.  
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The SDLP would indeed refuse to take part in any settlements talks while anyone was 
held without trial.550 The fact that the civil rights movement and the opposition in Stormont 
were against internment is no surprise, a bit more unexpected is Paisley and Boal’s opposition 
to the measure. Paisley told the members of the parliament that: 
If a man is described as a gunman there must be evidence that he is a gunman. If there is such evidence 
then the place for him is not in an internment camp but in Crumlin Road prison.551 
Boal said that internment had “made matters much worse; done without principle, ineptly 
carried out”.552 This is another example on issues in which the civil rights movement and the 
loyalists shared a point of view. This did not, however, mean that they had come to the same 
conclusion based on the same reasoning. There are indications that Paisley objected to 
interment because he was worried that it might be used against Protestants. He said to the 
MPs that “if Protestant people were interned on the same type of flimsy evidence, hon. 
Members opposite would be up on their feet saying, "It should not be done.".”553 Paisley took 
offence to a claim that he sounded like the republican opposition, and said that he advocated 
the strongest possible measures against the republican army, and that if they had been 
implemented there would have been no reason for internment.554 There was therefore no 
sympathy towards the republicans among the loyalists. The reason why Paisley and Boal 
could oppose internment stemmed probably form the belief that the Catholics who committed 
the violence were mere criminals and could therefore be removed from the street with normal 
procedures.  
In a parliament without the nationalist opposition, the government tried to stop the 
non-payment strategy of the Catholics by passing a law in an effort to force the people 
withholding rent, to pay. According to the government were 19% of public authority tenants 
withholding rents which amounted to a loss of £60 000 a week for the local authorities. 555 
The bill would make it possible for the government to withhold governmental payments, and 
use those to pay the debtors.556 The fact that so many were withholding rents shows how 
significant support the civil rights movement had obtained among the Catholic population, 
and shows that internment as an effort to get people off the street, proved to be 
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counterproductive. As the Catholic community came closer together as result of interment, the 
Protestant split became more formalised.       
  
A new Protestant party 
On the 13th of September 1971 Boal formally resigned his membership in the Unionist Party. 
Boal, who had been out in the cold and without the party whip since he refused to support 
Chichester-Clark, left the party because Faulkner intended to have tripartite talks with the 
British and Irish governments. Boal said that he had for the last five years seen the 
government make blunder after blunder, while the party had stood by, condoning the actions 
who nourished their political enemies, and alienated their political friends. 557  Faulkner 
defended the decision to have talks with the Irish Prime Minister Lynch by saying that Lynch 
could influence the situation to good. The border would not be an issue, but if the talks could 
help to stop the violence Faulkner felt that it was worth a try.558  
This sentiment was not shared by the loyalists. The Shankill Unionist Association said 
that “such talks with the sworn enemy of Ulster would be a complete sell out and the betrayal 
of one million Protestants”559 This is another clear difference between the moderate unionists 
and the loyalists. Faulkner had moved the official position of the party closer to that of the 
loyalists by using more force to stop the violence, but he would still try to resolve the 
situation by talking with all the moderate sections of the society, rather than the mere use of 
force, such as the loyalists had cried out for during the previous years. 
 After his departure from the Unionist Party, it would not take long before Boal 
announced his intention to create his own party. On the 1st of October Boal announced that he 
had taken the first steps to the formation of a new party. He said that the new government 
perpetuated the errors of the previous administrations, and by so doing hasted the country’s 
political destruction and psychical chaos. 560 The government had failed to provide security 
for the population, and was now set on a course that would undermine the democratic 
institutions and the effectiveness of the majority to determine their constitutional future.561 
 The Democratic Unionist Party was formed on the 30th of October 1971, and was 
headed by Boal and Paisley; in addition the party had William Beattie and John McQuade as 
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representatives in the parliament. The main issues for the party would be the security and 
constitutional ones.562  The political goals of the party was the same as the loyalists and 
hardline unionists had cried out for since the start of the campaign, and it is therefore not an 
exaggeration to conclude that the new loyalist party had came about as a result of the civil 
rights campaign, and the loyalist perception of the government’s failure to deal with the 
movement with enough force. The split of the Protestant population was now more formalised 
with the new parties, but there were still those who were on the outside.    
Craig was at this time a somewhat diffuse political entity in Northern Irish politics. He 
was no longer under the Unionist Party whip, not a part of the Paisley group, and in some 
aspects he stood in opposition to all in the parliament. But one thing that had been and would 
be consistent, was his opposition to the government’s policies. At this time one could see that 
Craig started contemplating using non-parliamentarian methods to stop the violence. He said 
that he would support the formation of loyalist civil defence force. Such a force would in 
Craig’s mind give the feeling of protection in exposed areas, and give the people confidence 
and lessen the risk of civil war. He stressed that the force could not be a paramilitary 
organisation, but he said that it was a dreadful commentary on the actions of the government 
that Protestants had to organise such a force in order to protect themselves.563 Craig wanted 
more internal control over the situation. He was in no way pleased with the British 
government’s interference in Northern Ireland’s internal matters. At this time he made it clear 
that if the situation did not change, then Ulster may have to become an independent entity.564    
In an interview with the Belfast Telegraph, Craig said if Britain was not ready to agree 
to realistic policies to ensure constitutional and political stability, then it was in the interest of 
the people to say:  
Our present constitution doesn’t work. The necessary base upon which to look forward to a peaceful, 
prosperous future is not there, and it is in the interest of the majority to have a constitution under the 
Crown similar to that of a dominion.565  
Craig said that this alternative was more likely than direct rule. If the British government was 
to implement direct rule, they would, according to Craig, immediately be in the wrong, since 
the British government had no right to go against the will of the majority of Ulster. If the 
British did so, it could no longer “pretend to hold its head up in the democratic world”.566 
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 This answer led the interviewer to ask whether the world did not already see the 
democratic standards in Ulster in an unfavourable light, and if the British government would 
no be able to justify its actions by the fact that half a million people could not agree to serve 
in a parliament under the current system. 567 To this Craig replied that one could not take away 
the rights of a million people to placate a half a million, who in the end were not interested in 
making any system work under the crown.568 He said that he did not believe that a majority of 
the minority supported the campaign against the constitution. He did not accept that the SDLP, 
the main political vehicle for the Catholics had genuine intentions. 569 In Craig’s mind was the 
newly formed SDLP a part of the IRA campaign to bring down the constitution. He said that 
SDLP and others “associated with the escalation towards violence” would be the main 
casualty of an election.570 
SDLP was founded on street violence and has always shown a readiness to resort to violent political 
tactics. Their support for civil disobedience is another example of that. (..) I don’t think one should try 
overmuch to talk to SDLP until they show a willingness themselves to participate in democratic 
government and abandon the pressures of violence.571          
It is hard to figure out what Craig believed to be a genuine Catholic political expression. Since 
the start of the civil rights campaign he had dismissed all Catholic political activity as a plot 
against the constitution. But at this time, Craig was among those threatening to end the union 
with Great Britain, and to go outside the parliament to ensure that his rights were not 
infringed. Asked of what he would do if direct rule was implemented, Craig replied that the 
right thing to do then would be to “mount a campaign where the majority would insist that it 
be given freedom against a situation that it could not trust.”572 This statement demonstrates 
how much the political situation had changed since the start of the civil rights campaign. The 
fact that one of the sternest critics of the civil rights movement’s way of protest would mount 
a similar campaign if he was denied the possibility to make his voice heard in the parliament 
is interesting. It is an ironic twist of faith that the ones who had started the street protest, both 
civil rights campaigners and the loyalists had formed traditional political parties to make their 
voice heard, whereas at the same time one of the strongest defenders of ‘politics in the 
parliament’ would form a movement that used the same methods of protest as he so strongly 
had denounced when he had influence in the government. Craig was at this time probably 
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feeling more and more marginalised, and it is a telling sign of the civil rights movement’s 
influence on how politics was conducted in Northern Ireland that Craig was contemplating 
using the same methods when he experienced being more and more put to the side. 
 The fact that Craig did consider to start a non-parliamentarian movement did not mean 
that he would stop to criticise the government in the traditional parliamentarian fashion. On 
the 13th of October he asked that the:  
House, having regard to the continuing deterioration in the maintenance of the peace and security of 
Northern Ireland, censures the Government for their continuing failure to adopt realistic policies to 
ensure an effective police force adequate to deal with the terrorist threat.573      
This was one of the biggest complaints from the Protestant opponents of the current 
administrations. The government’s decision to disband the B-Specials and to reorganise the 
RUC was seen as a betrayal by the loyalists. Craig said that the army had “failed the 
community in a very big way”574 Paisley expressed support for Craig’s proposal, and asked the 
house to condemn: 
the Government for surrendering control of Northern Ireland's security and acquiescing in the 
dissolution of its security forces, but recognises that the deplorable state that this folly has brought about 
can best be remedied by the Government ensuring that the proper directives are given to the military 
forces presently engaged in security duties, preparatory to the reorganisation of our police forces.575 
There was not much that separated the position of the two politicians. Paisley called for more 
use of the army against rioters, something Craig with his now very anti-British point of view, 
probably would not condone. Even so there is little doubt that Craig was closer to Paisley than 
the government at this time. Still they would not come together to from a united front against 
the Unionist Party, and soon the chance to form an alliance in the Stormont parliament would 
be gone.   
 
The end of Stormont 
Internment gave the civil rights movement a new momentum, and it was during an anti-
interment march that the faith of the Stormont Parliament would be sealed. The troubles 
would once again start in the month of January. The first protest march came already on the 
2nd of January 1972, and once again did Paisley warn that there would be a loyalist backlash if 
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the march went on.576 The march went on, without any great disturbances, but it was enough 
to make Faulkner ban all parades and marches to the end of the year.577 
 As it had in the past, the ban would not take the civil rights movement of the street. On 
the 22nd of January there was an anti-internment march in Derry. When the marchers neared 
the internment camp they were held back by the army. When it became clear that some of the 
marchers went past the barriers set up, the army started shooting rubber bullets and CS gas 
into the crowd. There were allegations of army brutality, and John Hume accused the army of 
"beating, brutalising and terrorising the demonstrators".578  The relationship between the 
Catholics and the army was worse than ever, and soon it would end in a deadly confrontation 
that would change Northern Ireland forever. 
As the internment continued, the civil rights movement announced that they would 
defy the governments ban on parades, and march in protest on the 30th of January. The march 
would go from Dungannon to Coalisland, the same route as the first civil rights march in 
August 1968.579 The birthplace of the civil rights movement would also become its graveyard. 
The army warned that the marchers had to be prepared to accept the full consequences of 
breaking the law.580    
The demonstration went on, and the result would be the end of large scale street 
demonstrations for civil rights. On the 30th of January were 13 people shoot dead after clashes 
between civil rights protesters and the army.581 It was by far the most serious incident since 
the troubles had begun three years previously. The army said that it was the civil rights 
protesters that had opened fire first, but the protesters themselves said that it was the army that 
had shot first, and that they had shot indiscriminately on the protesters.582  
Northern Ireland had changed much since the events on October 5th 1968, and the 
situation had outgrown the civil rights movement. The time of peaceful civil rights protest in 
the street was over. In Faulkner’s mind there could not be any doubt about the intent of these 
parades were, and that was to achieve a united Ireland.583 He said that the government had 
striven to remove the last of any legitimate complaint, but: 
if our gestures are spurned, our overtures rejected, and in the end we are faced with a continuing 
defiance of lawful authority and an attempt to overthrow the state, then this government and this house 
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will demand to be heard over any clamour in the street to assert that those we represent also have their 
basic rights and will defend them.584          
He would not say anything about who had shot first, that would be investigated by an inquiry 
by Westminster, but he did say that at this time, any gathering of thousands of people would 
pose a threat to the peace. 585 Because of this, Faulkner said that the blame could be laid at the 
feet of people like John Hume, who knew the risk, but went on with the protest anyway.586 
There was no longer any sympathy towards the civil rights movement within the government. 
Any goodwill that had existed within the Unionist Party since the beginning of the civil rights 
campaign, was gone.     
 As the civil rights movement had come to what would in effect be its end, a new 
movement was established. The movement would adopt some of the methods used by the 
civil rights movement. On the 9th of February Craig’s new loyalist association, Vanguard, was 
presented. He stressed that the movement was not a political party, and denied that its intent 
was to challenge Faulkner’s position. The association was established in the event that some 
tried to interfere with the constitution, and to take the necessary action needed in that event. 
Craig said that the talk of a political settlement in reality meant changing the constitution and 
give all the powers to Westminister. This would leave Stormont as “nothing more than a 
glorified county council.” 587 To stop this people had to be willing to make “the supreme 
sacrifice.”588 If there was no choice, the movement would support the establishment of an 
independent British Ulster.589  To show the loyalist discontent, Craig announced that the new 
movement was to arrange loyalist rallies all over the country, and that would culminate in a 
big rally in Belfast in March.590          
 The rally on the 18th of March attracted thousands of people. The army and RUC 
estimated that more than 75 000 people showed up. Craig announced that the movement 
would implement contingency plans, which would make any political initiative that were 
unacceptable to the majority, unworkable.591 The rhetoric and methods of protest that had 
been first used by the civil rights movement, than adopted by Paisley and his loyalist 
movement, was now being used by one of the strongest defenders of ‘politics in the 
parliament.’  
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 If Craig had moved closer to the position Paisley had, it did not mean that they had the 
same point of view. Paisley never supported an independent Ulster, and he said that he would 
accept direct rule as long as Northern Ireland remained British.592 As Craig formalised his 
position as an alternative loyalist leader, it was possible that the loyalist community could 
split the same way that the unionist had, but as time would show, this would, however, not 
happen during the Stormont period. 
In March 1972 there were more than rumours that the British government would soon 
implement direct rule.593  Speaking to a crowd of approximately 12 000 people during a 
Vanguard rally, Craig said that it would be foolish to reward the “terrorists and republicans” 
by tampering with the constitution.594 As the constitutional crisis loomed, Faulkner went to 
Downing Street to discuss the security situation, but it was clear that the two Prime Ministers 
stood far apart in respect to what should be done.595 It soon became clear that the British 
Government felt that the system of government that had ruled Northern Ireland for 50 years, 
no longer were sufficient to deal with the situation.    
On the 24th of March the British government announced that they would suspend 
Stormont for a year, and govern Northern Ireland through a local commission. The decision 
came after Faulkner refused to accept the British government’s proposals for changes in the 
security policy. The Unionist Party expressed “shock and amazement at the breach of thrust 
and surrender to violence by the conservative government”, and said that they supported 
Faulkner’s decision to refuse to give in to the demands from the British government.596 The 
British government said that they saw it as an indispensable condition for progress in 
Northern Ireland that Stormont transferred the responsibilities over law and order to 
Westminister. Since Faulkner refused to do so, they saw no other possibility than to assume 
the full and direct responsibility over Northern Ireland.597  
Faulkner said that even if they did not like the decision to suspend Stormont, they had 
to realise that the act had been made, and they had to accept it because it was the law. If they 
did not, they would “sink to the level of that rabble who for the past few years have 
proclaimed civil rights but recognised no civil obligations.”598 The Unionist Party, as one of 
the few political entities in Northern Ireland, was still in favour of the traditional political 
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procedures, and would therefore accept the British parliament’s decision. Not all would be 
contained to do the same. Craig and the Vanguard movement called for a two day strike to 
stop what he called the “surrender to terrorist violence”. He said that urgent action was 
required to stop the proposed changes, and make them impossible.599  
SDLP expressed support for the take over, and asked those who were engaged in a 
campaign of violence to cease immediately, so that interment would be brought to an end. 
They would continue with their campaign of civil disobedience until interment was 
abolished.600 The civil rights movement had outplayed their role in the Northern Irish society, 
but the fight was only starting. It would be close 30 years before a lasting peace settlement 
was reached, and it was not until 2010, that the powers of law and order were to be handed 
back to Northern Irish control. 
 
SUMMARY 
The end of Chichester-Clark’s premiership came early in 1971. On the 19th of March he 
resigned because of the British government’s refusal to send more troops to Northern Ireland. 
Faulkner was elected as Prime Minister, and announced that he would continue along the 
same lines as Chichester-Clark. Faulkner moved the position of the Unionist Party closer to 
the position of the hardliners, however, by appointing Harry West as Minister of Agriculture, 
but this did not earn him any goodwill from the loyalists, who right from the beginning 
expressed opposition to Faulkner. 
 Faulkner continued with the policy, of talking with all the moderate sections in 
Northern Ireland in an effort to restore the peace. But the moderate sections were dwindling 
away. On the 30th of October 1971, Paisley and Boal formed the Democratic Unionist Party. 
The party had come about as a result of the loyalists view that the government had failed to 
deal with the civil rights movement with enough force, and is therefore an example of how the 
civil rights movement influenced the split in the unionist movement.  
 As the violence grew, the civil rights movement had been pushed out in the 
background, but when Faulkner interned suspected IRA leaders in Agust 1971, it led to the 
alienation of the entire Catholic community. Internment provided the civil rights with a new 
fighting cause and gave the movement a new momentum. And it was during a civil rights 
march against internment in Derry that the faith of Stormont would be sealed. 
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 A new movement emerged during the last period of the Stormont parliament, Craig’s 
Vanguard movement. Vanguard was a loyalist movement that used many of the same 
methods as the civil rights movement. Both the political methods and language of Vanguard 
was a clear indication of how much the civil rights movement had changed the political 
climate in Northern Ireland. The fact that Craig, one of the strongest defenders of ‘politics in 
the parliament’, formed a movement along the same lines as the civil rights movement is 
evidence of how much the civil rights movements way of protest had been adopted by other 
groups who felt they stood on the outside of the traditional channels of political influence.     
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
Northern Ireland in March 1972 was very different from Northern Ireland on the 5th of 
October 1968. Even if there were those who in October 1968 warned of the consequences of 
what would happen if the civil rights movement was not forcefully dealt with, few would 
consider direct rule from Britain as a probable outcome of the campaign. There can be little 
doubt that the civil rights movement played a vital role in the downfall of Stormont.  
 The first question I asked in the introduction of this thesis was: 
• How did the unionist politicians perceive the civil rights movement, and how did the 
perception change between 1968 and 1972? 
There were several perceptions of the civil rights movement within the Unionist Party, even at 
the beginning of the disturbances in October 1968. The Prime Minister Terence O’Neill and 
his followers, expressed doubt about the claims from the civil rights movement that Catholics 
were being discriminated against in Northern Ireland. However, O’Neill did not dismiss the 
movement as a false movement. O’Neill felt that the Northern Irish society in some ways was 
backwards, and he had therefore set out to reform the society. Since he did not see the civil 
rights movement as a front movement, and because he wanted to modernise Northern Ireland, 
he had no great inhibitions to giving the civil rights movement some reforms in November 
1968.  
 The reforms coupled with his “crossroad speech” did earn O’Neill some goodwill 
from the civil rights movement, but it alienated a large section of the Protestant community, 
even a section within the Unionist Party. His own Minister of Home Affairs, William Craig, 
expressed opposition to the government’s policies towards the civil rights movement. Craig 
claimed right from the start that the civil rights movement was a front movement for the IRA. 
In addition he did not condone the civil rights movement’s methods of protest, which he felt 
had no place in a democratic society.  
 William Craig was not the only one who expressed scepticism about the civil rights 
movement’s motives. The Minister of Development, Brian Faulkner, said that the 
movement’s real aim was to overthrow the constitution. Faulkner, however, did not criticise 
the government’s reforms straight after the 5th of October 1968, and this separated him from 
Craig. Faulkner did, however, stress that if the campaign was to continue, it would have 
serious effect on the economy.  
   The views of O’Neill, Faulkner and Craig represent three different views of the civil 
rights movement within the Unionist Party. O’Neill was the one who expressed the strongest 
 123 
belief in the sincerity in the movement. Faulkner and Craig both said the movement was a 
front movement, but they would choose different approaches in dealing with the civil rights 
campaign and potential reforms. 
 The perception of the civil rights movement among the moderate section of the 
Unionist Party changed gradually between 1968 and 1972. Still there were some events that 
contributed more to the change of opinion than others. The March in Derry in October 1968 
forced the politicians to take a stand on the civil rights campaign. Another event was the 
Burntollet march organised by the Peoples Democracy in January 1969. Terence O’Neill 
changed his tone after the Peoples Democracy march. He used stronger words to characterise 
the PD than he had used when he spoke of the civil rights movement before the Burntollet 
march. He also felt that the group’s real aim was to cause disorder. This did, however, not 
lead to a change of policy, and O’Neill continued with his efforts to reform Northern Ireland.  
 Faulkner’s perception of the civil rights movement did not change after the Burntollet 
march. His practical approach towards the movement did, however, change somewhat. 
Faulkner resigned from the cabinet after O’Neill announced an inquiry into the reasons for the 
disorder following the events after the 5th of October 1968. Faulkner felt that the conclusion 
of such an inquiry would pinpoint the local election franchise as one of the main reasons for 
the civil rights campaign, and then the government would have no choice but to change it. 
Faulkner proposed instead that they should implement one-man, one-vote right away. He did 
not come to this conclusion because he had accepted the allegations from the civil rights 
movement, but because he felt that it would seem as if the government gave into pressure 
from the movement, if they waited to after the conclusions from the Cameron commission 
were presented. 
 Craig did not change his opinion of the civil rights movement during the years of the 
civil rights campaign. He did say that civil rights movement real aim was to end the union 
with Great Britain, and did this remained his position on this during the civil rights campaign. 
 The change of Prime Minister in May 1969, also demonstrated a change in how the 
unionist government spoke of the civil rights movement. The new Prime Minister, James 
Chichester-Clark, used stronger words to characterise the civil rights movement than O’Neill, 
and thus moved the position of the government closer to that of Faulkner. Nevertheless, 
Chichester-Clark said that there were elements within the civil rights movement that had 
sincere motives, and that he would continue with the reforms started by the O’Neill 
administration. Faulkner joined the government again, and from this point on, he was in 
agreement with the new cabinet’s policies towards the civil rights movement. The fact that 
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Chichester-Clark said that he would continue the reforms, does, however, not mean that 
Chichester-Clark had taken O’Neill’s position towards the civil rights movement. This is 
shown when a section within the Unionist Party withdrew and formed the Alliance Party in 
April 1970. The founders of the Alliance Party felt that the Unionist Party had moved to far 
away from the position of O’Neill.   
When the violence erupted again in July 1969, it affected how the unionist politicians 
perceived the civil rights movement, and thus is one of the events that increased the unionist 
doubt of the civil rights movement’s motives.  Even if the civil rights movement took no part 
in the rioting, it was blamed for the return of violence. This led to an increasing doubt of the 
motives of the movement among the unionist politicians. 
 The event that would remove all doubt within the unionist movement that the civil 
rights movement was a front movement for the IRA among the unionist politicians came in 
October 1970, when NICRA called for people to return to the street when the violence 
plagued the province. This lead the Prime Minister Chichester-Clark to dismiss the entire 
movement as a republican plot against the constitution. Still, the government tried to reason 
with all the moderate sections of the society, but the civil rights movement was from this 
point on seen as a movement with aim to incite violence in an effort to end the union with 
Great Britain. 
I have also explored what the loyalists in Northern Ireland thought of the civil rights 
movement. I asked the question of how the loyalist opposition perceived the civil rights 
movement? The answer to this is that the loyalists saw the civil rights movement entirely as a 
plot against the constitution. Similar to the hardliners in the Unionist Party, they claimed that 
the IRA was behind the campaign. In addition, the loyalist leader Ian Paisley said that the 
Catholic Church and the communists were behind the campaign. The belief that the civil 
rights movement was a plot from the Catholic Church separated the loyalist position 
somewhat from the position of the hardliners in the Unionist Party.   
 The main aim for this thesis has also been to answer how the civil rights movement 
influenced the events leading up to the suspension of Stormont in 1972, by exploring how the 
movement influenced the internal dynamic in the unionist movement. The questions I asked 
in order to explore this were: 
• How did the civil rights movement influence the development of the unionist 
movement and the process leading up to the suspension of the Stormont Parliament in 
March 1972? 
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• In what way did the loyalist perception of the civil rights movement influence the 
unionist government’s room to manoeuvre?  
There is little doubt that the civil rights movement to a large extent instigated the 
events leading up to the suspension of Stormont. There are of course several factors that 
influenced the events that led to direct rule in 1972, and as the situation grew more chaotic, it 
becomes more difficult to sort out which events that came as a result of influence by the civil 
rights movement. I will in this conclusion highlight three points in which the civil rights 
movement’s influence is evident. These points are: 
1. How the civil rights movement’s influenced the split in the Unionist Party, and the 
increasing difference of opinion within the Protestant community. 
2. How the civil rights campaign weakened the unionist government’s position in regard 
to the British government. 
3. How the civil rights movement changed the political language and how politics were 
conducted in Northern Ireland. 
1.  How the civil rights movement influenced the split in the Unionist Party and the 
increasing difference of opinion within the Protestant community. 
Before 1968 almost all Protestant political activity had been concentrated within the 
Unionist Party. The party had a great deal of room for different political views. This would 
change drastically during the years between 1968 and 1972. 
 After the civil rights march on the 5th of October 1968, O’Neill had to take action. 
The reforms presented on the 22nd of November 1968 did go some way in appeasing the civil 
rights movement, but the reforms also alienated a section within the Unionist Party who felt 
that the civil rights movement was an IRA plot, and that the movement should be stopped 
with force, not reforms. The civil rights campaign forced the politicians within the Unionist 
Party to take a stand on the reform package, and thereby bringing to the surface the different 
political views within the party. The reforms caused uproar among the unionist hardliners and 
the loyalist community who felt that O’Neill was betraying their unionist heritage. The 
hardliners within the Unionist Party and the loyalists felt that the civil rights movement 
should be dealt with more force, not reforms.   
William Craig was one of the most outspoken critics against the government’s policies, 
and this cost him his position as Minister of Home affairs in 1968. When the reforms did not 
lead to an end of the violence, but more conflict after the Burntollet march in 1969, O’Neill’s 
position got more vulnerable. His decision to appoint a commission to investigate the causes 
for the unrest, led to Faulkner’s resignation. As the split in the party was growing, O’Neill 
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announced that there would be a general election in February 1969. The election did not result 
in a clear mandate for O’Neill, and his position therefore became more unstable. O’Neill’s 
effort to win over Catholics by promising them reforms did not pan out, and instead he 
alienated a large section of the Protestant community. The Protestant community was thus 
divided as a result of the civil rights movement. The loyalist community expressed a strong 
discontent with O’Neill’s policies towards the civil rights movement, and when this 
discontent moved more and more into the Unionist Party after the Peoples Democracy march 
in January 1969, the opposition against O’Neill grew so strong that he resigned as Prime 
Minister in April 1969.  
After Chichester-Clark took over as Prime Minister, the civil rights movement was 
pushed more and more in the background by the acts of violence that occurred during and 
after the summer of 1969. The movement lost control over the actions of the protesters, and 
could not stop the violence that occurred. The increasing violence made the Prime Minister 
call in the army in an effort to stop the rioting. The decision to call in the army would anger 
the loyalist community, who would come to feel that the army only protected the Catholics, 
thereby increasing the split in the Protestant community.  
Even if the violence was not being committed by the civil rights movement, the 
movement received much of the blame from the unionist politicians. So, when the civil rights 
movement lost momentum due to increased violence, the differences of opinion between the 
unionist politicians grew over how the movement should be dealt with.  
As Chichester-Clark tried to continue with the policy of reform, the Unionist Party 
was falling apart. The umbrella structure of the party could not cope with the new political 
situation facilitated by the civil rights movement. The political landscape changed much as a 
result of the civil rights campaign. The events that followed the civil rights campaign, forced 
the unionist politicians to take a stand towards the civil rights movement and the reforms, and 
the Unionist Party would prove to be unable to handle this new focus on personal political 
conviction. The split in the Protestant community led to the creation of two new political 
parties, the loyalist Democratic Unionist Party, and the moderate unionist Alliance Party. The 
Unionist Party had lost support both to the loyalist side and to the moderate unionist side, and 
struggled to find their place in the new political landscape. In addition the Social Democratic 
and Labour Party was formed as a result of the civil rights campaign.  
The unionist government was not only forced to deal with the civil rights movement, 
and the loyalist movement, they also had to deal with the British government who became 
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more involved in Northern Irish politics as a result of the civil rights campaign. This brings us 
to the next point of the civil right movement’s influence.     
2. How the civil rights campaign weakened the unionist government’s position in 
regard to the British government. 
The civil rights campaign led to an increased British attention towards Northern Irish 
politics. Since the civil rights movement was successful in portraying the image of a 
suppressed Catholic minority, the British government pushed for reforms, and warned of the 
consequences if the reforms were stopped. This put the Northern Irish Prime Minister in a 
squeeze between the British government’s demand for reforms and the loyalists’ demand that 
the government should not succumb to pressure. The effect of the British pressure was in 
some degree felt already during O’Neill’s premiership, but both Chichester-Clark and 
Faulkner would have an even harder time in dealing with the British government without 
appearing to succumb to Westminister pressure. When the army moved into Northern Ireland 
in the summer of 1969, it became more difficult for the Northern Irish Prime Minister to 
profess control, since the army took over many of the law and order responsibilities normally 
reserved for the state. 
Craig was one of those who objected to Westminster’s interference into Northern Irish 
affairs. When the British became more involved in Northern Ireland, Craig’s opinion on the 
constitution changed. His support for an independent Ulster grew as the British presence in 
Northern Ireland increased.     
After the army was called in and up till internment was implemented, the civil rights 
movement lost much of its momentum. This, however, did not mean that the civil rights 
movement lost its influence. When the Cameron report, in September 1969, confirmed the 
allegations from the civil rights movement in the eyes of the British government, it became 
difficult for Chichester-Clark to ignore the complaints or justify the use of stricter measures 
towards the movement.  
As the violence increased, Chichester-Clark asked the British government for more 
troops in order to deal with the violence. When this was not granted he resigned as Prime 
Minister on the 19th of March 1971. He was followed by Faulkner as Prime Minister. 
The civil rights movement moved back into the spotlight after the Faulkner 
government started interning suspected IRA leaders. This act alienated the entire Catholic 
community and gave the civil rights movement a new momentum. The moderate section that 
the Unionist Party had tried to attract, decreased as the violence grew.  
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Even if the government’s policies caused strong discontent in the Catholic community, 
it was a clash between civil rights protesters and the British army that would seal Stormont’s 
faith. On the 30th of January 1972 the British army killed 13 civil rights marchers during a 
civil rights march protesting against internment. The increasing violence made the British 
government demand that the Northern Irish government surrendered the control over the law 
and order responsibilities to the British government. Faulkner refused to comply with this 
demand, and because of this the British government introduced direct rule on the 24th of 
March 1972.  
The British perception of the civil rights movement is not given much attention in this 
thesis. However, further research into how the British politicians and the British media 
perceived the civil rights movement and the unionist respons would increase the 
understanding of the years between 1968 and 1972, and would therefore be an interesting 
topic for future research.    
The civil rights movement changed the political landscape in Northern Ireland. The 
Unionist Party fell apart as a result of the civil rights movement, three new political parties 
was formed. A loyalist, a moderate unionist, and a one Catholic party based upon the platform 
of the civil rights movement, was all established, although for different reasons, as a result of 
the civil rights campaign. With the new political landscape, the way that politics were 
conducted in Northern Ireland changed, and this brings us to the last point of civil rights 
influence: 
3.  How the civil rights movement changed the political language and the way politics 
were conducted in Northern Ireland. 
Before the civil rights campaign, the rule of the Unionist Party had been undisputed, 
and virtually unchallenged. Those who stood on the outside had few possibilities to make 
their voice heard. This would change during the civil rights campaign. As I have shown in the 
section above, the political landscape changed in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1972. 
With the establishment of the new parties and movements, the political language that was 
used by those who stood on the outside of the halls of power changed.  
The civil rights movement’s way of protest was also adopted by other sections in the 
society. Paisley and his loyalist movement started early to use many of the same methods of 
protest, as well as the language that the civil rights movement used. Paisley and the loyalists 
defended their right to protest in the street, even if the protest could lead to disorder. In this, 
Paisley was closer to the point of view of the civil rights movement, than the hardliners in the 
Unionist Party.  
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Another example of how the civil rights movement changed the political language in 
Northern Ireland can be seen when Paisley started calling his campaign against the civil rights 
movement a campaign for “Protestant civil rights.” As the civil rights movement attracted 
attention, Paisley adopted the civil rights claim of discrimination, and Paisley started to say 
that it was the Protestants that were being discriminated against in Northern Ireland. one of 
the explanations for this change of language might be that the civil rights movement’s protest 
had proved to be quite successful in attracting attention and support from the British 
government. The concept of “civil rights” became a political expression for those who stood 
on the outside of the main channels of political influence, with both sides claiming that it was 
their side who were the true victims. 
Craig was one of those who changed his political expression after he was forced out in 
the cold in the Unionist Party. When he formed his own movement, Vanguard, in 1972, he 
based it to a large degree on the structure and method of protest used by the civil rights 
movement. This fact is one of the clearest examples of how the civil rights campaign had 
changed how politics were conducted in Northern Ireland. If we look back at some of the 
statements Craig made after the civil rights march in Derry on the 5th of October 1968, it 
becomes clear how much he had removed himself from his original position. On the 4th of 
December 1968, Craig said this in Stormont: 
I would repeat that whatever political discontent there may be in this country the right way to express 
that discontent is not by organising marches on the scale and on the frequency that we have had in 
recent weeks. It is not in keeping with the whole technique of democracy and everyone of us in this 
House should be prepared to say so.601 
Here he said that the civil rights movement’s way of protest was not in keeping with the 
technique of democracy. His position was quite different when he used these methods to 
express his discontent with the actions of the British government in 1972. At the time when 
the civil rights movement’s protest had come to an end after “Bloody Sunday” in 1972, Craig 
continued with mass rallies, attracting several thousands protesters, to oppose the British 
government intervention in Northern Ireland.  
  The civil rights movement’s influence on the unionist movement was both direct and 
indirect. Direct in the sense that the movement’s protest was the direct reason for the unionist 
government’s reforms, the reason for the increased British attention, and the reasons for the 
changes in the political landscape. But the influence was also indirect because the civil rights 
campaign made it impossible for the unionist government to modernise Northern Ireland 
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without meeting opposition from the loyalist community, who would see most changes as a 
surrender to the civil rights movement. The civil rights protesters and the loyalists stood so far 
apart that the middle ground Terence O’Neill sat out to find in 1968, was unobtainable in the 
years between 1968 and 1972. That ground was not to be found until the peace settlement in 
1998.           
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Abstract 
Denne oppgaven omhandler hvordan det nord-irske unionistpartiet oppfattet den nord-irske 
borgerrettsbevegelsen i perioden mellom 1968-1972. Gjennom en analyse av unionistenes 
oppfattelse og behandling av borgerrettsbevegelsen har jeg vist hvordan borgerrettsbevegelsen 
påvirket hendelsene som tilslutt skulle føre til direkte styre fra Storbritannia i 1972. 
 Jeg sammenlignet de ulike synspunktene innad i unionist partiet, og hva som skilte 
disse synspunktene fra de lojalistiske grupperingene i det protestantiske samfunnet i Nord 
Irland. Gjennom denne analysen viste jeg hvordan borgerrettsbevegelsen i stor grad påvirket 
den økende avstanden innad i det protestantiske samfunnet. Borgerrettighetskampen førte 
også til større innblanding fra den britiske regjeringen, og dette førte til at posisjonen til den 
nord-irske statsministeren ble mer utsatt. Borgerrettsbevegelsen gjorde at reformer som 
kanskje kunne blitt gjennomført uten store protester, av lojalistene ble sett på som en 
forræderi mot den protestantiske arven og protestantiske rettigheter i Nord Irland. Jeg har 
også vist hvordan borgerrettsbevegelsen førte til en forandring i det politiske landskapet og i 
det politiske språket som ble brukt, og hvordan de som sto på utsiden av maktapparatet i 
stadig større grad begynte i større grad å bruke språket og slagordene til borgerrettsbevegelsen 
for å uttrykke seg. 
